We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
The B9 summits in Bucharest – the security policy dimension
On May 13, Bucharest hosted the Bucharest Nine (B9) Summit, attended by the leaders of all nine countries on NATO’s eastern flank, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the leaders of the Nordic countries. The leaders participating in the summit called for increased defense spending and further expansion of the defense industry. In a joint declaration, the signatories stated that Russia “is and will remain the most significant, long-term, and direct threat to the security of the allies.” The leaders of the B9 and the Nordic countries condemned “Russia’s confrontational actions,” including sabotage, cyberattacks, and hybrid operations. The declaration emphasized that the further development of industrial capacity, supply chains, and production capabilities constitutes a necessary response to current security challenges and the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. A decision was also made to hold the next summit in 2027 in Warsaw.
The Bucharest summit provided an opportunity to showcase the strength of this regional format, which brings together countries on NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland and Romania. The significance of the event was underscored by the presence of the NATO Secretary General and the President of Ukraine. Bucharest leveraged the arrival of numerous leaders to advance its objectives, particularly in the area of defense policy—at the same time, the largest local defense trade fair, BSDA, was taking place, attended by the Presidents of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the presence of Nordic leaders signals tangible progress toward expanding the alliance’s membership, which aligns with the political priorities of the President of Poland, announced at the start of his term.
Turkey proposes a Turkey–Bulgaria–Romania military fuel pipeline
Turkey has proposed the construction of a military fuel pipeline that would connect the Turkish transmission network with Romania via Bulgaria, ensuring energy supplies for NATO’s eastern flank. The estimated cost of the project is approximately $1.2 billion. The infrastructure would be exclusively military in nature—with no access for civilian use. A decision on this matter is expected to be made before or during the NATO summit in Ankara (July 7–8, 2026). The impetus for the proposal stems from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has disrupted energy supply chains, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, which exposed vulnerabilities in the alliance’s fuel supply model.
The project is part of parallel efforts by Poland and Romania to expand the Cold War-era underground NATO Pipeline System (NPS) network eastward. The current network, spanning approximately 10,000 km and covering 12 allied nations, ends in Germany, leaving a significant gap in the fuel infrastructure for the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. For several years now, the countries on NATO’s eastern flank have been making efforts to expand the system in a region of potential future conflict with Russia. At the same time, the proposal strengthens Ankara’s strategic position within the NATO architecture just ahead of the summit and signals a more active policy in the region.
Czechoslovak Group is exploring the possibility of acquiring a stake in KNDS
The Czech defense conglomerate Czechoslovak Group (CSG) has submitted an offer to acquire a stake in the Franco-German group KNDS, one of Europe’s leading manufacturers of armored vehicles and artillery (including the Caesar self-propelled howitzer). CSG has approached the owners of a portion of KNDS shares with a proposal to purchase them, though it is unclear whether it will gain shareholder approval. Currently, KNDS is equally divided between German private shareholders and the French government, making the issue of changing the ownership structure politically sensitive—Paris and Berlin retain a direct interest in controlling the company, its production capabilities, and the priorities of defense programs. The company was also set to be the lead contractor for the joint “European” MGCS tank project, which has faced increasing political and business obstacles in recent years.
CSG’s proposal coincided with KNDS’s preparations for its initial public offering in early July, with an expected market valuation of €15–20 billion. The implementation of the IPO plans is being negatively impacted by CSG’s deteriorating reputation following allegations from Hunterbrook (which accuses the Czech group of withholding certain information in the prospectus) and internal disputes within the German governing coalition over the target stake to be repurchased from German owners. A potential acquisition of a majority or significant minority stake in the Western European conglomerate would crown the very rapid growth of CSG’s market position in recent years.
Nordic countries strengthen defense cooperation
In early May 2026, representatives of the Nordic countries met in Trøndelag under the Norwegian presidency of NORDEFCO. The initiative, established in 2009, encompasses military and political-defense cooperation among the five Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. Its goal is to strengthen the region’s defense capabilities through joint planning and procurement of armaments, as well as the coordination of military operations. The May meeting focused primarily on the Nordic countries’ ability to provide mutual support and to efficiently move military forces across national borders. Cooperation in the areas of aviation, drones, and counter-drone systems was also discussed. Participants also visited the Ørland Air Base and the SINTEF Ocean research center, where they learned about innovations in military technology. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov participated on the second day of the meeting. His presence underscored the growing significance of lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war for modern warfare, particularly regarding the use of drones, autonomous systems, and rapid technological adaptation on the battlefield.
The initiative behind the meeting, carried out within the NORDEFCO framework, is gaining increasing significance. Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has completely transformed the nature of Nordic cooperation—for the first time, all NORDEFCO members are simultaneously members of the North Atlantic Alliance. This is taking place against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and under the influence of the unique experiences that Ukraine brings to the European security architecture. The exclusivity of these experiences is evidenced by the invitation extended to Ukraine’s Minister of Defense to participate in this year’s conference. The agreement regarding Camp Jomsborg, expanded in October 2025, explicitly stipulates that in Lipa, Ukrainian instructors will train NATO soldiers in the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles, and not the other way around. A modern, international training center (primarily for drones), opened in October 2025 (Camp Jomsborg), is located in Lipa. The center was built by the Norwegians in cooperation with Poland and the Nordic-Baltic countries within the NORDEFCO framework.
Defence fair in Vilnius
On May 12–13, 2026, Vilnius will host the international defence industry event DAIMEX Baltic 2026, organized by the defence industry associations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in cooperation with the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. On the first day, a conference at the LITEXPO exhibition center brought together high-ranking representatives from politics, the military, and industry to discuss security challenges on NATO’s eastern flank and the region’s defense priorities. On the second day, the event moved to a military training ground near Pabradė, where the latest defense technologies, including unmanned systems, C4ISR, and air defense solutions, were demonstrated in real-world conditions. The event is attended by over 2,000 participants from more than 30 countries, with 130 companies from the Baltic states presenting their solutions alongside entities from Australia, Ukraine, the U.S., Israel, and many others. The organizers hope that DAIMEX Baltic will become a permanent platform for regional cooperation in the defense industry.
This event clearly demonstrates that the Baltic states are no longer merely consumers of Western defense technologies—they are becoming active and mature players in the European security market. In light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and growing threats on NATO’s eastern flank, such initiatives take on particular significance and signal that the region takes its own defense capabilities seriously. An interesting development is the participation in the fair of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union (Lithuanian: Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga), one of the main organizers of the event alongside defense industry associations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This organization’s participation underscores the growing importance of civil society structures and reserves in building the defense capabilities of the Baltic states.
New information regarding the breach of Finland’s central IT service provider’s system
On May 7, 2026, Finnish public broadcaster Yle revealed additional details regarding the scale of a serious breach of the government’s mobile device management system (MDM) operated by Valtori. The incident itself occurred in late January 2026 and affected approximately 50,000 users, including key public administration employees. According to current information, data was leaked from, among others, the Office of the President, the Finnish Defense Forces, the Border Guard, and police leadership. The attackers obtained first names, last names, email addresses, phone numbers, and device specifications. The investigation is proceeding on the grounds of a serious breach and suspected espionage.
Valtori is the central provider of IT and telecommunications services for the entire Finnish government. It serves, among others, ministries, the Office of the President, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Police, the Border Guard, Customs, and numerous other central institutions. It manages thousands of mobile devices (phones, tablets), email, servers, and the government’s cloud infrastructure. Statements regarding the incident confirmed that the attack affected Finnish ministries. However, the scale of the data breach at the Ministry of Defense was not disclosed. Given that the ministry uses Valtori’s nationwide mobile services (including Mobiili and Valtion AD), it is highly likely that a data breach also occurred there—primarily involving administrative, political, and mid-level staff. Published information indicates that classified and secret systems remained intact. Regardless of the scale of the leak at the Ministry of Defense, data stolen from the Border Guard and the prosecutor’s office may be particularly significant from the perspective of national security. The Border Guard plays a key role in Finland’s defense and mobilization system, constituting an integral part of the country’s territorial defense. The prosecutor’s office, in turn, is conducting numerous important investigations into the activities of Eastern intelligence services.
Putin’s visit to Beijing on May 19–20 as a demonstration of the axis and the raw materials agenda
Vladimir Putin arrives in Beijing on the evening of May 19, where he will be welcomed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The official ceremony will take place on May 20 at 11 a.m. Beijing time in Tiananmen Square. Talks are scheduled in both a small and an expanded format, culminating in an informal tea meeting with Xi Jinping. The leaders will adopt a joint declaration on shaping a multipolar world and a new type of international relations. About forty documents are scheduled to be signed during the visit, which is linked to the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Good-Neighborliness Treaty. The Russian delegation includes key representatives of the government as well as the raw materials and industrial sectors. The main topics of discussion include the “Power of Siberia 2” project, hydrocarbon cooperation, and trade settlements conducted almost entirely in rubles and yuan. In the first quarter of 2026, Russian oil exports to China increased by 35 percent year-over-year. In 2025, over two million Russians visited China, and over one million Chinese citizens visited Russia. The Kremlin emphasizes that the visit is unrelated to Donald Trump’s travel plans to China, and Putin addressed the Chinese people via a video message instead of a traditional press article.
The visit has a clear political dimension and sends a signal to the West that Russia, despite sanctions pressure, maintains its status as a strategic partner of China. The high level of diplomatic protocol and the symbolism of the location underscore the importance of bilateral relations, and the declaration on multipolarity builds on the existing policy line of Moscow and Beijing. However, the economic dimension—especially regarding energy—is of key importance. The presence of key representatives from Russia’s raw materials sector indicates that the main goal of the visit remains securing long-term contracts and deepening cooperation in raw materials exports. The “Power of Siberia 2” project remains a test of the true depth of the relationship and the extent of China’s readiness to further commit to the Russian gas sector. The ongoing de-dollarization of bilateral trade is part of a broader process of building an alternative financial system, but at the same time increases Russia’s dependence on the Chinese economy. As a result, the asymmetry in the relationship deepens, with Moscow playing the role of a raw materials supplier and Beijing remaining the dominant party, shaping the terms of cooperation.
Nuclear exercises in Belarus as a demonstration of deterrence and an element of Russia’s pressure system
Exercises involving units responsible for the potential use of nuclear weapons and nuclear support have begun on Belarusian territory, conducted under the leadership of Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muravyev. Components of the missile forces and air force are participating in the maneuvers. Officially, the goal is to increase readiness to use modern weapons systems, improve personnel training, and verify the capability of weapons and equipment to operate under dynamic operational conditions. As part of cooperation with Russia, procedures related to the handling of so-called special munitions are being practiced, including their transport, preparation for use, and deployment from unprepared areas in various regions of Belarus. The emphasis is on camouflage, maneuverability, and maintaining the continuity of the command system. Minsk and Moscow justify the exercises by citing the military-political situation in Europe and the alleged need to respond to the strengthening of NATO’s nuclear deterrence system involving Poland and France, including planned joint air exercises using Rafale aircraft in the Baltic region.
The exercises in Belarus are not a calendar anomaly but are part of a broader cycle of armed forces training and simultaneously serve as a demonstration of deterrence. For several years, Russia and Belarus have systematically incorporated a nuclear component into their exercises, both during large-scale maneuvers such as “Zapad” and smaller-scale events where the emphasis is on planning the use of nuclear weapons rather than their physical deployment. The current episode is distinguished by a strong propaganda framework in which their own actions are presented as a response to NATO’s allegedly aggressive preparations, while simultaneously emphasizing the “planned” and supposedly defensive nature of the maneuvers. In practice, we are witnessing the further integration of Belarus into the Russian nuclear system and the testing of procedures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons under operational conditions. Conducting exercises deep within the territory, with an emphasis on mobility and the use of unprepared areas, makes them difficult to observe and amplifies the psychological pressure on NATO countries on the eastern flank.
Belarus announces “targeted mobilization” as a new model for maintaining combat readiness
On May 12, Alexander Lukashenko announced the introduction of so-called targeted mobilization of the Belarusian armed forces, moving away from sporadic large-scale exercises in favor of a rotational system for calling up units for combat training. The Belarusian leader stated explicitly that the goal is to “prepare the army for war,” while noting that Belarus remains committed to peace. At the same time, nuclear component exercises are underway, forested areas near the borders have been closed off, and according to satellite data from May, the number of military vehicles in border zones with Ukraine has increased by 25 percent. Lukashenko emphasized the need to modernize the army and adapt its weaponry to the demands of modern conflict, signaling that air and missile deterrence alone is insufficient without a ground component.
The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation assessed Lukashenko’s announcements as the implementation of a Russian agenda rather than actual preparations for an attack, noting that Belarus currently lacks forces capable of conducting an independent ground operation. Regardless of this assessment, the accumulation of activities in Belarus—nuclear exercises, forest closures, selective mobilization, and increased activity along the border—paints a coherent picture of a systematic increase in readiness and psychological pressure on NATO’s eastern flank. If implemented, the rotational system will allow for maintaining a higher baseline level of training without the transparent signals of escalation that traditional large-scale exercises carry, which will make it more difficult to assess intentions on an ongoing basis. The pace and scale of actual unit rotations, as well as any transfers of equipment to border zones, remain to be monitored.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- Lt. Col. (Ret.) Maciej Korowaj, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute, analyzes the current military situation of the Russian Federation and the course of the war in Ukraine in a special interview for Defence24 . The conversation touched on, among other things, Russia’s ability to break through the front lines, the losses suffered by the Russian army, the potential for rebuilding combat capabilities, and the relevance of Gerasimov’s doctrine. We encourage you to listen to the entire conversation (in Polish).
- In the latest episode of “The Fog of War” (in Polish), Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute, joins Grzegorz Ślubowski to discuss the current security situation in Europe. In the conversation, they discuss the possible consequences of a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, Russia’s reaction to U.S. actions and announcements, as well as the changes taking place in Ukrainian society and statehood. The entire episode is available to watch on Kanał Otwarty (in Polish).
