We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Reductions in US military personnel in the region
The US Department of War has announced planned reductions in military personnel in NATO’s eastern flank countries. The reductions have already been agreed with the governments of the member states and will include Romania (from approx. 1,700 soldiers to approx. 1,000), as well as possibly Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that the American soldiers will be replaced by contingents from other allied countries. Contrary to some reports, the American military presence in Poland and the Baltic states will not be reduced.
The Department of Defense’s decision will not lead to a reduction in the Alliance’s operational capabilities in NATO’s eastern flank countries, but it has caused concern in the US Congress and European countries. It may be interpreted by the Russian Federation as a concession in bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. However, it should rather be seen in the context of the current US administration’s policy of intensifying deterrence in the Pacific region. The United States remains the country most measurably involved in strengthening the defense capabilities of NATO’s eastern flank.
Contract for the construction of a Rheinmetall gunpowder factory in Bulgaria
The Bulgarian government has approved a contract for the construction of a gunpowder factory, which will be carried out by a joint venture between the German company Rheinmetall and the Bulgarian company VMZ, controlled by the state treasury. The new production capacity will also include the production of large-caliber ammunition for 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced that the construction of the new production facility will take 14 months. The contract is worth approximately EUR 1 billion.
The signing of the contract is another success for the German company in the eastern flank of NATO and demonstrates its increasingly dominant position in the local market for large-caliber ammunition production. Similar plants are to be built in Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania, among other countries.
Anti-terrorism and information security standards
In 2025, the Russian Federation introduced a new state standard (ГОСТ) specifying detailed requirements for the anti-terrorism protection of sensitive facilities, including critical infrastructure, strategic enterprises, and state institutions. The regulations include, among other things, the obligation to provide enhanced technical surveillance, access control, reinforced alarm procedures, and crisis response plans. At the same time, the federal administration is updating the list of key infrastructure facilities and raising the requirements for managers regarding resilience to cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and hybrid activities, emphasizing cooperation between state services and the private sector.
Russian security policy consistently combines the physical and cyber spheres, strengthening central state control over the strategic sector.
Tightening of liability for “foreign agents”
On October 26/November 1, new regulations came into force in Russia tightening sanctions against individuals and entities recognized as so-called foreign agents. According to the amendment, violation of reporting obligations or designation as a “foreign agent” may result in imprisonment for up to two years after the first violation. Until now, criminal liability was only provided for repeated violations within a year. The changes are part of an intensifying regime of information and legal control over social and political circles and the media, making the status of “inoagent” a more repressive tool in the Russian Federation’s internal security system.
The tightening of regulations has a preventive and deterrent effect – it increases state pressure on independent circles and limits the space for public activity.
New security rules in Ministry of Internal Affairs facilities
Since November 2, stricter security requirements have been in force in the Russian Federation in facilities subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The changes include raising access control standards, expanding monitoring systems, and implementing more rigorous procedures for identifying and verifying persons entering police and ministry premises. The regulations are anti-terrorism in nature and focus on increasing the resilience of MIA facilities to internal and external threats, including sabotage and unauthorized intrusion attempts.
The change is part of a broader trend of centralizing and strengthening the security of the Russian Federation’s security forces, raising the level of operational control within internal security structures.
All-Russian training of command personnel
On November 4, 2025, nationwide operational training for command personnel was conducted in the Russian Federation. The event was attended by commanders, chiefs of staff, and commanders of various levels, who took part in workshops on the implementation of new training methods and the improvement of operational planning processes for 2025/2026. The program covered issues related to the unification of command standards, the modernization of methods of commanding troops, communications security, crisis response, and improving the efficiency of logistics. The exchange of experiences and the standardization of practices are intended to strengthen the cohesion and readiness of the Russian Armed Forces.
Russia continues to implement its new military doctrine, emphasizing the integration of activities, operational resilience, and logistical and communications efficiency in high-intensity conflict conditions.
Youth training and security education programs
Since November 2025, Russian military and civilian schools have been offering short group training courses on the basics of homeland defense and security. The program includes initial training in the use of basic equipment, elementary alarm response procedures, first aid, and cybersecurity. The aim is to gradually militarize education, shape defensive habits, and familiarize young people with basic crisis response techniques and information security. The initiative is part of a broader strategy to build human reserves and increase society’s resilience to hybrid threats.
The program strengthens the ideological and practical components of the younger generation’s defense preparedness, supporting the state’s mobilization model.
Special training for reservists and infrastructure protection
In recent weeks, based on new legislation, intensive “special reservist training camps” have been resumed in Russia. The program includes preparation for the protection of strategic facilities, including countering drone attacks, implementation of evacuation and emergency procedures, and elements of cybersecurity. The new regulations guarantee participants remuneration and a package of social benefits for the duration of the exercises. The training was carried out in the form of dispersed simulations of responses to mass attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles, with practical tests of air defense and radio-electronic warfare systems and the activation of local alarm modes.
The groupings strengthen mobilization readiness and the ability to protect critical infrastructure, confirming the priority of anti-drone measures and the resilience of local security structures.
Estonia bases its resilience system on its citizens
David Cattler, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security (2019-2023), in a text published for the Estonian International Centre for Defense and Security (Europe’s War and the Baltic Lesson: Building Resilience When the Front Is Everywhere), points out that for Estonia, deterrence has never been a matter of abstract arguments or indicators of military superiority. It starts with people – how they think, organize, and maintain the functioning of the state when the world is full of new crises and threats. The Baltic states have ingrained a culture of constant vigilance: the belief that national security is a civic habit, not a domain reserved for the military.
The strategic shift that followed the outbreak of Russia’s war with Ukraine in February 2022 creates an obvious need to revise the approach to peacetime in Europe. The author also refers to bold decisions related to aid for Ukraine, but above all points to Estonia and other Baltic countries as examples of building national resilience by instilling a sense of responsibility for the country in all areas of social life, i.e., in schools, families, the military, and social organizations.
Two Czech citizens worked for the GRU as illegals
A married couple of Czech citizens were involved in the activities of Russian GRU unit No. 29155, responsible for conducting sabotage operations in Europe and causing explosions at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice in 2014. The identities of Elena and Nikolai Shaposhnikov, Russian illegals (undercover officers), were revealed as a result of a journalistic investigation. One of the couple’s important tasks was to secure a safe place in a villa in Greece, arranged as a hotel with rooms for rent. This house was a secure base supporting the activities of a Russian sabotage unit.
The Šapošnikovs supported a sabotage operation carried out in 2014 in Vrbětice, Czech Republic. Nikolai and his two children were to be employed by the IMEX Group, which owned the ammunition depot. As a result of their actions, access to the protected area was facilitated. Running the hotel in Greece and making it available for operational purposes was Elena’s task, and she was recognized and awarded the “Hero of Russia” medal in 2015 for her valuable services. It is worth remembering that Eduard Vadimovich Shishmakov, the military attaché of the Russian embassy in Warsaw, who was expelled in 2014, was also involved in the activities of Unit 29155 and participated in the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016. In the context of the ongoing war, this case is an important signal for the counterintelligence services of NATO’s eastern flank countries to work intensively to detect covert spy networks.
Illegal collection of information about the Latvian defense sector
On November 3, 2025, the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) revealed that in the second half of October, a person suspected of collecting information about the Latvian defense sector for the Russian military intelligence service GRU had been detained. The detainee is a Latvian citizen who passed on information to the Russian services about the presence of NATO allied forces, military events, and private infrastructure used in aviation.
All European countries are victims of various types of hybrid activities. For many years now, there has been a constant Russian influence on the security systems of individual countries through the unauthorized acquisition of information or testing of responses. In addition to military activities (e.g., air incidents) and sabotage (e.g., arson), espionage activities are also carried out. In this case, it can be assumed that, among other things, the Latvian military base in Ādaži, where allied troops, including about 300 Polish soldiers, are stationed, has become the subject of interest of the Russian services.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- Polsat TV, in partnership with the Eastern Flank Institute, produced a report presenting the organization of Ukrainian anti-drone defense. Polsat News correspondent Marek Sygacz conducted a series of interviews with both soldiers serving on the front line and manufacturers of innovative systems for combating unmanned aerial vehicles. This is the second media cooperation project carried out by the EFI – we have previously carried out similar activities with Kanał Zero.
- We recommend the appearance of IWF expert Lt. Col (ret.) Maciej Korowaj on the program “Didaskalia” hosted by Patrycjusz Wyżga. The conversation concerned the modernization program of the Chinese armed forces, Beijing’s geopolitical perspective, and how it affects the development of the security environment in Poland.
- Starting this week, the Eastern Flank Review is also available in English. We recommend subscribing to the English version of our newsletter and promoting it among your friends who do not speak Polish and may be interested in a regular review of security policy information in our region.
