We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Bulgaria Reports the Exact Amount of Aid Provided to Ukraine
Bulgaria’s “caretaker” Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov has reported the exact amount of aid provided so far by the Bulgarian government to Ukraine. In military terms, the value amounted to just under 344 million euros, of which over 243 million euros were refinanced by the European Peace Facility (EPF) and other allied and partner mechanisms. A significant portion of the transferred support consisted of surplus combat equipment, including items nearing the end of their service life, allowing the Bulgarian side to avoid the costly process of decommissioning them.
The Gyurov government provided this information in response to an interpellation by Zlatan Zlatanov, a representative of the pro-Russian Renewal Party, which seeks to build support by, among other things, highlighting the high costs associated with Sofia’s aid to Kyiv. The government’s response highlighted the relatively low share of the Bulgarian state budget in the aid provided after 2022 and the lack of impact on current tasks related to the technical modernization of the armed forces.
The European Commission has approved the Czech Republic’s application for a loan under the SAFE program
On March 25 of this year, the European Commission approved the Czech Republic’s application for a low-interest loan under the SAFE program. The application amounts to approximately 2.06 billion euros. The first tranche of funds is to be disbursed to the Czech side as early as April of this year. The funds are primarily intended to finance the acquisition of new Leopard 2A8 tanks manufactured by the German Rheinmetall Group.
The Czech Republic had expected a positive decision from the European Commission a month earlier, but for undisclosed reasons, this did not happen. The scale of the loan for Prague is relatively small for the Central and Eastern European region. At the same time, the application for funding from Hungary has still not been approved, as Hungary remains in a broader dispute with Brussels over access to European funds.
IRIS-T Service Center in Latvia
German manufacturer of air defense systems and missiles, Diehl Defense, has signed an agreement with the Latvian company Ripo Remonta Centrs to establish a service center for IRIS-T SLM systems in Latvia. As part of the cooperation, plans are in place to establish a new joint venture that will be responsible for servicing and maintaining the German air defense systems purchased by Latvia and Estonia, as well as those planned for deployment in Lithuania as part of a new German brigade.
The establishment of the new service center in Latvia stems from agreements signed jointly by Latvia and Estonia with Germany, as well as from the need to streamline equipment repair and maintenance processes. At the end of 2023, Latvia signed a contract worth 600 million euros, and Estonia—approximately 400 million euros—covering the delivery of several IRIS-T SLM system batteries. Each system consists of a tactical operations center, a logistics support unit, several radars, and 3–4 missile launchers. IRIS-T systems will also be deployed in Lithuania as part of efforts to strengthen regional air defense and support the German 45th Panzer Brigade “Lithuania” (German: Panzerbrigade 45 “Litauen”)
Recruitment Methods Used by Chinese Intelligence in Finland
The Finnish report “National Security Overview 2026,” prepared and published in March by SUPO (the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service), highlights the methods used by Chinese intelligence to establish contact with individuals of interest. Social media or other forms of electronic communication are used for this purpose. From the perspective of the person being recruited, there are usually no clear indications that the contact is linked to China. For example, the conversation may resemble a standard professional recruitment process conducted by a foreign employer. Contact may be initiated by either the recruiter or the company seeking job candidates. This process often involves an intermediary mechanism, which prevents the interested party from recognizing the potential threat. At some stage, a request may arise to share information or materials sensitive to the company or the state. Such an occurrence can serve as a warning sign indicating the covert nature of an intelligence operation.
Finland, as a country engaged in the development of modern technologies—including telecommunications, artificial intelligence, space technology, and defense—is particularly vulnerable to attempts to recruit specialized personnel. The methods described may target both researchers at universities and research institutes, as well as staff at innovative high-tech companies. The Finnish intelligence service SUPO’s attention to these threats underscores the need for increased caution in the area of cybersecurity and the existence of risks associated with employees and researchers seeking new opportunities for professional development and skill enhancement. Hostile intelligence is capable of conducting sufficiently effective reconnaissance on a given individual so that the initial contact appears harmless. From a Polish perspective, those at risk of such activities are primarily specialists who will form the core of Poland’s industrial development, especially in the context of new investments in the growing high-tech and defense sectors.
Estonian Service Center for HIMARS Launchers
Estonia is expanding its service center for HIMARS launchers, which is part of the transformation of its command structure, namely the Estonian Division. The goal is to integrate national forces with allied troops and improve interoperability. This center is a key strategic logistics hub for the entire Baltic region.
As of March 2026, the Estonian center has received full authorization from the American manufacturer Lockheed Martin. This means that Estonian technicians can independently perform warranty repairs and advanced technical inspections, which reduces equipment downtime.
Until now, any major malfunction of HIMARS system components required shipping modules to the U.S. or Germany. It can be said that as of March 2026, Estonia has become self-sufficient. In the event of war, the ability to repair damaged equipment on-site determines the likelihood of conducting military operations. Estonia has purchased a total of 6 M142 HIMARS launchers, along with GMLRS rockets with a range of 80 km and ATACMS long-range missiles with a range of 300 km. Together with Latvia, which has 6 launchers, and Lithuania, which has 8 launchers, the three Baltic countries on NATO’s eastern flank possess 20 HIMARS launchers. The maintenance center itself is located at the Tapa base, approximately 80 km east of Tallinn.
Recruitment drops below casualty levels. The Kremlin accelerates preparations for a new wave of mobilization
Recruitment into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has fallen below current casualty levels for the first time since 2022, indicating that existing sources of personnel replenishment are being exhausted. In response, the Kremlin has drafted amendments to regulations allowing for the compulsory conscription of reservists and imposing criminal penalties for criticizing the mobilization. The bill has been submitted to the State Duma under an expedited procedure. According to the Defense Ministry’s plans, the first groups of mobilized troops are to be sent to the front in early April, mainly to the Zaporizhzhia and Kupiansk-Sviatynsk directions.
A decline in recruitment capacity coupled with rising casualties confirms the Russian army’s growing manpower problems. Maintaining the current pace of operations necessitates resorting to administrative coercion, which in turn increases the risk of internal erosion of morale and social tensions. The introduction of penalties for criticizing the mobilization signals the authorities’ growing fears that discontent will spread to local communities and soldiers’ families. The new wave of mobilization will likely strengthen the front in the short term, but at the cost of further degradation in personnel quality and troop loyalty.
War Economy and the Defense Industry: Increased Production
The Russian defense-industrial complex maintains a high level of arms production, as confirmed by both Russian government statements and assessments by NATO representatives. According to public statements by Russian government officials, the production of tanks and aviation equipment has increased significantly in recent years, the state defense order for 2025 has been fulfilled, and the plan for 2026 has been secured with resources.
However, the high pace of arms deliveries is associated with mounting inflationary pressure and the need for increasingly restrictive price controls in state contracts, as indicated by statements from government representatives and the Bank of Russia. Such a war economy model increases short-term military resilience but deepens the economy’s structural dependence on defense spending and the risk of macroeconomic shocks following a potential end to the wartime boom.
Militarization of Universities and the Personnel Reserve for Unmanned Forces
Russian technical universities are increasingly serving as direct recruitment channels for the army, particularly for unmanned forces. Students receive offers of one-year (and potentially longer) contracts to serve in units responsible for the operation and development of drones, which effectively blurs the line between the education system and the mobilization system.
Such militarization of higher education enables the rapid recruitment of personnel with desired technical skills, but at the same time deepens the dependence of science and innovation on military contracts. Within a few years, this could alter the profile of Russia’s technical elites, steering them more toward the military-industrial complex than the civilian sector
The “Rassvet-3” Program – Russia’s Starlink
On March 23, the first batch of 16 satellites from the “Rassvet-3” constellation—a project developed as the Russian equivalent of the Starlink system—was launched into orbit from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. The launch was conducted with limited media coverage, and confirmation of the mission came only after the payload was successfully placed in orbit.
Ultimately, by the end of 2026, the constellation is expected to comprise over 150 low-Earth orbit satellites, enabling the launch of satellite broadband internet services with a significant military component. From an operational perspective, this system is intended to provide secure communications and data transmission for drone operators and combat units, enabling remote control of unmanned aerial vehicles from deep within Russian territory.
Counterintelligence in Crimea and the SWR Narrative
The FSB reports further arrests of alleged collaborators with Ukrainian intelligence in Crimea who were transmitting data on the deployment of Russian troops via messaging apps. The cumulative number of arrests in a short period may indicate both an operational breakthrough by the FSB and the scale of infiltration that necessitated more extensive operations.
At the same time, SWR Director Naryshkin maintains the narrative that a “partnership with the West is practically impossible,” which serves to legitimize the thesis of a long-term, systemic conflict with Europe and the U.S. Such statements create the informational backdrop for the further tightening of Russia’s domestic and foreign policies.
Russia, Iran, and the War in the Middle East
The Russian Foreign Ministry and state media emphasize Moscow’s role as Iran’s political patron, while officially denying that intelligence is being shared with Tehran. Declarative support for Iran is coupled with rhetoric about “American-Israeli aggression,” which is intended to reinforce Russia’s image as the leader of the anti-Western bloc.
Western media, citing intelligence sources, report on deliveries of modernized drones and targeting data from Russia to Iran, which the Kremlin consistently denies. If this information is accurate, it would mean that Russia’s experiences from the Ukrainian front are being transferred to other theaters of conflict.
Security Council on Critical Infrastructure Protection
At a March meeting of the Security Council’s permanent members, Putin discussed “additional measures to protect critical infrastructure” with the heads of the security services and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The meeting took place against the backdrop of intensifying Ukrainian drone strikes on energy and industrial facilities deep within Russia.
Strengthening infrastructure protection entails, among other things, additional investments in air defense and the expansion of physical and cyber security measures. In practice, this could lead to a further shift of resources from the front lines toward internal defense.
Iran: Public Gratitude and Practical Support
The Iranian president publicly thanked Russia for its support in the conflict with the U.S. and Israel, highlighting the inspiring role of Putin’s messages. In recent weeks, Moscow has provided Tehran with medical aid, among other things, which was publicized as a gesture of solidarity toward its strategic partner.
Western media reports of secret deliveries of drones and reconnaissance data from Russia to Iran, if accurate, point to deep military integration between the two countries. The Kremlin, however, maintains an official line of denial, seeking to avoid being formally classified as a party to the conflict in the Middle East.
Countdown to the Telegram Blockade
Russian authorities are preparing to effectively block Telegram within the Federation, with the exception of access for the military in combat zones. The percentage of failed connections to the service has already risen significantly, and the Ministry of Digital Development is consulting with operators and platforms regarding further restrictions.
Planned fees for excessive international mobile traffic and restrictions on users utilizing VPNs are intended to effectively make it harder to circumvent censorship. The Telegram blockade will impact both independent media and pro-Russian channels, demonstrating that the authorities’ priority is to centralize control over the information space, even at the expense of some of their existing propaganda tools.
New regulations effective March 1 and April 1
Starting in March and April, further regulations tightening state control over the public sphere, the economy, and private life will come into effect, including provisions on the protection of the Russian language, new requirements for taxis, and registries of sensitive data. At the same time, the Russian Federation is preparing restrictions on cash transactions and cryptocurrency mining in selected regions.
This package of changes is part of a broader trend toward building a system for managing political and economic risks in wartime conditions. The expansion of registries and new reporting obligations increases surveillance capabilities and the potential for repression against groups deemed problematic.
Belarus-Russia: Long-Term Military Program Through 2030
Minsk and Moscow maintain intensive military cooperation, confirmed by the adoption of a military partnership program extending through 2030. It envisions hundreds of joint training, technological, and operational initiatives aimed at strengthening the “military security of the Union State.”
The program through 2030 cements the structural integration of the Belarusian and Russian armies—at the levels of planning, infrastructure, and armaments. This means that Minsk’s margin of autonomy in strategic matters, including potential participation in external conflicts, will in practice be increasingly constrained by the Kremlin’s will.
Lukashenko in Pyongyang – a demonstrative alliance with North Korea
Alexander Lukashenko paid an official visit to North Korea, during which he met with Kim Jong Un; during the gift-exchange ceremony, he presented him with an assault rifle and traditional Belarusian products, receiving in return, among other things, a saber, a decorative vase, and a gold commemorative coin. The visit was widely publicized by North Korean and Belarusian media as a symbolic gesture of strengthening cooperation between two countries subject to Western sanctions.
The “rifle gift” gesture reinforces Minsk’s image as an active member of the anti-Western camp, ready to demonstratively support the most controversial regimes. For Lukashenko, this is also a signal to Moscow that he is consistently positioning Belarus within the political sphere shaped by Russia—from Iran to North Korea—in exchange for further security guarantees and economic support.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- What is the Strategy of Displacement, and what is the state of U.S. defense in the era of great power conflict? We encourage you to read the new analysis by Sebastian Bojemski Ph.D. IWF Senior Fellow. The publication is available at this link.
- IWF Program Council Chairman Michał Dworczyk announced on Radio Wnet’s “Poranek” program the need for changes in the organization and tasks of the Territorial Defense Forces, as well as the creation of a modern program for universal military training in Poland. The interview is available on the Radio Wnet website.
- Sebastian Bojemski Ph.D. IWF Senior Fellow discusses active measures, disinformation, and methods of defense against these threats with Karol Darmoros in the podcast “Anatomy of Disinformation.” The podcast is available at this link.
