We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Italy is sending additional tactical aircraft to Romania following a drone incident
Italy has deployed approximately 100 troops and multi-role aircraft to Romania, with the aim of training Romanian forces and strengthening their ability to counter drone threats. According to the daily La Repubblica, the mission had been planned earlier, but its launch was accelerated by the incident on May 29, when a Russian drone crashed in Galați. The operation, which differs from standard NATO air patrols, is to be conducted from the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base and is expected to last about a month; the arrival of Italian troops is scheduled for June 15, and training in countering unmanned aerial vehicles is to take place at a base near Constanța. The mission is to be supplemented by combat aircraft and—possibly—unmanned platforms as well.
The Italian decision fits into an increasingly common pattern of Western engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. It goes beyond the established air policing missions and responds to the growing number of incidents involving unmanned aerial vehicles. In the case of Romania, we are dealing with a series of airspace violations by Russian unmanned aerial vehicles operating along the border with Ukraine. The use of tactical aviation to counter UAVs (e.g., the Geran-2 type, which crashed in Galați and injured two civilians) is a measure with a relatively high degree of flexibility, though it remains very costly in terms of cost-effectiveness relative to the objective.
Romania is expanding its fleet of Vector unmanned aerial vehicles as part of one of the first projects funded by SAFE
The German company Quantum Systems has been selected by the Romanian Ministry of National Defense to supply additional Vector unmanned reconnaissance systems for observation missions, as part of projects funded by the EU’s SAFE credit facility. The new contract expands the Romanian Armed Forces’ existing fleet of Vectors and complements the co-production program underway in the country. Acting Minister of Defense Radu Miruță emphasized that the contracted systems supplement equipment already in service and the ongoing joint production project.
The contract is part of Minister Miruță’s active procurement policy, in which he consistently leverages favorable budgetary conditions and high levels of SAFE funding (Romania will commit over €16 billion under the instrument), with an emphasis on local production. Another contract for Quantum Systems also fits into the increasingly dynamic growth of the German company and the entire local drone sector—this is the result of several years of intensive investment and efforts, including those by the German government.
Bulgaria suspends services for U.S. aircraft following a visa dispute with Trump
Bulgaria’s new Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated that after the end of June, U.S. military aircraft will no longer be able to use Sofia’s “Vasil Levski” Airport for stopovers and refueling, after the United States failed to approve visa-free travel for Bulgarian citizens. Radev said that during a conversation with President Donald Trump, he requested the lifting of the visa requirement but did not receive a positive response, and announced that he would extend the authorization only until the end of June to give allies time to relocate. The aircraft—including KC-135 Stratotanker refueling aircraft and C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft—have been stationed in Sofia since mid-February and significantly supported at least the first phase of the strikes on Iran (logistically).
The decision illustrates an attempt to link the issue of access to defense infrastructure with bilateral political demands (visa abolition) and the new government’s use of the leverage provided by the limited number of alternative bases in the region in the event of a war with Iran. The stance of the new Bulgarian government contrasts with earlier actions taken by Bucharest or Warsaw, which emphasize maintaining their role as attractive logistics hubs for Washington.
Czech ammunition initiative for Ukraine loses half its donors after government change
Following the change of government in the Czech Republic, the number of countries co-financing the Prague-led initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine has fallen by half—from 18 to 9—President Petr Pavel said in an interview with the Financial Times. This mechanism has so far accounted for up to 50% of all large-caliber ammunition deliveries to Ukraine, and since 2024 has facilitated the transfer of over 4 million rounds. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš criticized the initiative during his campaign, pointing to a lack of transparency, and is now emphasizing the priority of domestic needs, including support for citizens facing higher energy costs following the war in Iran; however, the government has backed away from plans to withdraw from the program. Michal Strnad, CEO of the Czechoslovak Group, assessed that the initiative is still active but has slowed down, and some partners are purchasing ammunition directly from manufacturers. The contracted volume for 2026 is approximately 1 million rounds, which is about 44% less than the 1.8 million delivered in 2025.
The erosion of the initiative reflects a growing political dispute in the Czech Republic, encompassing issues critical to international security policy. The problems with the ammunition initiative coincide with an attempt to expand the Czechoslovak Group’s business potential.
For Poland, the problems with the ammunition initiative have dual significance: first, the matter potentially concerns the ammunition security of the entire eastern flank and the continuity of supplies to Ukraine, where interruptions directly impact the operational situation on the front lines. Second, should the Polish government decide to increase orders and new manufacturers emerge, this creates potential opportunities for the Polish defense industry.
Belarus: Intensified Exercises and Building Technological Sovereignty
In May 2026, the Belarusian Armed Forces conducted three related command-staff exercises: May 12–14 with command bodies and technical support units under the direction of Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments Gen. Andrei Fedin, May 24–26, focusing on planning the use of territorial defense (TD) with a particular emphasis on counter-drone operations; and May 26–28, involving command bodies and rear security units, conducted for the first time in a practical setting at rear facilities. The general direction of the reforms calls for accelerating work on technological sovereignty, with an emphasis on electronic warfare (EW), drones (UAVs), and the implementation of recommendations from the recent combat readiness inspection.
The May series indicates that Minsk is building a coherent, layered defense system: from the Territorial Defense Forces with an anti-drone component, through reinforced technical and logistical support, to its own capabilities in WRE and UAVs, which reduces dependence on Russian supplies “at the tactical level,” but at the same time better prepares Belarus to function as a support base for Russian operations in the western direction. From the perspective of Poland and NATO, this means that the Belarusian army—even with limited quantitative capabilities — is increasingly learning to replicate the “Ukrainian” model of drone and EW use and is strengthening the resilience of its own rear, which increases the risk for countries on the eastern flank in sub-threshold crisis scenarios as well as in the event of kinetic operations.
The Russian-Belarusian war narrative – forum in the Moscow Region
On May 26–29, 2026, the first International Security Forum was held in the Moscow Region under the auspices of the Russian Federation Security Council, with delegations from over 140 countries in attendance. On May 28, Alexander Wolfovich, Secretary of the State Council of the Security Council of Belarus, stated that Europe is “openly preparing for war,” and that Western strategic planning documents cite the year 2030 as the date of a potential conflict. He pointed to the reform of NATO’s eastern flank from battalion to brigade level, the expansion of military infrastructure along the Russian-Belarusian borders, and exercises simulating nuclear strikes on the territory of both countries.
The forum is the Kremlin’s first instrument of this kind aimed at building an alternative security architecture and legitimizing the narrative of a “siege” of Russia and Belarus. For Poland, it is crucial that Wolfowicz’s words—based in part on actual facts (the expansion of the BFG, infrastructure)—are woven into a propaganda context justifying Russia’s own militarization and instrumentalizing NATO exercises as a pretext for escalation.
Belarus: mobilization of territorial forces and the national militia in the Vitebsk Region
On May 31, 2026, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense launched a command-staff exercise involving the territorial forces of the Lepel and Chashniki districts (Vitebsk region), scheduled for May 31 through June 2, 2026. Officers from district military commissariats, reservists called up from the reserve, militia officers, and volunteers from “national militia” units are participating in the maneuvers. According to a statement from the ministry, “the main focus will be on the use of territorial forces in conjunction with internal affairs agencies and units of the National Militia (National Militia) in the course of enforcing martial law and combating enemy sabotage groups,” and the exercises were justified by the “difficult situation at the country’s external borders.”
This is a qualitative change: following a series of readiness inspections and Territorial Defense Forces exercises, Minsk is, for the first time in years, incorporating the “national militia” directly into a scenario responding to an external military threat, rather than merely “internal stabilization.” The location in the Vitebsk region—near the borders with Lithuania and Latvia — indicates that the component of the Territorial Defense Forces, the militia, and the opolchenie is being tested as part of the “second echelon” deployment in the Baltic direction, which from NATO’s perspective signifies further militarization of the border zone and preparation for long-term operations under a regime of heightened readiness for military and hybrid threats.
Another Chinese citizen arrested in Norway on espionage charges
In Norway, a decision was made to place a 46-year-old Chinese citizen under temporary arrest on charges of spying for the People’s Republic of China. The detained man was interested in information related to northern Norway. At this stage of the investigation, no additional details have been disclosed, nor have any official links been confirmed to another high-profile case—the arrest of a Chinese citizen involved in reconnaissance of military infrastructure in the town of Andøya.
This is the second case this year in which Norwegian counterintelligence has detained individuals suspected of spying for China. Northern Norway, where both individuals were active, is a critical point on the security map, particularly due to the military installations located there. In the case of Andøya, Chinese intelligence was reportedly surveying sensitive infrastructure responsible for space operations. According to PST information, the Chinese citizen participated in an attempt to activate a receiver for downloading data from satellites in polar orbits, and the Norwegian company was, according to investigators, acting as a front for a Chinese state-owned entity. These incidents clearly align with the warnings issued in this year’s National Threat Assessment for 2025, published by the Norwegian Security Service (PST), regarding the threat of espionage from both Russia and China.
Russian operations and active measures against European countries
On May 24 of this year, the website of the international investigative journalism project “Organized Crime and Corruption” published a report on Russia’s use of active measures against European countries. Leaked Documents Reveal Russian ‘Cognitive Strikes’ Against the West — Including Islamophobic ‘Pig Head’ Attacks in Paris | OCCRP. The text was written based on materials from a messaging app and digital resources of the Russian public relations firm Social Design Agency, which came into the possession of journalists from the Estonian news portal Delfi. The material includes documents from a report on the placement of pig heads near mosques in Paris, as well as correspondence between company managers and representatives of the presidential administration regarding the objectives of such actions.
This is already the third recent publication based on materials from Russian internal servers and messaging systems. (The others: GRU: Officer Factory – FRONTSTORY.PL, Kremlin’s Hybrid Campaigns Against Armenia and European Countries: Confidential Documents – FIP.AM). If the documents on which these texts are based are considered authentic and reliable, clear “gaps” in Russian civilian IT systems are evident. It must be assumed that such publications signal to the Russian Federation that it, too, has vulnerabilities that are and can be exploited. This constitutes an element of deterrence built within the information domain.
Seizure of the Jin Hui tanker by the Swedish Coast Guard
On May 3, 2026, the Swedish Coast Guard and police conducted a joint operation, boarding the 182-meter-long Jin Hui tanker in Swedish territorial waters (southwest of Trelleborg). The vessel was suspected of belonging to the Russian shadow fleet, and the immediate reasons for the intervention were the use of a false Syrian flag, the lack of required insurance, and the creation of a threat to maritime safety. As a result of the operation, the ship’s Chinese captain was arrested and charged with document forgery and gross violation of maritime law. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson emphasized that this was already the fifth such operation in 2026, recalling earlier spring interventions against the tankers Caffa and Sea Owl One.
Sweden employs a consistent and effective law enforcement strategy against the shadow fleet, citing unseaworthiness and inadequate insurance as grounds. Western officials link these vessels not only to sanctions evasion but also to broader Russian hybrid activities, including espionage and drone operations. Sweden’s actions demonstrate that the Baltic states are increasingly confident in enforcing the law against the shadow fleet. In the case of the tanker Jin Hui, as well as the Caffa and Sea Owl One, the crews included Russian citizens. For example, the captain of the latter tanker is under investigation for document forgery and violations of maritime law. The presence of Russians on board these ships (especially in officer positions) is, for Swedish authorities, evidence that these vessels—despite being registered in countries such as Syria or Guinea—may in fact be controlled by Russian entities to circumvent sanctions.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- We encourage you to read the latest analysis by Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj titled “The Russian Drone Line: From Improvisation to a Systematic Approach. The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Systems in Ukraine 2022–2026” (in Polish). The EFI expert describes the process of transforming Russian capabilities in the use of unmanned systems—from improvised actions to the development of an increasingly systematic model for conducting operations based on the integration of drones, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare. The analysis also includes recommendations for Poland and NATO countries.
- Michał Dworczyk, Chairman of the Program Council of the Eastern Flank Institute, emphasized on RMF FM radio the need to rebuild the state’s personnel reserve capacity through the introduction of universal military training. He also highlighted the growing challenges to Poland’s security and the need for long-term strengthening of the country’s defense capabilities. We invite you to listen to the full interview (in Polish) and read the report by the IWF and the Sobieski Institute titled “Universal National Service: A Program for Building Human Reserves for the Security of the Republic of Poland” (in Polish).
