We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania May Lose Part of Its SAFE Funding Due to the Coalition Crisis
Romania may lose access to part of the approximately €16 billion in loans allocated under the EU’s SAFE (Security Action for Europe) instrument. The reason is the short timeframe for completing the approval procedures—which are currently blocked by the crisis in the ruling coalition. The prolonged political deadlock, caused by the Social Democratic Party’s withdrawal from the ruling coalition, prevents Romania from meeting all the conditions required by the European Commission. SAFE funds are intended to support, among other things, infrastructure investments and, indirectly, the defense capabilities of EU member states. Losing these funds would significantly curtail Romania’s modernization plans, including those related to expanding its large-caliber ammunition production capabilities.
Romania has tied a number of significant plans to modernize its armed forces to a large amount of low-interest loans under the SAFE program. The European Commission imposed very short deadlines on all participating countries for concluding and reporting on relevant contracts with manufacturers, a move that has drawn criticism from opposition parties in numerous member states.
Romania is finalizing tests of American interceptor drones
Romania has conducted tests of MEROPS interceptor drones in response to the growing threat posed by the war in Ukraine and airspace violation incidents. Over the past few months, the country’s airspace has been regularly violated by Russian unmanned systems. The MEROPS system was developed by the American company Project Eagle, founded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt. The system uses autonomous “Surveyor” interceptor drones capable of independently detecting and neutralizing targets. According to Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruta, the system is set to be operationally deployed in the coming days.
Bucharest’s urgent actions are a response to the growing number of incidents in which Russian drones violate Romanian airspace during attacks on targets in Ukraine. Romania shares a border of approximately 650 km with Ukraine. The American system is already being deployed in Poland, and its success is attributed, among other things, to the good results achieved on the Ukrainian battlefield. At the same time, local anti-drone technologies based on interceptor drones are being developed in some countries on NATO’s eastern flank and in Ukraine.
Czech Defense Minister Rules Out Return to Compulsory Military Service
Czech Defense Minister Jaromír Zuna, in an interview with the Aktuálně portal, unequivocally ruled out the possibility of reinstating mandatory military service in the country. This declaration comes at a time of intensifying public debate on national resilience and mobilization readiness in the Central and Eastern European region. Zuna emphasized that he sees no prospect of returning to a universal conscription system, which he described as a “despised model from the days of the previous regime.” According to the minister, the state currently lacks both the political consensus and the infrastructural and financial capacity to train thousands of conscripts annually. Instead of mandatory service, the ministry wants to develop a system for training officers at civilian universities. This program would build personnel for both the professional army and the active
The minister’s statement coincides with reports of difficulties in meeting NATO spending targets (the 2% of GDP requirement). The ministry acknowledges that financial constraints are forcing the postponement of certain modernization contracts (including those for Leopard 2A8 tanks) to 2027 and beyond, which further limits the possibilities for potentially expanding the military structure to include a conscription system. Minister Zuna’s position reflects a broader trend in Czech defense policy, which, despite the deteriorating security situation in the east, is cutting defense spending due to growing social policy needs. This approach differs from that of most countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
Spring Storm 2026 Exercises in Estonia and Latvia
In early May 2026, the international military exercises Spring Storm 2026 will begin, involving approximately 12,000 soldiers from Estonia and allied nations. The main objective of the exercises is to simulate a conventional conflict, requiring close cooperation between the Estonian Division and allied forces. In parallel with the process of integrating new allied units, as part of support for ongoing military operations, units of the Estonian Division and the Southern Regional Command (Tartu) of the Estonian Defense League (Est. Kaitseliit) will be included in the joint operations. The exercises will take place in the counties of Põlva, Tartu, Valga, Viljandi, and Võru, as well as in northeastern Latvia.
The upcoming Spring Storm 2026 exercises focus on realistic scenarios of high-intensity conflict on the eastern flank. Of key importance is the testing of allied RSOM (Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement) procedures—that is, the ability to rapidly receive and integrate large allied forces. The cross-border nature of the exercises and the participation of numerous countries enhance interoperability, but also demonstrate readiness for operations in a dispersed environment where national borders do not restrict military operations. In the context of the tasks assigned to Estonian units during this year’s edition, it is particularly worth highlighting the role of the Estonian Defense League as one of the key pillars of Estonia’s territorial defense system.
Thwarting assassinations and hybrid operations in Lithuania on behalf of the GRU
The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau and the Prosecutor General’s Office, conducting an intensive investigation in cooperation with the civilian counterintelligence agency VSD (Lithuanian: Valstybės saugumo departamentas (VSD)) and international partners, thwarted the planning of the assassination of two individuals in Lithuania. The case is organized and multi-faceted, and its elements also point to the possibility of planning terrorist-related activities commissioned by the Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU). In April of this year, charges were filed against thirteen suspects. Nine of them were also detained, and European arrest warrants were issued for four individuals. Suspicions regarding the Russian secret services were confirmed by Saulius Briginas, Head of the Lithuanian Criminal Police.
The investigation into this case began in early 2025 after a citizen of the Russian Federation – Ruslan Gabbasov (Rus. Руслан Габбасов) – who was residing permanently in Lithuania, reported to the police. His concern was aroused by the discovery of a GPS tracking device in his car. As a result of further operational and investigative activities, potential perpetrators of a planned assassination attempt on Gabbasov’s life, as well as on the life of a Lithuanian citizen, Valdas Bartkevičius, were identified. Ruslan Gabbasov is a Bashkir opposition figure, activist, and well-known critic of the Kremlin and Russian aggression in Ukraine. He is a Russian dissident who has been granted political asylum in Lithuania. Valdas Bartkevičius, on the other hand, is a Lithuanian social activist known for his sharp, consistent criticism of Russian policy. The actions targeting both anti-Russian activists were carried out by citizens of several countries, including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Greece. These individuals either resided in Lithuania or traveled there specifically to carry out assigned tasks. The investigation revealed that criminal networks were utilized in the operation. Lithuanian police also obtained information about a planned arson attack on military equipment destined for Ukraine and ongoing reconnaissance of military infrastructure. In 2026, as part of international cooperation, numerous searches were conducted outside Lithuania, including in Poland, Ukraine, and Greece.
The Kremlin is preparing a meeting on election security in Russia
A Kremlin spokesperson announced that Vladimir Putin will hold special meetings next week dedicated to ensuring security during the upcoming election campaigns and processes in Russia. The focus of the preparations will be on coordinating the activities of law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and regional administrations, with an emphasis on preventing “terrorist and sabotage threats” and controlling the information landscape.
The announcement of a separate meeting by the president on election security indicates that the Kremlin views the upcoming political processes as a potentially sensitive issue—both in physical terms (attacks, incidents) and in terms of information and public perception. In practice, one can expect a further expansion of the powers and presence of security services in political processes, as well as the use of the “protection against terrorism” argument as a pretext for the preventive suppression of any manifestations of independent civic activity.
Belarus – Comprehensive Inspection of the Armed Forces with Counterintelligence Involvement
In early April, Alexander Lukashenko held extensive meetings summarizing a comprehensive inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces, attended by approximately 300 officers—commanders of tactical units involved in the inspection. The president admitted that within the army, “lies have not been completely eradicated,” and revealed that all special KGB units, counterintelligence agencies, the prosecutor’s office, the Investigative Committee, and other security structures had been mobilized to assess the actual state of the armed forces.
The use of counterintelligence resources to monitor the military demonstrates Lukashenko’s low level of trust in command reports and his treatment of the army as a potential source of political risk, rather than merely an instrument of national defense. The extensive involvement of the KGB and investigative bodies in the assessment of the army strengthens “vertical” control over the officer corps, cements the model of a repressive state, and limits the autonomy of commanders at all levels.
Belarus – Spring Draft Replenishes Special Forces and Border Guard Units
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced that as part of the 2026 spring draft, approximately 10,000 conscripts will join the ranks of the Armed Forces, with their deployment to units beginning on April 23.The first batch of approximately 1,000 recruits will be assigned specifically to special operations forces, the Minsk Military Command, training centers, and security and support units, as well as to border guard units.
The structure of conscript deployment—with a significant presence of special operations forces and border units—indicates a priority given to units useful both in internal control scenarios (suppressing protests) and in operations along border areas. Maintaining a relatively high level of conscription amid limited demographic resources suggests that Minsk is not abandoning the model of a mass army, which, if necessary, can be used as a tool of pressure against neighbors and its own society.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- The television station wPolsce24 aired a report titled “The Fifth Column” (in Polish), dedicated to Russian hybrid operations targeting Poland and attempts to exert pressure on security and stability along the border. Representatives of the Eastern Flank Institute – Col. (ret.) Łukasz Paczesny and Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj – appeared in the report.
- Dr. Piotr Woyke, director of the Eastern Flank Institute, appeared on the podcast “Peace with a View of War,” which addressed the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Poland and discussed the state and prospects of nuclear technology development in our country. The full version of the conversation is available on YouTube (in Polish).
- We encourage you to watch the latest episode of “Special Report” titled “The Kaliningrad Fortress” (in Polish) featuring IWF expert Lt. Col. (Ret.) Maciej Korowaj. The report analyzes the ongoing militarization of the Kaliningrad Oblast and the resulting threats to Poland and Europe, while emphasizing its significance as a key tool of Russian power projection in the Baltic Sea region—both in military and hybrid dimensions.
- In our latest publication, “Volunteers on Duty: Models of Territorial Defense as Exemplified by Selected Countries on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” prepared as part of the “IWF Perspective” series, we analyze foreign approaches to territorial defense and their significance for Poland. The study includes case studies of Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Sweden, and identifies practical conclusions and directions for the development of the Territorial Defense Forces, as well as the need for further reforms to enhance their readiness and effectiveness. We invite you to read the full text of the study (in Polish).
