We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
The Romanian Ministry of Defense is taking a tougher stance toward foreign defense contractors
Last week, reports emerged of problems in the implementation of a number of major defense projects in Romania, due to price pressure exerted by foreign manufacturers. The issue reportedly centered primarily on Rheinmetall’s bid to produce 298 KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, whose final price—according to the Romanian Ministry of Defense—was to be increased by approximately 30% compared to initial expectations. Part of the pressure from the German manufacturer was reportedly the relatively short negotiation period tied to deadlines set by the EU’s SAFE program, which was intended to cover ongoing costs. Last week, the Romanian Ministry of Defense also announced the possibility of canceling a $400 million contract for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles with Israel’s Elbit (due to multiple delays in delivery dates).
Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruță is pursuing a decisive policy regarding the procurement of foreign weapons systems, leveraging, among other things, favorable budgetary conditions for defense, high levels of funding from the EU’s SAFE program, and Bucharest’s significant role in providing logistical support to U.S. forces in an attack on Iran. The Romanian Ministry of Defense’s increased activity in the area of arms procurement policy indicates an expectation of securing new, more favorable terms from individual manufacturers. This trend is likely to continue in the near future due to the upcoming BSDA 2026 trade fair in Bucharest this May—the largest industry event in Romania.
WB Group Establishes a Subsidiary in Romania
The Polish WB Group, known for products such as the Warmate loitering munition systems, the Fonet on-board communication system, and the Flyeye reconnaissance UAVs, has launched WB Romania—a subsidiary focused on the Romanian market. This is another foreign subsidiary within the group, joining those in Malaysia and Ukraine, among others. The launch took place in Bucharest, in the presence of the Polish ambassador and representatives of the Romanian government and armed forces.
The company has not yet disclosed its sales priorities for the Romanian market, but unmanned systems such as Flyeye, Warmate, and Gladius were a key part of the presentation in Bucharest. Given the Group’s well-developed production infrastructure and ability to localize production relatively quickly, as well as the high demand from the Romanian armed forces for unmanned systems, it can be assumed that the Group’s new subsidiary will place particular emphasis on promoting this type of weaponry in Romania.
The establishment of the company strengthens bilateral Polish-Romanian relations and is an example of the still relatively rare cooperation between defense industries within the countries of NATO’s eastern flank.
Bulgaria and Ukraine Sign Defense Agreement
At the end of March this year, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov signed a 10-year agreement on defense cooperation, which covers, among other things, joint training and the production of large-caliber ammunition and unmanned systems, including through funding from the EU’s SAFE program. The agreement is similar in nature to the one previously concluded with Romania. It has drawn strong criticism from opposition parties, which are preparing for early elections on April 19. Prime Minister Gyurov, whose government is a caretaker administration, has been accused of creating “risks to national security” by one of the country’s most popular politicians, former President Rumen Radev.
The agreement reflects Ukraine’s strengthened position as an arms manufacturer, particularly in the countries on NATO’s eastern flank, and in the case of Bulgaria, it likely consolidates the existing cooperation between local companies and Ukrainian entities. At the same time, it was concluded during the election campaign, which could call into question the implementation of some of its provisions should a new governing coalition be formed by parties skeptical of Kyiv.
Sweden invests in air defense
In early April, the Swedish government decided to conclude several key contracts related to Sweden’s air defense. The contract for the GUTE II system is worth approximately 8.7 billion Swedish kronor (3.4 billion PLN). The system consists of Tridon Mk2 cannons, radars, ammunition, 70 trucks, and 24 off-road vehicles. The suppliers of these solutions are BAE Systems Bofors, Saab, Sisu, and Nammo. The concept of the Swedish air defense system is based on utilizing existing technologies from various suppliers and adapting them appropriately to the existing threats to Sweden’s critical infrastructure.
The GUTE II system is based on several key components that form a layered and mobile air defense system. The main firepower is provided by the Tridon Mk2 system with a 40 mm cannon (manufactured by BAE Systems Bofors).
It is complemented by the lighter, remotely controlled Saab Trackfire weapon module, equipped with a 30 mm M230LF Bushmaster cannon (the cannon is manufactured by the American company Northrop Grumman but integrated by Saab). Target detection is handled by Giraffe 1X (G1X) radars supplied by Saab. All weaponry is mounted on mobile wheeled platforms: Tridon Mk2 systems are mounted on Scania trucks (8×8 or 6×6). Trackfire modules are installed on highly mobile Sisu GTP off-road vehicles (designated TGB 24 in the Swedish Army). Volvo FMX trucks serve as carriers for extendable masts with G1X radars and function as mobile command and fire control centers.
The ordered system was developed, among other things, based on consultations with the Ukrainian side within the framework of working groups active in 2023–2024. The implemented changes were intended to improve the operation of the G1X radar so that its software could precisely distinguish small targets from terrain obstacles. At the same time, it was decided to use various mobile platforms, which, given Ukrainian conditions, increased the likelihood of dynamic redeployment depending on the threat at hand. The key to the system’s effectiveness is Nammo’s programmable ammunition.
GRU officers and intelligence centers identified by Latvian military intelligence
A report published on April 3, 2026, by the Latvian Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD), which assesses threats for the year 2025, points to the key role of Russian intelligence centers in Kaliningrad, Smolensk, St. Petersburg, and Moscow in conducting operations against Latvia. According to the document, these structures are responsible for recruiting Latvian citizens, using opportunities such as their regular trips to Russia and Belarus to establish cooperation. A precedent in the history of the Latvian intelligence services is the fact that the MIDD has, for the first time, made public the full personal details of several identified officers of the Russian GRU and the Belarusian military intelligence. This action aims not only to neutralize their operational activities but also to raise public awareness regarding the recruitment methods used by foreign intelligence services on NATO’s eastern flank.
The Latvian MIDD’s identification of specific GRU intelligence centers responsible for reconnaissance at the operational-tactical level serves as significant confirmation of their key role in the long-standing infiltration of Latvian defense structures and in ongoing preparations for future military operations.
It should be noted, however, that a more detailed description of these structures was already provided in a January 2022 report by Estonian military intelligence. That document described in detail the operations of five centers targeting the West: the 73rd Intelligence Center in St. Petersburg, the 264th Intelligence Center in Kaliningrad, the 74th Intelligence Center in Smolensk, the 269th Intelligence Center in Moscow, and the 1194th Intelligence Center in Murmansk.
An innovative approach by the Latvian services is the decision to disclose detailed personal information about intelligence officers in an official, unclassified, and publicly available document. The MIDD report exposes the following officers of the Russian GRU: Major Alexei Pizhikov, Lieutenant Commander (Captain 2nd Rank) Alexei Lesnikov, Lieutenant Commander Nikolai Chetverikov, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Yushin, Colonel Alexander Gladkov, and Grigory Ivanov (b. 1989). Additionally, the report reveals the details of a representative of the Belarusian military intelligence—Siarhei Baranau. All of the individuals listed were directly responsible for gathering information on Latvia’s defense infrastructure, the presence of NATO forces, Latvia’s support for Ukraine, and airport networks and troop movement logistics.
Of particular note is Grigory Ivanov, whose operational activities had previously been identified by Ukrainian counterintelligence. Ivanov is alleged to have directed intelligence and sabotage operations within the 316th Intelligence Center, stationed in Crimea after 2014. According to available data, he coordinated operations enabling airstrikes on Odessa, locating Ukrainian air defense systems, and collecting data on troop movements and the effects of missile strikes.
Digitization of conscription and consolidation of the mobilization system in Russia
Russia is transforming its conscription system into an integrated digital infrastructure, linking military records with central state registries (residence, tax, insurance, transportation, and education) and an e-services platform, which allows summonses to be considered delivered via a citizen’s account in the e-administration system and significantly reduces the possibility of falling through the cracks of the mobilization apparatus. As a result, Russia gains the ability to automatically detect inconsistencies (e.g., a person works and pays taxes, but does not respond to summonses) and to apply pressure on large groups of citizens at relatively low operational costs, while the whole process is presented in the authorities’ narrative as a technical “modernization of the administration” and “tightening of registries,” rather than a qualitative intensification of military conscription.
The digitization of conscription reduces classic “loopholes” (outdated data, moves, failure to physically deliver the summons) and shifts the system from a model based on the manual work of military commissions to a model of centralized, automated control, in which evading mobilization becomes logistically and economically increasingly difficult, while simultaneously minimizing the political visibility of mobilization processes by framing them in the language of efficiency and the state’s digital modernity.
Belarus: exercises, preparations “for war,” and integration with the Russian defense system
Since the second half of March, comprehensive exercises by the Western Operational Command have been underway in Belarus, involving, among other things, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare assets, elements of information operations, artillery combat, and operations by mechanized and armored units against “illegal armed formations” and sabotage groups, culminating in a defensive operation with counterattacks along the border. In early April, Alexander Lukashenko explicitly stated that Belarus was “preparing for war,” describing the ongoing readiness checks as “unprecedentedly rigorous” and emphasizing that on the western front, Minsk constitutes the “main link of the CSTO,” which, in the event of a conflict, can count on the presence of the “core” of the Russian armed forces on its territory, while simultaneously developing military cooperation with Russia and—symbolically—with North Korea.
Belarus is de facto cementing its role as a forward-deployed component of the defense system, integrated with the Russian Federation, on the CSTO’s western flank, while the narrative of “preparations for war” serves a dual function: internally, it justifies the further militarization of the state and the subordination of social life to the logic of security; externally, it is intended to strengthen the deterrent effect against NATO, signaling that a potential conflict in this direction would automatically bring into play both Belarusian and Russian armed forces deployed on Belarusian territory.
Local exercises and readiness of the Russian Armed Forces
Russian regional media are announcing and reporting on a series of military exercises on Russian territory, including large-scale counterterrorism exercises involving aviation, naval vessels, and units from various services in closed cities of the Murmansk Oblast (Severomorsk, Vidyaevo, Zaozersk, Gadievo) from March 31 to April 2, as well as maneuvers using live imitation ammunition in the Kerch region of Crimea from April 1 to 3, about which local authorities are informing residents due to expected noise and troop movements.
At the local level, this creates an image of “routine” military activity—the exercises are communicated as planned activities aimed at maintaining combat readiness and security (counterterrorism, territorial defense, interagency cooperation), which normalizes the military’s presence in public spaces and reinforces the message of an efficiently functioning state defense apparatus, without directly referencing the war in Ukraine.
CSTO – preparations for the “Barrier-2026” exercises on the territory of Belarus
The Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) announced preparations for the “Barrier -2026” exercises, which are scheduled to take place in Belarus in October, focusing on defense against radiological, chemical, and biological threats as well as medical support, with the stated intention of incorporating these findings into the further development of the defense against weapons of mass destruction (OPBMR) component and the state’s medical support system.
The planning of CSTO exercises in Belarus reinforces Minsk’s role as a key training ground for developing “collective defense” capabilities in the WMD defense and medical dimensions, while simultaneously signaling a readiness for further doctrinal and logistical integration with Russia in the area of preparing for a conflict with a potentially higher escalation threshold (including the use of weapons of mass destruction).
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- On March 30, the Polish Dual-Use Chamber (PIDU) began operations—an organization bringing together manufacturers of defense and dual-use technology solutions. During the event, attended by representatives of the administration, business, and the Polish Armed Forces, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Eastern Flank Institute and PIDU. The EFI will support the Chamber in identifying promising defense and dual-use technologies.
- On May 4, 2026, “Kanał Otwarty” will launch—a new media platform co-created by two representatives of the Eastern Flank Institute: Ambassador Bartosz Cichocki and Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj. We encourage you to follow updates on this new project (in Polish).
