We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
The Czech Republic has a new Minister of Defense
On December 15, President Petr Pavel appointed a new cabinet led by Andrej Babiš, which means a change in the position of defense minister. The new head of the ministry is Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jaromír Zůna, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff in 2019-22 and defense attaché at the Czech Embassy in the People’s Republic of China (2023-24), representing the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party. According to the new government’s programmatic declarations, the new minister is to oversee the implementation of existing modernization plans without introducing radical changes.
Security issues are not a priority for the new cabinet, which wants to address primarily economic and social problems. Although President Pavel (also a retired officer) reminded during the nomination of the changing negative geopolitical environment and the priority role of NATO, the new defense minister does not announce any significant reforms. It is possible that his military experience is intended to stabilize the government’s image in security matters and emphasize his equal standing with the president. Zůna’s appointment has sparked controversy among opposition politicians due to his past in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and his service as a political officer, among other things.
Romanian president announces change in defense policy priorities
In an interview with French news channel France24, Romanian President Nicușor Dan announced a shift in the country’s arms policy towards the acquisition of European weapons and military equipment, as well as an increase in the role of the domestic defense industry. He emphasized the importance of the EU’s SAFE program (Bucharest is the second-largest beneficiary of the program) and the investment gaps in the Romanian arms industry.
Although President Dan noted continued interest in American weapons and the technical nature of the reduction of USAF personnel in Romania, the interview clearly indicates the direction of Bucharest’s defense policy. The role of the head of state in Romanian defense policy is significant, and in recent months Nicușor Dan has stepped up his activities in this area. It is no coincidence that the declaration of a shift in emphasis in armament policy was made in an interview with French television, and Romania is involved in expanding the production capabilities of its own industry in cooperation with European companies (e.g., in the area of large-caliber ammunition with Rheinmetall).
Ukraine accelerates the digitization of military IDs
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced that the electronic military ID (in the “Rezerv+” app) will become the primary document for persons subject to mobilization . It will still be possible to issue the document in paper form, but it will not be mandatory. The changes are intended to speed up the issuance of identification documents, make forgery more difficult, and shorten the entire recruitment process. The system will collect data on, among other things, the pace of military qualification, which will make it easier to identify moments and causes of downtime.
The changes to the military identification system show that, under pressure from Russian aggression, Ukraine is actively implementing technological innovations not only in the combat dimension, but also in administration and the broadly understood rear. The extension of basic e-government services (integrated around the “Dija” application) to mobilization issues allows for the rapid elimination of problems resulting from the bureaucratization of the process or dependence on classic, analog databases.
Estonia is building new bunkers on the border with Russia
Estonia has begun construction of its first concrete bunkers on the border with the Russian
Federation. These activities are being carried out as part of the so-called Baltic Defense Line project, an investment carried out jointly with Latvia and Lithuania. Ultimately, approximately 600 bunkers are to be built in the three Baltic states, with the aim of strengthening NATO’s eastern flank.
In the first phase, 28 bunkers are planned to be built, while the next stage involves the ordering and installation of another 572 structures. Estonia’s border with the Russian Federation, which is shorter than that of Lithuania and Latvia, allows the project to be implemented with a budget of approximately €60 million and to concentrate the defense infrastructure on a relatively small section of the border. The bunkers arean important element of the country’s defense system and, together with the planned construction of minefields and anti-tank ditches, will strengthen the security of the state border.
Espionage by Russia in a new report by the Danish intelligence service DDIS
On December 10, 2025, DDIS published its annual risk assessment report, presenting existing threats to Denmark’s security and interests and forecasts for developments in 2026. The report indicates that Russia treats espionage against Denmark and NATO as part of preparing the battlefield for a potential armed conflict, rather than merely as classic intelligence activities in peacetime. The authors of the report note that in the current phase of escalating threats from the east, the line between peacetime and wartime is blurring, and some Danish infrastructure may already have been identified and penetrated.
Due to incidents that took place in 2025, Denmark is particularly sensitive to espionage and sabotage activities targeting critical infrastructure. This year, the threat level for telecommunications infrastructure has been raised, with Russia identified as the main risk country. In March, a DDoS cyberattack took place, which, in addition to crippling government websites, also blocked military services. In May, the Danish Military Intelligence Service (FE) warned that Russia was conducting organized cyber operations against Denmark in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO. As part of efforts to improve the security of technological research, Danish universities began refusing to hire foreign researchers (mainly from Russia) due to fears of possible leaks of technology and research data.
Sweden strengthens its contingent in Latvia
In accordance with a decision by the Swedish parliament in December 2025, Sweden plans to strengthen its contingent within the NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia. The first Swedish contingent was stationed in Latvia in early 2025, and the next rotation of the mechanized battalion is scheduled for early 2026.
In response to the growing threat posed by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the battalion will be reinforced with LVKV 90 anti-aircraft systems based on the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle chassis. The LVKV 90 is equipped with radar and a 40 mm Bofors cannon capable of firing programmable missiles, allowing it to engage short-range air targets such as drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft.
Russian security services report increase in sabotage and armed attacks by Ukrainian services
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reports a significant increase in terrorist threats in 2025, mainly related to activities attributed to Ukrainian intelligence services. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee, led by FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, conducted a comprehensive operational review, identifying a growing campaign of attacks using unmanned aerial systems targeting transport and energy infrastructure. The FSB highlights the involvement of Western intelligence agencies in sabotage activities, including the deployment of explosive devices. Recruitment focuses on young Russians and foreign economic migrants. Operational results for 2025 show the prevention of 374 terrorist
crimes, the neutralization of 24 individuals, and more than 2,000 detentions. On December 15, the FSB arrested ten Russian citizens in five regions of the country—Komi, Astrakhan, Vologda, Volgograd, and Krasnodar Krai—on charges of sabotage operations on behalf of Ukrainian intelligence services, including the zarson of law enforcement vehicles.
The FSB report reflects an escalation of asymmetric operations in the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict. The emphasis on increased drone activity and the recruitment of migrants suggests an evolution in Ukrainian sabotage tactics. The data on detentions may indicate a real threat to internal security or serve as propaganda reinforcing the narrative of an internal threat. The FSB uses operational results as an instrument of public security communication in Russia.
Gradual increase in the aircraft fleet and personnel numbers of the Russian Armed Forces in a geopolitical perspective
Between 2021 and 2025, the Russian Air Force showed a gradual increase in operational capacity. The number of operational aircraft increased slightly from 1,160 to 1,224 units,
representing an increase of about six percent over four years. At the same time, the armed forces’ personnel increased from 165,000 to 170,000 employees, representing an increase of about three percent. Defense Minister Andrei Belousov warned of a potential large-scale conflict with NATO over the next decade at an expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry’s collegium in December 2024. Belousov argued that the Russian armed forces must be adequately reorganized and strengthened regardless of the final outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, pointing to long-term security challenges that go beyond the current conflict.
The growth of the aircraft fleet and personnel remains proportionately moderate compared to Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. Minister Belousov’s indications regarding a future conflict with NATO suggest strategic preparations that go beyond current activities. The modernization and reorganization of the armed forces may be a response to the experience in Ukraine, although the increase in the number of aircraft remains below the rate of operational losses and tactical requirements of a symmetric conflict.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- EFI Director Piotr Woyke took part in the first meeting of the Belvedere
International Policy Forum (in Polish). The meeting was devoted to transatlantic relations in the context of the prospects for developments in Ukraine and the European security architecture. - EFI expert Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj publishes an analysis (in Polish) entitled “WAR – 2026-2030 – Poland at the heart of a hybrid conflict.” It concerns the escalating hybrid war in which Russia, unable to openly confront NATO, will systematically undermine Europe’s resilience through sabotage, drones, cyberattacks, and information pressure.
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