Author: Sebastian Bojemski PhD
During a conference recently organised by the Warsaw Enterprise Institute, the chair of one of the panels asked: is the US really pivoting towards Asia? At the time, there was nothing to suggest that this might not be the case. This was evident both from the National Security Strategy 2025 and from one of its cornerstones, the 2021 book The Strategy of Denial. The latter work, authored by Elbridge A. Colby, who currently holds the position of Under Secretary for Policy – one of the key roles in the Department of War – presents the realist school’s approach to the US’s position in the world and the challenges facing this superpower. However, regardless of who within the US administration contributed to the latest conflict in the Middle East, it is worth taking a look at the book, which remains relevant due to its thesis – backed by macroeconomic data – regarding a potential clash between the US and China.[1]
The 46-year-old Colby has spent most of his professional life in the US administration. He has worked in, amongst others, the Departments of Defense and State, as well as in the analytical division of the US intelligence services. In Donald Trump’s previous administration, he was also jointly responsible for drafting the 2018 National Security Strategy, although at that time he held a lower-ranking position – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – which is comparable to that of a department director in the Polish administration. Together with Wess Mitchell, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs during Trump’s first term, he founded the think tank Marathon Initiative in 2019, whose aim is to support the administration in the context of global great power rivalry. Unlike his partner, who has four books to his name, Colby is the author of the single book that is the subject of this review.
The theoretical basis of the strategy of displacement
In his study, the author operates within the framework of the hegemonic theory developed by John Mearsheimer and presented in the book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. According to this theory, the US, for whom three regions of the world matter – Europe, the Middle East and Asia – must strive for a balance of power in each of them. The absence of such a balance may, in fact, lead to the rise of one state’s power and result in it dominating the region. Such a state is termed a regional hegemon. The hegemon’s further objective on its path to power is to compete with a hegemon from another region and to strive to deprive it of that position. According to Mearsheimer, the only regional hegemon in modern history is the USA, which occupies a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. Intervention in Europe during the First and Second World Wars was intended to prevent German regional hegemony. The Cold War period, in turn, was aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from achieving regional power.
Based on the theory outlined above, Colby points out that Asia is the key region today, and that China poses the greatest challenge to the US. Turning to the question of Europe, he does not see Russia as a potential rival due to its weak economic foundation, which is insufficient to build a military power capable of posing a threat to Europe. At the same time, he acknowledges that the countries of the Eastern Flank are threatened by Russia. However, under certain circumstances, he sees Russia as a partner in an anti-Chinese coalition: even a Russia that adopted a more moderate, less threatening stance towards Europe, whilst focusing on containing Chinese power, would be a boon to an anti-hegemonic coalition. In the short term, there is also no threat from Germany, but even if there were, this would be mitigated through cooperation with other European states.
Virtually all of Colby’s arguments relate to Asia, China and Taiwan. For, as he himself stated, the evidence increasingly points to the fact that China has shifted its approach towards achieving hegemony in the region or has been pursuing these aspirations for some time, with the difference that this has recently become more apparent. Given that Asia’s share – at the time of writing – of global production and service sales stood at 40% and that two-thirds of economic growth was generated there, China’s development potential was, and remains, enormous. However, whilst the US leads China in terms of nominal GDP, China ranks first in terms of GDP calculated at purchasing power parity. This was already the case when the book was written. Colby treats economic issues as fundamental, because the economy directly leads to an increase in military strength, which is the ultimate argument in international relations. Therefore, China – in its quest for power – will seek to create its own economic bloc, which will result in the consolidation of its own economic position, the weakening of its rival for dominance (namely the US), and the attainment of regional power status.
How to contain China?
The key issue in Colby’s work is the formation and defence of an anti-hegemonic, i.e. anti-Chinese, coalition. This could include South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, Japan and India. The terms of membership would, however, vary. The anti-hegemonic coalition could utilise the format of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD): the US, Japan, Australia and India. The essence of the book lies in its description of the process of establishing military alliances and the US defence perimeter, as well as an analysis of the best-case scenario for China regarding the strategy and capabilities for the defence of Taiwan – a key location on the political and economic map of South-East Asia.
When building coalitions, and particularly alliances, Colby draws attention to the issue of the US’s credibility as a partner. In discussing the issue of varying degrees of credibility, he puts forward the thesis that some alliances – that is, US military commitments – need not be honoured if they conflict with other, higher-priority commitments. Especially since there are too many of these commitments: “In fact, America is almost certainly overburdened by the promises it has made, having failed to properly anticipate the full scale of China’s rise. The United States has undertaken a vast number of commitments over the past 75 years. According to one estimate, around 50 countries are beneficiaries of American security promises.” (p. 108) The motivation for such decisions was – according to the author – a genuine need, but also, since the collapse of the USSR, a belief in enduring unilateralism and the end of history. Among the misguided decisions, the author cited the expansion of NATO to include the Baltic states as “contributing nothing to the alliance”. The entire argument concerning credibility concludes with a significant statement, stemming from earlier reflections: the United States should make every effort and fulfil its commitments to the defence of these states to the very end, even if this is costly, risky or arouses resentment. At the same time, it should jealously guard its ability to fulfil these promises, even at the cost of limiting commitments in other regions.
Colby defines the Asian defence perimeter, i.e. the territory for which the US is willing to fight. It is centred in South-East Asia, including the islands, and is linked to alliances that the US has formed or may form. It does not encompass the entire potential anti-hegemonic coalition, as it excludes India, which does not require a defence alliance with the US. In turn, the author of the book considers that the membership of New Zealand, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is irrelevant to the anti-hegemonic coalition. At the same time, he assumes that, due to conflicts with their neighbours, Cambodia and Pakistan will be partners of China. Colby defined the defence perimeter in accordance with the principle that the United States should exclude from the coalition, or limit their significance as allies, those states that cannot be defended if their vulnerability to a potential attack is sufficiently high. This applies to Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. He notes, however, that it is in the US’s interest for Central Asia to remain independent of Chinese or Russian domination.
The key strategy the US should adopt in its rivalry with China is one of thwarting China’s attempts to create faits accomplis against members of the anti-hegemonic coalition. That is, the most likely form of achieving hegemony in the region. This is one of several approaches that the US’s Asian rival could theoretically employ.
Predicted courses of action by Beijing
The first is the punishment method, which involves inflicting pain and losses on the target state. However, it excludes a direct military attack aimed at seizing territory or forcing capitulation. The punishment method employs sanctions, travel restrictions, supply blockades, but also military measures: cyberattacks and bombing. However, the punishment method is effective only if applied to a politically isolated state. It may therefore prove ineffective against a member state of an anti-hegemonic coalition that can count on allied support.
Another method of achieving hegemony is conquest. This usually involves killing or driving the enemy’s forces out of their territory, followed by its occupation and exploitation. An alternative is to establish supervisory control over the defeated party. This form of domination is characteristic of states striving for hegemony, in this case China. Exercising this form of control requires the seizure and occupation of key territory, that is, the source of a state’s political, economic and military power.
If the aggressor is not strong enough to conquer and establish control, it is left with the method of fait accompli, that is, seizing part of the territory and discouraging the victim from attempting a counter-offensive, and persuading them through deterrence to accept the new state of affairs. This is a strategy employed by weaker powers and does not involve forcing the victim to relinquish essential resources. The fait accompli method requires the aggressor to hold a local military advantage. It also involves persuading the victim not to attempt to reclaim the occupied territory and reinforcing one’s own military presence and defences. This method is most effective in border territories. In Europe, we have examples of the fait accompli method being used against Ukraine in 2014. Currently, Russia is creating the threat of applying this approach to the Baltic states, NATO members with the weakest demographic, economic and military potential. And as if that were not enough, they are in an unfavourable geographical position that hinders effective defence.
The author sets out the premises for specific scenarios of defence against a fait accompli: thwarting the seizure of a key territory and thwarting the retention of that territory. He assumes that preventing the occupation of Taiwan does not end the conflict, which transforms into a limited war, during which two key principles apply: limitations on means and objectives, and a reduction in the objectives of the war. The burden of escalation during the conflict is to be borne by China, which would increase the coalition’s resolve and discourage non-aligned states from siding with China. The conditions for ending the war or de-escalation must be acceptable to the US. He notes, however, that after a limited war, the defeated side must be left with something, otherwise the losing side will have no motivation to end the conflict. Colby does not, however, believe that defence by denial is 100 per cent effective, given China’s power and Taiwan’s proximity. Instead, he points to a potential sequence of events following China’s capture of Taiwan, which would then turn its attention towards the Philippines, Vietnam and other targets in South-East Asia.
Tools for implementing the strategy of containment and the outlook for the eastern flank
Colby highlights the need to strengthen existing alliances, outlining the reasons why the US should be involved in the defence of Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea and Japan. He also notes that the integration of these countries’ defence strategies and the deployment of forces would, from the US perspective, significantly facilitate preparations for achieving this objective. It is likely for this reason that, in July 2025, he attempted to compel the governments of Australia and Japan to issue a declaration regarding the role of these countries in a potential conflict over Taiwan.
What is particularly interesting from a Polish perspective is the role assigned to Europe. The purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance is to counter the establishment of Russian hegemony on the Old Continent. NATO, that is, the European partners, has great potential from the US perspective. This is despite the fact that its members include countries whose territories are difficult to defend and are not significant to the alliance’s potential. Here, Colby is referring to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
But for this to happen, European states must strengthen their military capabilities, having the economic and demographic foundations to do so. Here, Germany is the main partner, and NATO’s real potential, for economic reasons, must – in Colby’s view – rely on them. However, if European nations are unwilling to arm themselves to build deterrence capabilities, then the US may leave Europe to its own devices: the United States may not fill the gap created in the eastern part of NATO as a result of Europeans’ reluctance to intensify their efforts towards their own defence. In fact, according to the thesis I put forward in this book, the United States should not fill this gap. From a Polish perspective, this sounds ominous, especially as Germany, which is Europe’s most important country, faces fundamental problems with expanding its army. One example is the inability to assemble an armoured brigade to be stationed in Lithuania.
According to the author’s theory, the presence of NATO troops in the Eastern Flank states appears crucial in view of Russia’s possible actions. The most likely form of action is the fait accompli method. Colby believes that allowing the occupation of the Baltic states and eastern Poland, and the consolidation of Russian forces in these areas, is a path leading to the escalation of the conflict, ultimately reaching the level of a tactical nuclear strike. Therefore, NATO should be capable of launching a swift counterattack in these areas.
Europe’s deterrence build-up is intended to protect the US from a premature outbreak of conflict in this region. For the US, a negative scenario would be a reduction in capabilities related to the conflict over Taiwan due to an earlier conflict on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Furthermore, the author states that the most stressful variant of such a simultaneous war scenario – and thus the one with the strongest impact on the development, tactical position and combat readiness of military forces – would most likely be a simultaneous war with China and Russia, in which the conflict with Russia would begin first. Earlier, however, he emphasises that assistance to European allies can only be provided if the US is certain it can defend Taiwan.
Generally speaking, in the US’s grand strategy, the role of Europe – whether federal or sovereign – is to support the anti-China coalition being constructed by the US. A Europe of sovereign states is the better option, as the US would not need to become involved in the region to counterbalance a potential hegemon on the continent. Should such a Europe prove unable to support the US in its policy towards China, the US will begin to support the integrationist trend, even at the cost of worsening US-EU relations. One can therefore see a rather utilitarian approach on the part of the American strategist towards the Old Continent. The British experienced this first-hand when, last year, Colby told them to withdraw their aircraft carrier from the Pacific, as their area of responsibility is Europe.
Colby sums up the expected effect of increasing NATO’s capabilities by stating: by clearly emphasising both US restraint and the futility of weakening NATO, this approach should reduce Moscow’s interest in directing its attention and efforts westwards and make it see the threat to its autonomy from China in a clearer light.
The Strategy of Denial by Elbridge A. Colby is a kind of mind map of the man responsible for key issues in US security policy. It clearly sets out his vision, and when compared with the National Security Strategy 2025 and the National Defense Strategy 2026, it should be regarded as the intellectual foundation for these state documents. Published in 2021 in the US and in 2023 in Poland, it makes it clear that no one should be asking any longer whether the US pivot to Asia will take place.
Confrontation with reality
Today, however, one might ask: how does this relate to an attack on Iran? After all, Colby wrote that in a land war, Iran stands no chance against its neighbouring countries, and the US has no strategic objective to invade that country. He emphasised that any potential action against Iran must not compromise the US’s ability to defend Taiwan. Given the US’s overwhelming superiority in the nuclear sphere, he also saw no significant threat even if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. Though he acknowledged that this was not irrelevant to American interests and that efforts should be made to prevent Iran from doing so.
Another question is whether Colby’s work is still relevant today? Or has there been, or will there be, some other shift? It seems that the reasons for which this book was written have not disappeared. China will continue to strive for dominance in Asia, and Colby will continue to view US security through the prism of regional hegemony.
What will certainly change is the stock levels of the US armed forces and the pace at which they are replenished.
From a Polish perspective, clarity regarding the terms on which the US will be engaged in Europe is essential. The repeatedly voiced expectations regarding the expansion of Germany’s military capabilities pose a challenge to Poland’s historical memory. How can one reconcile the need to expand NATO’s conventional forces—whose purpose is deterrence, but also the defence of the Eastern Flank—with the experiences of over 80 years ago? The Baltic states do not face this problem, unlike the Poles. Following the author’s line of thought, if Germany transforms its economic power into military might, it will naturally, in the long term, seek hegemony in the region. In that case, we can expect Elbridge A. Colby’s successor to write a book on how to defend Europe against German hegemony.
[1] E. A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defence in an Age of Great Power Conflict, Warsaw 2023.
Photo: MSC/Zappner
