We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
The Czech Republic will launch co-production of CV90 infantry fighting vehicles
In accordance with the contract signed for the delivery of CV90 infantry fighting vehicles for the Czech armed forces, the local defense industry is preparing the appropriate production facilities to ensure deliveries of 20 units per month (assembly at the VOP CZ plant). The Czech Republic has decided to purchase 246 vehicles to replace the post-Soviet BWP-2, and under the negotiated agreement, at least 40% of the production work is to be carried out by Czech companies.
CV90 infantry fighting vehicles have been meeting with increased interest in the Eastern Flank of NATO for several years, partly due to their effective service on the Ukrainian front and the high level of local involvement of the manufacturer (the British BAE group and its Swedish subsidiary). The vehicles are used in Scandinavian countries and Slovakia, among others, currently as mortar carriers, but a modified version is also being considered as a chassis for tanks.
Romanian water administration falls victim to massive cyberattack
The Romanian National Water Administration, the administrative body responsible for managing Romania’s water resources, fell victim to a massive cyberattack on December 20. According to information provided by the National Directorate for Cybersecurity, 10 of the Administration’s 11 regional branches were attacked using ransomware, a technique that maliciously uses encryption software to block access to data. The Administration’s current operations were not compromised.
Cyberattacks on water infrastructure facilities are a regular threat in NATO’s eastern flank and have been carried out this year in Poland, among other places (e.g., in May, technical parameters were manipulated at a water treatment plant in Szczytno). Disrupting key processes in the functioning of the state and society is one of the most visible symptoms of the growing security crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. Russian actions in Ukraine demonstrate this trend in its most extreme form (e.g., the destruction of energy infrastructure facilities).
The Ukrainian Armed Forces received 3 million FPV drones in 2025
Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal declared that in 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces received approximately 3 million FPV drones from various sources, more than 2.5 times more than in 2024. The ending year was also supposed to be a record-breaking one in terms of the use of land-based unmanned aerial vehicles, with a total of over 15,000 units deployed. The minister emphasized that unmanned systems are currently one of the key factors on the battlefield and a development priority for the Ministry of Defense.
The information provided by the Ukrainian defense minister, even assuming the lack of accurate data on FPV drones that are quickly consumed or acquired outside the formal circulation, points to the fundamental role of unmanned aerial vehicles in the ongoing conflict. Despite the rapid pace of adaptation by both sides and the implementation of many systems (e.g., electronic warfare or physical obstacles) that reduce the effectiveness of FPV drones, due to their high speed, low cost, and ease of use, they remain a primary tool for tactical influence.
Spain strengthens Lithuania with an anti-drone system
Spain has decided to deploy the CROW anti-drone system in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission on the eastern flank of the alliance. The system is manufactured by Indra Sistemas, one of Spain’s most important defense companies, known for its solutions in electronic warfare, radar technology, cybersecurity, and air traffic control systems.
The current version of the CROW system, designed to combat small unmanned aerial vehicles, was developed as part of research and development work in 2020–2021. The first implementations took place in Spain, in areas around airports and critical infrastructure facilities. Outside Spain, the system was used as part of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) before being deployed in Lithuania. In terms of its capabilities, it should be noted that the CROW system is tactical in nature and is designed to detect approaching objects at relatively short distances. The intruder detection system works in cooperation with the operator and, unlike some solutions from other manufacturers, does not use artificial intelligence models. The technology used in the system is limited in terms of neutralization to disrupting the control signal and taking control of the drone. It is also worth noting that Lithuania has decided to purchase solutions from the Polish company APS (Advanced Protection Systems) to protect critical infrastructure.
Interview with the Head of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
According to Kaupo Rosin, head of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA, est. Välisluureamet), the intensive actions taken by NATO and European Union allies have had a significant impact on Russia’s behavior in the Baltic region. In his opinion, there are currently no indications that Russia is planning an attack on the Baltic states or, more broadly, on NATO members. However, this does not mean that the security situation will not change after the possible end of the war in Ukraine.
Kaupo Rosin also pointed out that the reduction in Russia’s aggressive actions in the Baltic Sea region is accompanied by active efforts to limit Western military support for Ukrainian forces.
Summarizing the events of the year is a regular practice in Estonia, especially since the Estonian services are required to prepare and publish successive threat assessments in the form of publicly available documents. Such a study was presented at the beginning of 2025, and the next report is planned for early 2026. The announcements made in the interview and in the upcoming annual report indicate a change in assessments regarding the possibility of Russia “losing” the war in Ukraine, with potential consequences in the form of a frozen conflict or a peace agreement. The head of Estonian intelligence also signaled that one of the significant problems could be Russia’s internal difficulties related to the reintegration of soldiers returning from the war. A separate issue is the possibility of reinforcing the expanding military structures in the Baltic region with units that have combat experience gained in the war against Ukraine.
Finnish shipbuilding industry to build icebreakers for the US
Finland will build two icebreakers under an agreement signed in December 2025 with the US Coast Guard (USCG). The vessels are to be delivered by 2028. This initiative is part of the practical implementation of the US Arctic Security Cutters program, which aims to strengthen the operational capabilities of the US and its allies in the Arctic region. The choice of Finland, one of the global leaders in the design and construction of ice-going vessels, is a direct result of the political agreements made in October 2025 by the presidents of the United States and Finland to deepen industrial and defense cooperation in the area of northern security.
The contract has been awarded to the Finnish shipyard Rauma Marine Constructions (RMC) and the first phase involves the construction of two modern icebreakers in Finland.
In the longer term, it is planned to develop cooperation by building further vessels at Bollinger Shipyards in the United States, as part of a broader industrial consortium. This consortium also includes the Canadian shipyard Seaspan Shipyards and the Finnish company Aker Arctic, responsible for design and ice technologies. The program will be based on Finnish know-how, technology licenses, and the transfer of expertise, which will enable the gradual transfer of icebreaker production to the US while maintaining the high technical standards required for operating in Arctic conditions. The creation of new Arctic vessels with the potential for a permanent presence and control of sea routes also has an important military dimension related to the ongoing competition for strategic superiority between Western countries (the US, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland) and Russia and China.
Results of the extended meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense – structural transformation
During the meeting on December 17, 2025 (attended by Vladimir Putin), key indicators for the development of the Russian Armed Forces were revealed. The recruitment plan was exceeded – almost 410,000 people were recruited (two-thirds of whom were under the age of 40). In 2025, 5 divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments were formed. The creation of another 4 divisions and 14 brigades is planned for 2026. A revolution in tactical mobility has taken place: 38,000 motorcycles and buggy vehicles have been delivered (a 10-fold increase y/y) . The saturation of radio-electronic warfare (REW) assets increased 6.5-fold (130,000 systems). According to the Russians, the official figures already show a twofold quantitative advantage over Ukraine, e.g., in battlefield drones, with about 50% of losses being inflicted by FPV strike drones.
The Russian Armed Forces are moving away from heavy structures in favor of light motorized infantry (buggies/motorcycles) saturated with drones and WRE. This is an adaptation to the “transparent battlefield.” The pace of forming new divisions (9 in two years) indicates preparation for a long-term, high-intensity conflict.
Status of Russian strategic weapons (Burevestnik, Poseidon, Oryzhnik)
V. Putin and Gen. V. Gerasimov confirmed in October and December 2025 the completion of trials of key systems. The nuclear-powered maneuverable missile “Burevestnik” (9M730) successfully completed a 15-hour flight over a distance of 14,000 km. The unmanned underwater vehicle Poseidon (range 10,000 km, unlimited depth) completed testing; 32 units were ordered for the Belgorod and Khabarovsk OORPs. The Orieshnik missile system is to enter combat duty by the end of 2025, with planned deployment also in Belarus.
The completion of testing coincides with the expiration of the START III agreement (February 2026). Russia is building asymmetric deterrence capabilities that NATO is currently unable to effectively counter. The deployment of “Oriesznik” in Belarus permanently changes the security architecture of NATO’s eastern flank.
Command crisis in the Kupiansk direction
Russian analytical sources (unofficial) reveal a systemic problem of false reports in December 2025. Official reports of “100% control” over Kupiansk led to the withdrawal of reserves and the withdrawal of combat allowances from soldiers, while in reality “extremely heavy fighting” is ongoing. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have maintained bridgeheads in the forests and on the heights (Gusinka), while the Russian defense is “focalized.” As a result of “virtual successes,” the Russians have lost the territory they had actually captured on the western bank of the Oskol.
The Kupinsk crisis is a textbook example of how propaganda of success (“PSYOP – against oneself”) paralyzes operational command. False initial data leads to wrong staff decisions, which in this case blocked the strategic possibility of striking Slavyansk from the north.
New generations of Russian drones and loitering munitions
December 2025 saw the unveiling of new capabilities for Russian unmanned aerial vehicles. The “Gieran” family received a 5th version with a jet engine (170 km/h), a 90 kg warhead, and a “hunter” option (camera + operator). The “Verivka” (net drop) and “Cyclops” (range 2 km, launched from a hand-held launcher) drone interception systems were introduced. The modernized ZALA T-20 has radio wave-absorbing plating and AI for autonomous target recognition. The air force received rocket-powered gliding bombs (range up to 193 km) and UMPC modules with the “Kometa” system, which is resistant to GPS interference.
Russia is shifting from quantity to quality (AI, jet engines, stealth). The introduction of cheap interceptor drones is a response to the saturation of the battlefield with Ukrainian drones. Increasing the range of bombs (193 km) allows the air force to operate beyond the range of most medium-range air defense systems.
Recruitment potential and economic situation of the Russian Federation
D. Medvedev reported on December 23, 2025, that 453,000 people were recruited in 2025. With estimated losses of ~500,000 (according to Belousov, November 20), Russia is barely compensating for the losses. Signs of exhaustion: contract bonuses of 3-5 million rubles (up from 200,000), upper age limit of 65, recruitment of prisoners and migrants. The Bank of Russia has lowered its rate to 16% (still crisis-high), forecasting inflation of 6% (independent estimates: 12-18%). GDP grew by 1% – in a war economy, this is stagnation, with the civilian sector shrinking. Defense spending 7.3% of GDP (2026: increase to 13.5 trillion rubles).
The volunteer recruitment system is exhausting social reserves (increasingly higher bonuses required). The economy avoided a collapse in 2025, but is entering stagflation – high inflation with low growth. The key test in 2026: whether financing can be maintained without mobilization or tax increases, which could cause social tensions.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
-
EFI Program Council member Ambassador Bartosz Cichocki gave an interview to the Rzeczpospolita daily (in Polish), in which he discussed, among other things, Poland’s participation in peace talks.
- In the coming New Year, we wish you health, prosperity, and personal happiness. May every day of 2026 be filled with kindness, mutual understanding, and peace. Thank you for being with us!
