We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
The BSDA 2026 trade fair kicks off in Bucharest
From May 13–15, 2026, the ROMAERO exhibition complex in Bucharest will host the 10th anniversary edition of the Black Sea Defense and Aerospace (BSDA) trade fair, celebrating the 20th years of the event—one of the largest defense industry events in Central and Eastern Europe and the most important in Romania. Organizers expect over 550 exhibitors from 36 countries, more than 30,000 visitors, and over 350 representatives of government authorities and the armed forces. The anniversary edition focuses on modern battlefield technologies, including unmanned aerial systems, anti-drone measures, and applications of artificial intelligence in defense.
Key exhibitors will include companies competing for contracts in the Romanian market, which is significantly supported by loans from the EU’s SAFE program, such as Rheinmetall, Lockheed Martin, Hanwha Aerospace, Leonardo, the WB Group, and Airbus. The BSDA trade fair serves as a barometer of procurement activity in Romania, which remains at a high level despite the current political crisis. The May 2026 edition takes on particular significance in light of Romania’s growing importance as a regional logistics and procurement hub.
Polish-Slovak agreement on the export of the Borsuk IFV
The Polish Armaments Group signed an agreement with the Slovak company EVPÚ regarding the integration of the Turra 30 remotely controlled turret system with the Borsuk infantry fighting vehicle. The agreement was signed on March 3, 2026, during the Polish-Slovak Defense-Industrial Dialogue in Bratislava. The announcement was made by PGZ Vice President Marcin Idzik, who noted that the new configuration featuring a different turret type will soon be publicly unveiled. The demonstration is scheduled to take place in early May at the IDEB 2026 exhibition in Bratislava, while PGZ representatives cite Saudi Arabia and Vietnam, among others, as promising export markets.
PGZ’s experience to date highlights the difficulties in exporting large land-based platforms, which are subject to numerous restrictions on individual components, growing domestic market demand, and the lack of a dynamic, long-term export strategy. Critical voices have also emerged within the Polish expert community regarding the replacement of the domestically developed ZSSW-30 unmanned turret—which had been under development for many years—with a Slovak component. The signing of the agreement in the presence of the Polish and Slovak defense ministers in Bratislava—during the Polish-Slovak Defense-Industrial Dialogue—demonstrates the continued close bilateral relations in the defense sector.
Dimitar Stoyanov is Bulgaria’s new defense minister in Rumen Radev’s government
On May 8, 2026, the Bulgarian parliament approved the composition of the new government led by former President Rumen Radev. These were the eighth parliamentary elections in five years, marking the culmination of a long-standing political crisis that had resulted in a series of short-lived governments. The post of Minister of Defense was given to Col. (Res.) Dimitar Stoyanov—an Air Force officer with over 25 years of service, who previously served as Secretary General to the President (2017–2022), interim Minister of Defense in caretaker cabinets (2022–2023), and Secretary for Security and Defense in President Radev’s administration (2023–2026).
Stojanov’s appointment is of particular significance in Radew’s cabinet, as Radew is a major general in the reserves and a former commander of the Bulgarian Air Force. The former president won the parliamentary elections primarily on a platform of fighting corruption and the oligarchic model of governance—his pro-Russian stance and skepticism toward Sofia’s direct involvement in the war in Ukraine were part of his political profile, but not the main focus of his campaign. During his previous terms, Stoyanov continued military support for Ukraine despite political controversies and implemented advanced modernization projects. However, the ongoing consolidation of power by circles skeptical of Kyiv poses a risk of a gradual shift in policy. At the same time, Bulgarian defense companies remain involved in supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces—including through trade in large-caliber ammunition—and the new government is unlikely to seek to block these transactions.
Dismissal of the latvian minister of defense
On May 10, Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Andris Sprūdss. She cited oversights in the deployment and proper operation of anti-drone systems, which were intended to protect Latvia from further incursions by foreign drones, as the reason for this decision.
It was irrelevant in this case that on the night of May 6–7, it was not Russian but Ukrainian combat drones that appeared over Latvian territory, flying in from deep within Russian territory. They struck the “East-West Transit” oil storage facility in Rēzekne, located in Latgale just 63 km from the border with the Pskov Oblast. Four tanks were damaged, a brief fire broke out, and there were no casualties—the tanks turned out to be empty. Minister Sprūds rejected the accusations, accusing the prime minister of political haste and falsely claiming that she had not informed him or his party, the Progressives, of the decision. The new head of the Ministry of National Defense is Latvian Army Colonel Raivis Melnis, previously the prime minister’s advisor on military cooperation, with experience gained during a mission in Ukraine.
The real background to the dismissal appears to be tensions within the three-party governing coalition, with the incident in Rēzekne serving merely as a pretext. This is evidenced, among other things, by the choice of Andris Sprūds’ successor. He is not a politician, but an officer without his own political base, previously Prime Minister Siliņa’s personal advisor. Replacing a civilian politician with a loyal military figure from the prime minister’s inner circle signifies a consolidation of control over the ministry. The ministerial change can also be viewed in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in the fall of 2026, when defense and security issues may become a factor influencing a potential victory. Nevertheless, a gap in Latvia’s air defense exists, and further similar incidents can be expected in the future.
Chinese citizen detained on espionage charges in Norway
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has detained a Chinese citizen on charges of espionage related to strategic space infrastructure in Andøya, northern Norway. A spaceport is located there, providing access to polar and sun-synchronous orbits, which allow satellites to fly over the entire globe, including the Russian part of the Arctic. A company registered in Singapore, which purchased property on Andøya in April 2026, is linked to the suspect’s activities. The company also operated in the municipality of Vågå, where a search was also conducted. According to the PST’s assessment, the aim of these activities was an attempt to install a ground receiver capable of intercepting data transmitted by satellites in polar orbit.
Andøya is not a random location on the map of Norway. In addition to the Norwegian spaceport, there is a military base there where the first US Space Force satellite station outside the United States is being built, designed for early warning against Russian cruise missiles. The facility also supports Norway’s AOS program—Arctic Ocean Surveillance—and serves as the planned base for the Norwegian Armed Forces’ long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. Attempts to gain direct access to this strategic complex are one of the obvious intelligence objectives for both China and Russia. The detention of the Chinese citizen is likely the result of an earlier alert to Norwegian counterintelligence by local authorities, who had noticed unusual activity by a company registered in Singapore.
Northern Strike 26 artillery exercises
In May 2026, the multinational Northern Strike 26 artillery exercises are taking place in Finland. The exercises are taking place at the Vuosanka training ground in the municipality of Kuhmo, just 70 km from the Russian border, with the participation of the U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, Norway, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania. A total of 640 soldiers are participating, and today (May 12) they are practicing artillery, mortar, and tactical fire. The most important phase of the Northern Strike 26 exercises began on May 11. Its goal is to assess the progress made since the previous exercises and to test the allies’ readiness under conditions as close as possible to a real battlefield. The exercises are scheduled to last practically until the end of May. At the same time, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced naval exercises in the waters of the Gulf of Finland along the Virolahti–Hamina–Kotka stretch, in the immediate vicinity of the border with Russia.
The exercises currently underway at the Vuosanka training ground are primarily operational in nature, and to a lesser extent demonstrative. Nine NATO countries are testing the actual interoperability of artillery systems in forested and marshy terrain—an environment that would be decisive in a potential conflict on this flank. The range of participants—from Estonia to France, from Norway to Hungary—shows that the Alliance is practicing allied cooperation and interoperability. The synchronization with naval exercises in the Gulf of Finland along the Virolahti–Hamina–Kotka stretch is no coincidence. The simultaneous engagement of land and naval forces at two critical points along the border with Russia tests the ability to coordinate in both domains simultaneously—a scenario that has been taken seriously in Finland’s defense planning for years. The Russian side, through Ambassador Kuznetsov, confirmed that the fact of these exercises will be factored into Russian military planning. Moscow’s actual response may involve intensified hybrid operations.
Belarus’s new State Armament Program for 2026–2030
Defense minister Viktor Khrenin announced that Lukashenko has approved the approach to the new state armament program for the current five-year period, covering the years 2026–2030. The document sets out several key priorities, including the development of systems to counter unmanned aerial vehicles, strengthening air defense, improving the resilience of the command system, and further modernizing the ground forces. Chrenin emphasized that countering drones remains one of the major global trends and that Belarus must have an effective anti-drone system.
The armament program formalizes Belarus’s transition from the status of a “post-Soviet army” to the role of a specialized component of the Union State, focused on air defense and counter-UAV operations rather than large-scale ground operations. The priorities are chosen to increase interoperability with the Russian Federation—particularly in air defense, command networks, and the unmanned domain—which makes Belarus a key node in the Russian security system, but at the same time further limits its strategic autonomy
Reserve officers in the Belarusian Armed Forces—a “quiet mobilization”?
In mid-April, Lukashenko signed a decree calling up reserve officers for active duty, which was presented as part of a planned strengthening of the army’s personnel.
The call-up of reserve officers increases the number of personnel in command and staff positions without a formal declaration of mobilization, thereby limiting political and propaganda costs. From the perspective of the security system, this means increased flexibility for the Belarusian Armed Forces—the state gains a larger number of trained officers capable of directing both military operations and support for security forces in the event of an internal crisis.
Belarus-Russia: 2026–2030 Strategic Military Partnership Program
Belarus and Russia have approved the 2026–2030 Strategic Military Partnership Program and the 2026 defense ministry cooperation plan, which includes 164 joint projects, more than half of which are practical in nature. It is emphasized that Russia remains the main supplier of arms to Minsk, and over 400 Belarusian military specialists are being trained at Russian training centers; two reinforced armored battalions and several dozen instructors from Belarus have also been prepared.
The partnership program serves as an “overarching framework” for Belarus’s defense plan and armaments program—in reality, key decisions regarding training priorities, structure, and equipment are made in Moscow. The intensity of joint ventures (164 in 2026 alone) demonstrates that military integration goes far beyond mere symbolism. Belarus is drawn into a process of constant exercises, training, and preparations based on Russian scenarios.
FSB: “Foreign Terrorists” – The case of a German citizen and an accomplice from central Asia
In April, the FSB reported the arrest of a German citizen and a citizen of a Central Asian country, accused of planning an attack on a security facility in the Stavropol Krai. According to the FSB’s account, the woman was to carry a backpack containing explosives, the detonation of which was intended to cause the maximum number of casualties among law enforcement officers; she herself was reportedly unaware of the full role she was to play and could have become one of the victims.
In this way, the FSB is constructing a narrative of “international terrorism directed from Kyiv,” in which citizens of Western and Asian countries become tools of Ukrainian intelligence services. This expands the scope for justifying restrictions on foreigners, tightening visa regulations, and increasing the operational freedom of security services along the border, which has a direct impact on the structure of Russia’s internal security system.
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs: rise in serious crimes and staffing crisis (2025 Data)
Analyses based on Ministry of Internal Affairs data cited by Russian-language media indicate that in the first quarter of 2025, the number of serious crimes in Russia increased by 13.6% year-over-year, to approximately 170,800 cases, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs was short more than 170,000 officers (approximately 18–19% of positions).
Although the data is somewhat older but officially confirmed, it provides an important backdrop to the current situation. Regional police units operate with chronic staff shortages, while violent crime is on the rise. This increases the relative importance of other security forces (Rosgvardia, FSB) in maintaining order in the regions and contributes to the further militarization of internal security at the expense of the traditional police.
Russia: Amendment to the Defense Act – “Protection of Citizens” as a clause for extraterritorial intervention
The State Duma adopted in the first reading a draft amendment to the “On Defense” Act and related regulations, which expand the list of situations permitting the use of the Russian Armed Forces outside the country’s borders. The new regulations provide for the possibility of using the military, among other things, to “protect citizens of the Russian Federation” and persons under Russian jurisdiction if they are detained, arrested, or subject to criminal proceedings abroad that Moscow deems unlawful or politically motivated. The explanatory memorandum to the draft emphasizes that the aim of the changes is to “strengthen the protection of Russian citizens against unlawful actions by hostile states” and to “counteract campaigns of Russophobia” on the international stage, while the list of actions deemed hostile remains deliberately broad and imprecise.
The new “protection of citizens” clause becomes a universal pretext for the use of military force beyond the borders of the Russian Federation—functionally similar to the former formula of “protection of the Russian-speaking population,” but this time explicitly enshrined in the Defense Act. In practice, nearly any case involving the detention, extradition, or trial of a Russian citizen or a person subject to Russian jurisdiction can be framed as a limited-scale casus belli, ranging from the demonstrative deployment of a small military contingent to covert operations by the GRU, FSB, or special forces presented as “protection missions.” For third countries, especially those bordering Russia and NATO members, this means an increased risk of hybrid escalation. Any legal action against a Russian citizen—from the arrest of a spy to the filing of war crimes charges—can be exploited by Moscow as a justification for political and military pressure, intimidation of the judiciary or the prison system, or attempts to force the release of detainees. This provides the Kremlin with a legal cover for rescue, diversionary-sabotage, and “stabilization” operations outside Russian territory, while maintaining the narrative of defending its own citizens rather than conducting aggressive external actions.
Russia: strengthening social benefits for combatants
On April 25, 2026, Putin signed three laws expanding the system of social benefits for combatants, veterans, and family members of the fallen—including benefits, tax breaks, and legal status.
Although formally this is a “social welfare” measure, in practice it is an element of legal reinforcement for mobilization: the system of incentives and guarantees is intended to maintain the flow of personnel to the regular armed forces, volunteer formations, and broadly defined “participants in operations,” including certain special forces units. Combined with the expansion of the grounds for deploying the army abroad, this creates a framework within which the state can conduct long-term special and expeditionary operations while maintaining a minimum level of personnel loyalty thanks to a package of privileges
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- Michał Dworczyk, Chairman of the Program Council of the Eastern Flank Institute, gave interviews on RMF FM and Radio WNET, commenting on the necessity of reforming the Territorial Defense Forces and the need to introduce mandatory military training in Poland. Link to the interview on RMF FM, link to interview on Radio WNET.
- In a broadcast on Radio WNET, Gen. Jarosław Gromadziński argues that Poland should move away from the narrow discussion of compulsory military service and start talking about universal service to the state. In his view, every citizen should have a duty to contribute to national security—whether in the military, police, civil guard, civil defense, or public administration. link to the interview on Radio WNET .
- Former Polish ambassador to NATO Tomasz Szatkowski commented on the WOT 2.0 study presented by the Eastern Flank Institute at the Defence24pl Conference in Warsaw: quote: “WOT is, in essence, a very good and important project, regardless of the mistakes and distortions that can occur in any organization. One of the most important achievements (contrary to the initial blind criticism) of the previous two governments and two Ministers of National Defense, which, fortunately, has not been thrown in the trash today. However, as with any project, its objectives and implementation methods must be reviewed over time. Kudos to the authors of the report on this topic @EFI_IWF, and to the WOT commander for engaging in a public discussion with the authors during the conference @Defence24pl.”
