We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Hanwha Aerospace to Invest €1.3 Billion in Romania’s Defense Industry
South Korean conglomerate Hanwha Aerospace has announced a €1.3 billion investment package aimed at significantly expanding production capacity and transferring advanced technologies to Romania. The program, implemented by a local subsidiary, involves moving away from the traditional procurement model toward deep localization and the establishment of long-term industrial partnerships. It is estimated that over the next decade, the investment will generate an economic value of €14.4 billion and create over 9,000 jobs at manufacturing facilities and among subcontractors.
The strategy calls for the establishment of several production and development centers in Romania. These centers will be responsible for the production and testing of K9 self-propelled howitzers and Redback infantry fighting vehicles. Another key pillar of the cooperation will be the unmanned systems sector, encompassing the “Made in Romania” drone program and the creation of an industrial hub for unmanned ground vehicles. Additionally, the partnership will focus on reconnaissance systems, early warning technologies, and satellite solutions utilizing artificial intelligence. This investment builds on a 2024 contract worth $1 billion for the delivery of 54 K9 systems and 36 K10 ammunition carriers. Activities in Romania point to the growing role of South Korean suppliers in the countries on NATO’s eastern flank—a trend that began with large-scale contracts with the Polish Armed Forces.
Bulgaria to modernize multiple-launch rocket systems
The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense has decided to modernize its M270 rocket artillery systems and upgrade them to the MARS III standard. At the same time, Sofia is abandoning plans to purchase American M142 HIMARS wheeled launchers. This decision was primarily driven by economic considerations and the long lead time for fulfilling a potential order from the U.S., which did not fit within the Bulgarian Armed Forces’ modernization schedule. The project involves the acquisition and modernization of eight launchers, which will enable the Bulgarian Army to strike point targets using GMLRS precision-guided munitions. The MARS III standard is being developed by the Franco-German consortium KNDS and the Israeli company Elbit Systems (which jointly form the EuroPULS joint venture). The Bulgarian side highlighted the advantages of the tracked chassis, which better suits local terrain requirements.
Sofia’s decision to opt for the European variant of the M270 system modernization over HIMARS (already in use by Poland and Estonia, among others) is part of a trend among Eastern Flank nations to seek cost-effective solutions that allow for the rapid phasing out of post-Soviet BM -21 Grad systems and replace them with Western technology without placing an excessive burden on the defense budget. From Bulgaria’s perspective, this is particularly important given budget constraints and the need for careful coordination of modernization plans, due to the lack of a stable parliamentary majority in successive cabinets.
President Zelenskyy Proposes a European Alternative to NATO
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has presented a concept for creating a new defense alliance that would serve as an alternative to NATO in the face of prolonged uncertainty regarding the future stance of the United States and the lack of progress in Kyiv’s actual integration into Western integration structures. The proposed initiative would bring together Ukraine, European Union member states, and other European countries (such as the United Kingdom), focusing on building an autonomous security space. Countries such as Ukraine and Turkey would play a special role in this arrangement. According to the Ukrainian leader, the new structure could become the foundation of a modern security architecture on the continent, capable of responding quickly to the Russian threat without having to wait for a political consensus among all NATO members.
Kyiv’s rhetoric over the past year reflects a desire for greater activism and the use of wartime experience to strengthen the country’s position on the international stage. In recent months, President Zelenskyy has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of firmness on the part of Western countries toward the Kremlin. Zelenskyy’s concept envisions not only political cooperation but, above all, deep integration of defense industries, the development of joint air and missile defense systems, and the creation of mechanisms for automatic military support in the event of an attack on any of the signatories. It is intended to address growing uncertainty regarding NATO’s prospects in light of President Trump’s recent statements expressing dissatisfaction with the passivity of certain allies regarding operations against Iran.
The Border Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and its intelligence activities from the perspective of Estonian Counterintelligence
The FSB Border Service, like other intelligence structures (SWR, GRU), conducts intelligence activities against Estonia. Regional branches of this service—the so-called border directorates—are located in the administrative centers of Russian regions along the country’s external borders. Units operating in border regions report to them. In addition to units responsible for protecting land and sea borders, the FSB Border Service’s field structures also include operational departments. Officers of the FSB Border Service’s operational departments differ significantly from typical Russian border guards. Contrary to the common image of guards in green uniforms patrolling the border, using binoculars and service dogs, operational officers usually operate in civilian clothing. They put on a uniform only when necessary to conceal their true role. Their main task is to gather intelligence in the border zone and beyond, on the territory of foreign states. This also includes recruiting informants from among those crossing the border and directing their activities.
The modus operandi and organizational structure of the Federal Security Service’s intelligence units within the Border Guard are outlined in the 2025–2026 Annual Review published on April 12, 2026, by the Estonian civilian counterintelligence agency KAPO (Est. Kaitsepolitseiamet). (Est. Astaraamat 2025–2026, Eng. Annual Review 2025–2026). This information paints an extremely intriguing picture of the seemingly harmless Border Guard. The report indicates that low-profile officers from operational units conduct intensive, systematic, and organized recruitment and intelligence activities. According to KAPO, the first contact with potential candidates for collaboration takes place at border crossings. Travelers are questioned about their destination, relatives living in Russia, and their address of residence. This information is collected and used to further identify individuals selected for further investigation. Currently, Russian border services are particularly interested in topics related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Western support for Ukraine, and the situation of Ukrainians living in Estonia.
Finland’s Agreement with South Korea on K9 Howitzers
The Finnish Ministry of Defense has concluded an intergovernmental agreement to purchase 112 additional 155 mm K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers (including spare parts, specialized tools, and testing equipment). The contract is worth 546.8 million euros. Once deliveries, which will begin in 2028, are completed, Finland will have a total of 208 K9 howitzers. This makes it the second-largest operator of K9s in Europe—after Poland. The howitzers come from South Korean military surplus and are not brand-new; in practice, they are vehicles with minimal mileage or newly manufactured. Before entering service, they will be adapted to Finnish standards.
Since joining NATO and with over 1,300 km of border with Russia, Finland has been consistently increasing its artillery firepower—a key element in positional warfare and the defense of its own territory. The K9, as one of the best self-propelled howitzers in the world, boasts high mobility, a rapid rate of fire (up to 6–8 rounds per minute), and a range of approximately 50 km. Choosing Korean equipment allows for rapid delivery and a favorable price compared to Western European counterparts. Finland, following a path similar to Poland’s in this regard, is building a homogeneous, large fleet of K9s, which simplifies logistics and training. In the context of the entire NATO alliance, this means further strengthening the eastern flank with high-readiness artillery.
A. Belousov – Contract recruitment is ahead of schedule – over 80,000 since the start of the year
Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated on April 7, during an inspection of the new military recruitment office building in Moscow (Yabluchkova Street), that the staffing of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with contract soldiers is proceeding ahead of schedule. New units and subunits are being formed. Particular attention is being paid to the preparation and coordination of subunits, including the Unmanned Systems Forces (ВБС). Earlier, on March 27, Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev reported that since the beginning of 2026, over 80,000 people have signed contracts for military service—“plus volunteers on top of that figure.” All have already been assigned to units and are in their positions. Medvedev emphasized that the mobilization is proceeding “at a fairly decent pace” and “there is no need to announce a new wave of mobilization.” By comparison: in all of 2025, 422,704 people signed contracts, and an additional 32,000 joined volunteer units.
Official Russian data (80,000 in the first quarter) indicates a rate of about 930 people per day, which is significantly lower than the 2025 average (about 1,160 per day). Ukrainian and independent analyses directly point to a decline in recruitment rates to a two-year low. The rhetoric of “being ahead of schedule” suggests that the Kremlin has lowered its own planned targets to maintain a narrative of success. At the same time, Belousov’s emphasis on “forming new units” confirms the continued structural expansion of the army—which reinforces the thesis from an earlier review regarding the shift from shock mobilization to a steady “drip” of recruitment. Medvedev’s mention of “no need for mobilization” is a classic preemptive signal: a denial directed at the public to quell rumors, which in themselves prove that the topic is still alive.
Unmanned Systems Forces (ВБС) – a new branch of the armed forces achieves operational readiness
The Unmanned Systems Forces achieved full operational readiness in April 2026 as a new branch of the armed forces. A combat coordination exercise for an independent unmanned systems regiment—comprising companies of heavy multi-rotor unmanned aerial vehicles—was conducted at a training ground in the Moscow Military District. The instructors are soldiers with combat experience from the Special Military Operations (SOW). Upon completing training, the subunits are sent directly to the operational zone. Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Anatoly Koncevoy, reported at a meeting of the Federation Council that in 2026 the army plans to train over 70,000 specialists for the UAS – operators, engineers, and technicians. Kremlin spokesperson Peskov stated on April 2 that the Unmanned Systems Forces need personnel and that an invitation is open to those willing to serve.
The creation of the UAS (WSB) as a separate branch of the armed forces—not as a subunit of existing structures, but as a distinct branch with its own regiments, training path, and budget—is likely the most significant organizational change in the Russian armed forces since the start of the war. The scale is unprecedented: 70,000 specialists in a single year is more than the entire officer corps of many European armies. The fact that Peskov is publicly encouraging people to join the WSB, however, suggests recruitment difficulties—they need people with technical skills, not just “manpower” for the trenches. The key point is that Russia is institutionalizing the “dronization” of war at a systemic level, not just as a stopgap measure—which means that unmanned capabilities will continue to grow regardless of the fate of the SOV.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- The Eastern Flank Institute has become a partner of the Resilience Conference Warsaw 2026. The event, organized by Resilience Media, will take place on April 15 in Warsaw and will focus on the development and implementation of innovative defense technologies that strengthen the security of NATO’s eastern flank. The conference will bring together experts from the military, technology, and financial sectors, and its goal is to strengthen cooperation between innovators and government institutions, facilitating the transition of technologies from the testing phase to full operational implementation.
- Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute, gave an interview to Radio Akadera. In the interview, he discussed growing international tensions and the shift away from diplomacy toward a policy of force, highlighting Poland’s special role in the region’s security system. He also emphasized the importance of education and the skills of the younger generation in addressing the challenges of the modern world. We encourage you to listen to the entire broadcast (in Polish).
