We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Arson Attack on an Arms Manufacturing Plant in Pardubice, Czech Republic
On March 20 of this year, an arson attack occurred at the production facility of LPP-Archer (a manufacturer of military thermal imaging systems) in Pardubice, Czech Republic. Activists from the organization The Earthquake Faction claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack, citing their desire to fight Israel and its policies toward Palestine as their motive (the plant was carrying out tasks as part of a partnership with the Israeli company Elbit). As a result of the attack, the warehouse infrastructure was destroyed; however, the company’s CEO, Oleksandr Yaremenko, announced that the incident would not affect the pace of deliveries to customers, although estimated losses amount to approximately $1 million and necessitate reconstruction work that will take several months.
The target of the attack, the professional manner, and the method of its execution raise a number of questions regarding the actual responsibility and intentions of the perpetrators. LPP-Archer is a manufacturer of thermal imaging systems also for the Ukrainian Armed Forces—these are used, among other things, to guide anti-tank missiles in the Stugna-P systems. Defense industry facilities (including those within NATO territory) are on the list of priority targets for Russian armed forces and special services, as exemplified by the 2014 fire at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice, Czech Republic. Increasing the resilience of countries on NATO’s eastern flank requires a systematic approach to protecting the defense industry, including the establishment of higher standards for companies serving the armed forces.
FN Herstal’s preparations for expansion into the Romanian defense market
The Belgian group FN Herstal is preparing to permanently increase its presence in Romania, likely in connection with the allocation of significant funds (over €439 million) for soldiers’ personal equipment in a proposal under the EU’s SAFE program. Over the past few months, the Belgian company has signed cooperation agreements with over a dozen local businesses and established a special-purpose vehicle, FN Herstal Romania, tasked with launching local production. Ultimately, the company aims to become the primary supplier of small arms not only to the Romanian armed forces but also to other uniformed services.
FN Herstal’s activities in the Romanian market exemplify a consistent export strategy (initiated in 2024) and the use of favorable external conditions (a favorable loan under SAFE) to build a strong position in the local market through extensive local production. The Belgian group’s activities should serve as an interesting case study for defense companies from countries on NATO’s eastern flank, which typically have products tailored to similar expectations of armed forces across the region, yet lack the funds for investment.
Chinese activity from the perspective of Baltic and Nordic intelligence agencies
Reports published in the first three months of 2026 by the intelligence services of the Baltic and Nordic states clearly and unequivocally define the threat posed by Russia. In the long term, this concerns a military threat, while in the short term it is linked to hybrid operations, cyber threats, and traditional espionage. At the same time, some reports point to an existing and growing risk of activities by China. Areas where suspicious activity has been observed include research cooperation, technology development, and attempts to gain economic influence.
In recent months, a number of activities related to the presence and operations of Chinese intelligence have been recorded in several European countries. The most recent case involved the detention in February of this year at Warsaw Airport of a 32-year-old Montenegrin citizen suspected by the Lithuanian Civil Intelligence Agency (VSD) of collaborating with Chinese intelligence. This case is linked to activities by Chinese intelligence services, which are also reported by (in conjunction with the VSD) Lithuanian military intelligence (AOTD), warning that Chinese institutions are seeking to establish technological cooperation with Western universities and research centers. The aim of these activities is to acquire knowledge and innovation. These activities take various forms, but the most common include joint research projects and academic exchanges. Among other examples related to Chinese intelligence’s interest in Europe is the arrest of a 54-year-old Greek colonel who was a telecommunications specialist. This soldier was alleged to have collaborated with Chinese intelligence by transmitting information primarily via encrypted electronic channels. Another case occurred in France, where four people were arrested in connection with the illegal interception of Starlink communications in the Gironde region of France. In 2024, three German citizens were arrested on suspicion of obtaining technology from German institutions and companies, including through negotiations and participation in research projects related to maritime technology.
New Defense Companies in the Estonian Industrial Park in Ermistu
The Estonian Center for Defense Investment (ECDI) has established partnerships and signed agreements with companies that will set up new factories in the defense industrial park in Ermistu. Under the signed contracts, Nitrotol OÜ will produce ammunition, including mines and explosives,
Frankenburg Technologies OÜ will specialize in the production of short-range missiles for air defense systems, Infinitum Strike OÜ will manufacture ammunition components, and Odin Defence OÜ (affiliated with the British company Thor Industries Ltd) will produce plastic explosives.
The Ermistu industrial park has entered the phase of implementing actual contracts. Based on the selection of individual companies and their declared specializations, construction is beginning on a full production chain for ammunition and short- and medium-range missile systems. Production is set to begin in 2027 and is based on a concept in which the state builds the basic infrastructure (an investment of approximately 50 million euros), while selected companies construct their own facilities and production lines. This is the first facility in Estonia designed specifically for ammunition production.
Joint Agreement on Transport Planning and Civilian Evacuation
The Nordic and Baltic countries, along with Poland and Germany, signed an agreement in March 2026 providing the basis for the introduction of mutually binding regulations regarding the planning of population evacuation and transport in the event of war or crisis situations requiring the activation of such procedures. This is a broad agreement that goes beyond the traditional NB8 cooperation framework, indicating efforts to find common, regional solutions and reflecting an existing sense of threat from a potential conflict.
The signed document opens new opportunities for mutual cooperation in preparing and updating border control procedures during population displacement, registering individuals, and defining evacuation corridors and transport routes. This initiative is a logical implementation of the lessons learned from the events that took place shortly after the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022. The military operations at that time were accompanied by massive population movements and a humanitarian crisis. Advance preparation of procedures allows for better identification of threats and the development of appropriate responses.
Expansion of the Russian Armed Forces and preparations for a protracted war
Between 2025 and 2027, the Russian military is undergoing an expansion process, including an increase in personnel, the development of a contract-based component of the armed forces, and the reorganization of structures to conduct a long-term, high-intensity conflict.
The Russian military leadership anticipates a permanent shift away from the model of short-term expeditionary campaigns toward a long war, requiring systematic personnel rotation, replenishment of losses, and the expansion of line units and support infrastructure.
Russia is openly building structures and resources for a long-term military effort, which has direct implications for NATO planning on its eastern flank. Countries in the region should verify whether their pace of expanding stockpiles, reserves, and production capabilities is adequate to counter an adversary that plans in terms of years, not months.
Russian doctrinal lessons from the war in Ukraine
The Russian military views operations in Ukraine as a testing ground for verifying and refining its military doctrine. Key areas of change include a shift toward deep defense, dispersed formations, the massive use of artillery and drones, and the restructuring of the command system and logistical support. These experiences are to be permanently incorporated into the training and combat readiness system.
Russia does not view the war as an isolated incident, but as a laboratory for future conflicts—including potential clashes with NATO. An analysis of the directions of adjustment in Russian doctrine allows us to forecast the forms of operations to be expected on the eastern flank: the scale of artillery, the significance of drones, and the dispersion and depth of defense.
The Massive Use of FPV Drones as a New Pillar of Russian Firepower
The Russian military is making massive use of FPV drones—estimates indicate 120,000–140,000 units in use, with a target production of up to 200,000 per year. The drones are used in conjunction with conventional artillery and serve as a low-cost means of striking point targets, equipment, and fortifications. Concurrently, work is underway to adapt tactics to an environment heavily saturated with the enemy’s electronic warfare measures and satellite communication systems.
FPVs are becoming a central element of Russian firepower—a cheap “artillery of the poor,” compensating for losses in conventional strike systems. For the countries on the eastern flank, this means the need for urgent investments in very short-range air defense, electronic warfare capabilities, passive protection for troops, and the development of their own massive fleet of offensive drones.
Russian industrial mobilization and increased arms production
Between 2024 and 2026, the Russian military-industrial complex significantly increased its production of ammunition and equipment, prioritizing artillery, drones, and electronic warfare systems. Production was reoriented toward a long-term war economy, with a growing role for the private sector—particularly in the manufacture of components for unmanned aerial vehicles.
The scale of Russia’s industrial mobilization—even accounting for propaganda-driven exaggerations—raises the question of whether regional ammunition and drone production capacities in NATO countries are growing fast enough to keep pace. A comparison of Russian declarations with Western estimates can serve as a starting point for assessing the industrial balance between the two sides.
The Evolution of the Russian Mobilization System and Legal Framework
The Russian mobilization system has undergone a series of reforms over the past decade—from the laws of 2006 and 2014, through the partial mobilization mechanisms of 2022, to further legislative changes in 2023. The current model is hybrid in nature, combining contract soldiers, reservists, volunteers, and BARS-type formations. Further increases in personnel strength are planned through 2026–2027.
The sequence of legal reforms demonstrates a systematic effort to build the capacity for rapid army expansion in a crisis situation. For countries on the eastern flank, it is crucial to align this process with their own pace of rebuilding reserves, mobilization systems, and reservist training—especially in the context of the ability to rapidly increase the size of the armed forces in the initial phase of a conflict.
Casualties, Replacements, and Acceptable Levels of Combat Wear and Tear
The Russian command has accepted a high level of losses as a permanent element of planning and incorporates it into its system of rotations, replenishments, and the restoration of units’ combat readiness. The organizational structure is adapted to conduct prolonged, high-intensity operations, with a continuous flow of personnel and equipment replenishments.
The willingness to sustain high losses, combined with the ability to rapidly replenish personnel and equipment, could undermine NATO’s qualitative advantage unless the alliance ensures a comparable rate of replenishment at the brigade and division levels. Russia’s ability to “absorb losses” should be a key parameter in war scenarios for the eastern flank.
Perception of NATO as a Real Adversary in the Ongoing Conflict
In Russian military discourse, NATO and Western nations are presented not as a potential but as a real adversary—the organizer and guarantor of support for Ukraine.
The conflict is defined as a “proxy war” against the “collective West,” and the need to prepare for a protracted confrontation with the alliance is communicated directly to officers and soldiers.
Of particular significance is the fact that this is internal language, directed at the military, not at the public. Such a perception of NATO lowers the threshold for interpreting the alliance’s actions on the eastern flank as hostile and fosters escalatory thinking in a crisis situation.
Logistical challenges facing the Russian army in prolonged operations
The Russian army faces serious problems regarding supply, rear-area organization, and personnel rotation. Adjustments are underway in the logistics command system, the role of rear units is being expanded, and warehousing is being reorganized. Resolving logistics bottlenecks is viewed as a prerequisite for maintaining combat capability over the long term.
Logistical problems constitute a real systemic weakness that can be exploited through operations targeting deep rear areas, transport hubs, and supply lines. At the same time, visible efforts to eliminate these weaknesses should be taken into account in assessments of the Russian Federation’s future ability to conduct operations outside the current theater of operations.
Electronic Warfare and Countering Western Satellite Infrastructure
The importance of electronic warfare (EW) is growing in Russian operational planning, encompassing countermeasures against satellite systems such as Starlink, the development of communication jamming capabilities, and the adaptation of tactics to conditions of high reconnaissance saturation. EW is treated as a key component of future operations, determining the effectiveness of drones, artillery, and command systems.
The Russians view the electromagnetic spectrum as one of the main theaters of combat, not merely a support element. For the eastern flank, this means the need to invest in the resilience of C2 systems, communications redundancy, and counter-WRE measures. The development of Russian WRE capabilities is a pillar of operational planning, not an add-on.
Moral Propaganda and Social Consolidation for a Protracted War
The Russian military apparatus is conducting an intensive campaign of moral consolidation, invoking the traditions of the Great Patriotic War, the heroization of modern soldiers, and the cult of sacrifice. The message directed at military personnel emphasizes “resilience” despite losses and the obligation of society and the regions to continue providing material support to the front.
The scale of this symbolic mobilization influences assessments of the durability of Russian public support for a protracted war and the adversary’s ability to maintain morale amid mounting casualties. For the countries of the Eastern Flank, this also illustrates the fundamental difference between Russian and Western approaches to communicating casualties and war sacrifices.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- The National Security Bureau has made available the presentations from the conference titled “Between Voluntary Service and Compulsory Service: Does Poland Need to Reinstate Compulsory Military Service?”. We encourage you to review the EFI’s materials on the concept of Universal Public Service and other prepared presentations. Polish version is available at the link.
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The Eastern Flank Institute has agreed to serve as patron for the book titled “The War We Don’t Want. But Are We Ready for It?” by Bartłomiej Wypartowicz and Wojciech Kozioł, which will be released on March 27, 2026. The publication analyzes Poland’s security in the context of growing international tensions. We encourage you to order the book (in Polish) on the Prześwity publishing house website.
