We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Cyberattacks on Romanian critical infrastructure
On February 23, Dan Cîmpean, head of the National Cybersecurity Directorate, reported a series of cyberattacks on selected critical infrastructure facilities, including oil, water, and energy. The hacker groups responsible for the attack, operating from the territory of the Russian Federation, coordinated the attacks during a period of increased demand for energy supplies associated with the winter season.
The series of cyberattacks on Romania’s critical infrastructure confirms the country’s important role in the regional security architecture. In recent years, Romania’s role in the region has grown not only due to increasing defense spending, but also as a base for Ukraine, which is currently at war.
Bulgaria’s response to the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East
Immediately after the start of the American and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, Bulgaria’s acting Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov convened a meeting of the Security Council and then announced at a press conference that there was “no immediate threat” to the country. At the same time, a 24-hour crisis management team was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In preparation for the air strikes on Iran, increased US air traffic was observed at Bulgarian military bases and airports, including the temporary closure of Sofia International Airport to civilian traffic. Public debate quickly raised concerns about the potential consequences for Bulgaria due to its possible involvement in the operation against Iran (direct links were officially denied). The current Bulgarian government is of a “technical” nature and is unlikely to want to become more involved in the ongoing operation against Iran, focusing its efforts instead on evacuating Bulgarians from the danger zone.
Czech government and opposition support operation against Iran
Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis announced on social media his support for US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, stating that Iran’s nuclear program posed “a threat to the Czech Republic and Europe.” A similar position was expressed by Czech opposition leaders, including the ODS and TOP09 parties. The leader of the Pirate Party, Zdenek Hrib, raised doubts about the legality of the action, but did not question the political objectives of the operation.
The similar stance of the government and the opposition stems from a desire to maintain good relations with the United States and Israel. Both countries are long-standing suppliers of various equipment to the Czech armed forces, and political relations have been unequivocally positive for many years, regardless of changes in government.
Estonia’s plans to participate in the development of the CV90 Mk IV infantry fighting vehicle
Estonia has expressed its willingness to actively participate in the CV90 Mk IV (Swedish: Stridsfordon 90) infantry fighting vehicle production program, which indicates ongoing negotiations regarding the prospective purchase of next-generation vehicles for the Estonian armed forces. There are proposals to include Estonian companies in the supply chain – companies capable of producing camera systems, cabling, and performing welding work. The vehicle is manufactured by the Swedish company BAE Systems Hägglunds
Estonia is considering purchasing CV90 Mk IVs over the next five years. The process of developing a policy decision related to the planning of this order is currently underway. The inclusion of Estonian industry in the production of components for the new generation of vehicles could contribute to speeding up deliveries and, importantly from Estonia’s point of view, increasing the involvement of the local defense sector.
It should be added that Estonia is a party to a joint CV90 Mk IV procurement project with the Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. So far, a technical agreement has been reached as a basis for further cooperation, but the main procurement contract has not yet been signed. Estonia currently operates the earlier generation of CV9035 vehicles (Mk III variant with a 35 mm cannon). To date, CV90 Mk IV vehicles have been ordered by Slovakia (152 units), the Czech Republic (246 units), and Lithuania (100 units). The target number of CV90 Mk IVs under the multinational program is conservatively estimated at around 500 units.
Russian drone in the Øresund Strait
In late February 2026, Swedish armed forces detected a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle in the Øresund Strait, which forms the maritime border between Denmark and Sweden. At that time, the French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, participating in NATO’s Orion 26 exercises, was moored in the port of Malmö. The drone was tracked by the Swedish patrol ship HMS Rapp about 7 nautical miles from the aircraft carrier, just before entering the protection zone. As a result of the immediate activation of radio-electronic warfare (jamming) systems, the drone lost control, disappeared from radar screens, and failed to approach the ship.
The incident, which took place in the area of the strategic Øresund strait separating the waters of Denmark and Sweden and connecting the Baltic Sea with the Kattegat, is an example of a relatively simple action capable of seriously disrupting maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea. This time, the Swedish armed forces officially confirmed that the drone took off from the deck of the Russian radio-electronic reconnaissance ship Zhigulevsk (Russian: Жигулёвск), belonging to the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. It was built in the 1980s at the Northern Shipyard in Gdańsk, Poland, on behalf of the USSR.
Russians want the war to end in 2026
Russian polling centers, including VTsIOM and Russian Field, show that most Russians expect the war to end in 2026; this percentage reaches about half of the respondents. Russian Field data indicate an increase in the number of people who consider the course of the “SWO” to be unsuccessful, while at the same time declaring high support for Vladimir Putin and a willingness to accept any “peaceful” solution he announces. These institutions’ publications do not openly criticize Putin – concerns are shifted to the “length of the conflict,” “heavy casualties,” and “uncertainty,” and a solution is sought in “negotiations on terms favorable to Russia.”
Research suggests growing war fatigue while maintaining loyalty to the leader, which is typical of an authoritarian system with a strongly controlled public space. Through state and pro-government opinion research centers, the Kremlin may be testing the public’s readiness for a negotiation scenario, while maintaining the narrative of the need to end the war “on terms favorable to Russia.”
Russia is preparing for the “Center-2026” strategic maneuvers
At the turn of February and March, a large series of exercises and combat readiness tests are taking place at 18 training grounds in Russia – land, sea, and air – presented in propaganda as part of the preparations for the “Center-2026” strategic maneuvers. In the Novosibirsk region, several days of command and staff exercises have begun for one of the Strategic Missile Forces divisions, including the deployment of forces, column marches, transition to the highest level of readiness, training in evading strikes, and camouflaging mobile missile complexes.
An important element of the cycle are also air defense and anti-drone exercises; regional reports emphasize continuous duty, repelling attacks, and the operation of air defense systems over several regions simultaneously, which is intended to reinforce the image of Russia’s high resistance to air strikes. Such well-organized and publicized exercises serve both to test the components of the Russian Armed Forces and to demonstrate readiness before the actual phase of the “Center-2026” maneuvers.
Strategic Missile Forces – alert exercises in Siberia
The regional channel Westi (GTRK Novosibirsk) reports on large-scale command and staff exercises of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) in the Novosibirsk region, which began on February 28 and lasted several days. The SRMD division was raised to the highest level of combat readiness: an alarm was announced, equipment was deployed, and columns were dispatched to the exercise area. It was emphasized that the maneuvers are being carried out in accordance with the plan of the Main Control Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which suggests an element of a nationwide training cycle in the RWSN, with strong media emphasis on the Siberian grouping and the full deployment of the division.
This message reinforces the image of the high readiness of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and is intended to create the impression of constant control and efficiency of the RWSN, especially in key areas of Siberia. The emphasis on the formula of “raised after the alarm” and the full deployment of the division may also be a signal to the West, in line with Russia’s practice of demonstrative strategic exercises with a nuclear component.
The structure and personnel of the Russian Armed Forces after four years of war
Russian military journalism indicates that after four years of war, the main structural processes in the Russian Armed Forces are the expansion of divisions and armies based on existing brigades and the full integration of reserve regiments formed in the regions in 2022–2023. The latest decisions do not introduce any qualitatively new solutions, but rather represent the practical implementation of previously announced plans: completing “paper” divisions, filling positions, and drawing contract reserves into the training and combat readiness system.
Russian analysts point to the problem of “resource quality”: formally, the Russian Armed Forces are still able to recruit contract soldiers, but the proportion of less well-trained, older people and those from poorer regions, who are the main mobilization base, is growing. The military’s response is to increase the emphasis on training, more intensive rotations, and the expansion of the system of financial incentives, which is intended to compensate for the decline in the quality of new personnel while maintaining the declared voluntary nature of recruitment.
Decree No. 67 launches the spring conscription campaign in Belarus
On February 23, 2026, the president signed Decree No. 67 “On the release to the reserve and conscription for basic service and reserve service”; the document enters into force on February 25 and launches the spring conscription campaign. The decree provides for conscription in March-May 2026 for basic service and reserve duty, with conscripts being sent to the Armed Forces and other formations by June 1; typically, this involves about 10,000 young men, formally as a “routine” draft, but synchronized with the ongoing readiness check of the entire armed forces. The regulations cover men who have reached the age of 18 and are not entitled to deferment, as well as those who have lost that right; the law requires them to personally collect their call-up papers, report to the military recruitment office, undergo a medical examination, and report to the assembly point.
The decree is part of maintaining a constant number of personnel and replenishing the personnel reserve in the context of the state’s growing mobilization requirements, and its synchronization with the readiness check may indicate testing of the efficiency of the entire conscription and deployment system. The requirement to personally collect the summons and appear before the commission increases the administrative pressure on the recipients of the decree, limiting the scope for legal evasion of service
Belarus militarizes its border with Ukraine
The State Border Committee of Belarus and the border service leadership announced at a collegium meeting that five new border guard complexes will be built on the border with Ukraine in 2026, allegedly to strengthen defenses against “Ukrainian aggression.” This is a continuation of the “Border Security 2026-2030” program and the 2023-2027 Federal State Border Security Development Program; two new guard posts were already established in 2025 on the Mazyra and Brest sections, and some units in the south were reinforced with additional personnel.
Statistics from the State Border Committee indicate that in 2025, there were about 60 cases of border violations with Ukraine, including 20 incidents involving drones, which is the official justification for further militarization of the border zone.
The declared “strengthening of defense” serves not only to actually seal the border, but also to build a narrative of threat from Ukraine and legitimize the increased presence of Lukashenko’s regime’s security forces in the south of the country. The expansion of border infrastructure as part of the federal government’s multi-year programs also strengthens military and security cohesion with Russia and creates a base for potential joint operations in the Ukrainian direction.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- The Rzeczpospolita daily published an article entitled “How to mine the border with Belarus and Russia,” which refers to a new report by the Eastern Flank Institute. The text refers several times to the IWF publication entitled “Contemporary mine warfare. Ukrainian experiences and challenges for Poland and the region after leaving the Ottawa Treaty.” We encourage you to read the entire text on the Rzeczpospolita website. The full report is available on the IWF website.
