We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania is seeking a new loan from the U.S.
Romania is seeking a new loan under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to finance military purchases from the U.S. defense industry worth approximately $3 billion. According to the government, the loan would supplement the EU’s SAFE instrument, which has provided Romania with nearly €17 billion. SAFE allows up to 35% of components to come from outside the EU within a given capability, but this provision does not cover purchases made directly from the U.S. government under the FMS program, which would enable the implementation of the provisions in the Romanian Army Equipment Plan 2026–2035. The plan to submit the loan application has reportedly already been approved by Romanian authorities.
Bucharest’s actions demonstrate a desire to utilize available credit facilities to balance procurement projects across European and American industries. Currently, there is no statement from the Romanian government regarding specific procurement plans; nevertheless, it can be assumed that the new loan would primarily serve to refinance systems already under contract, such as F-35 multi-role aircraft, Abrams tanks, or Patriot air defense systems, or possibly to acquire, for example, new anti-drone systems (including Merops interceptor drones).
Stoyanov announces suspension of arms deliveries to Ukraine
Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov stated on June 9 at a press conference that Bulgaria would not supply Ukraine with any more weapons, arguing that the war would not be decided on the battlefield. He noted that since taking office, he had not received any new requests from Kyiv for specific military aid and distinguished between state aid and commercial transactions – decisions regarding arms sales by the Bulgarian defense industry, in his view, remain the purview of the companies themselves, not the ministry. Stoyanov later admitted before a parliamentary committee that Bulgaria had not previously informed its EU and NATO partners of the decision to suspend military aid, emphasizing that it was a sovereign national decision. The minister’s statements align with the position of Prime Minister Rumen Radev, who has consistently advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. At the same time, on June 13, the government approved a national plan to gradually increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.
The decision underscores an attempt to reconcile the interests of the Bulgarian defense industry with political pressure from voters. Radev’s government combines the rhetoric of a “peaceful resolution” with benefits for its own defense sector. This allows the new cabinet to meet voters’ expectations without closing an important channel for the flow of ammunition to Ukraine.
From the flank’s perspective, the political signal is also significant: despite moving away from formal military support for Kyiv, Sofia is declaring the direction and timeline for achieving a high level of defense spending.
Slovakia is considering alternatives to the Patria KTO 8×8
The process of acquiring new 8×8 wheeled armored personnel carriers for the Slovak Army has stalled. A contract worth approximately €0.5 billion with the Finnish company Patria was signed in 2022 by then-Defense Minister Jaroslav Naď, and the combat versions of the Patria vehicles are assembled in Slovakia. Under the agreement, 76 vehicles are to be delivered to two of the Slovak Army’s five mechanized battalions. Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák announced that the ministry is exploring potential alternatives for equipping the remaining units.
Among the potential alternatives to the Patria vehicle are, among others, the Polish Rosomak (manufactured by PGZ under license from a Finnish manufacturer) or the Czech Pandur (manufactured by CSG). The proposal for the latter solution is controversial in Slovakia. On the one hand, the opposition has raised allegations of close ties between the current defense minister and the Czechslovak Group (CSG), which manufactures the Pandur vehicle. On the other hand, regional integration of the Czech and Slovak defense industries has been underway for several years, a trend that has become particularly evident in the context of growing demand triggered by the conflict in Ukraine.
Ukrainian assessments of Russian production capabilities regarding air assault capabilities
The HUR military intelligence agency and Serhiy Bezrestnov, an advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense (alias “Flash”), have recently published further estimates regarding Russian production capabilities for air assault systems. HUR claims that the Russians are capable of producing 55–60 9M723 missiles per month for Iskander-M systems and approximately 40 RM-48U missiles launched from S-300PM/S-400 launchers, as well as 5 Kinzhal aerobalistic missiles. This amounts to approximately 700 9M723, 480 RM-48U, and 60 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles annually. In turn, Flash claims that data from an analysis of missiles used against targets in Ukraine indicates that the 9M723 missiles were manufactured in 2025. This allows Russia to maintain a constant stockpile of these missiles at 180–250 units. Also last year, Kh-59 missiles were reportedly produced, and this year, Kh-101, RM-48U, and 3M22 Zircon missiles. According to Flash, Shahed-136/Geran-2 unmanned aerial vehicles are sent to the front almost straight from the factory (within 5–15 days). An advisor to the head of the MOU also reported on the purchase prices paid by the Russian Ministry of Defense for loitering munitions used by the Russian Armed Forces. According to this data, the cheapest weapon is the Molnija-2, costing $1,600 (range 50 km, 10 kg warhead). The other most commonly used types are significantly more expensive: Skalpel and KUB (USD 30,000 each), Lancet X-52 (USD 40,000), Klin (USD 55,000), and Lancet X-51 (USD 68,000).
The Ukrainian side regularly provides estimates regarding Russian production capabilities; in previous years, it frequently resorted to manipulation, significantly overstating them. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Russian capabilities in the production of key weapon systems necessary for conducting operations on the front lines have increased. The open question is whether, following a potential end or freeze of the war with Ukraine, Russian industry will be able to continue production at this level -and whether the federal budget will fund it – or whether it will scale back production to pre-war levels.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine are expanding their counter-mine capabilities
The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MOU) reported that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have 316 units of mechanized demining equipment. The development of the equipment fleet began in 2024 with the purchase of the first two units. Later that same year, another 50 machines were acquired. Currently, the UAF uses both foreign and domestic solutions. The first category includes, among others, the Swiss GCS-100 and GCS-200 platforms, Croatian DOK-ING machines, and Slovakian Bożena 4 mine-clearing trawls. Among Ukrainian products in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the GERMINA, Gart 5100, and Wąż (Ukrainian: Змій).
Mine-clearing machines are one of the branches of land vehicles in which unmanned units are being developed in a particularly significant way. This helps reduce the risks to personnel resulting from the unplanned detonation of explosives. Given the saturation of Ukrainian territory with mines and other hazards, it is highly likely that Kyiv will continue to develop capabilities of this kind.
Work on the Ukrainian air defense system
The private defense company Fire Point announced the successful testing of the FP-7.х. missile, which is intended to become the primary warhead for the Ukrainian Freyja air defense system. Tests of the missile are scheduled to begin in February of this year. It is to be made of composite materials and reach a speed of 1,500–2,000 m/s. As company representatives noted, Freyja is a response to the persistent shortage of warheads for the Patriot air defense system, which Kyiv is currently facing. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russia is capable of producing approximately 120 ballistic missiles per month, and this is also the level of demand for air defense.
Fire Point’s statements should be treated with a great deal of caution. The company is at the center of corruption scandals that have come to light in recent months among Ukraine’s ruling elite. Nevertheless, work on the system’s development will continue, likely with the undisclosed participation of Ukraine’s foreign partners.
Russia is building a new military base in Karelia near the border with Finland
Russia has begun construction of its first completely new garrison since Soviet times in the town of Novaya Vilga near Petrozavodsk, approximately 175 km from the Finnish border in the Republic of Karelia. Construction began in the spring of 2026, and the facility is ultimately intended to house between 4,000 and 6,000 soldiers – the equivalent of a motorized brigade – though the total number of troops in the region could rise to 15,000. The Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed the construction in late May 2026 during an inspection conducted by the Deputy Minister of Defense, and at least ten large barracks blocks are already being erected at the construction site. At the same time, infrastructure is being expanded in Petsama (Pechenga) near the Norwegian border, in Sapernoye and Luga near Pskov, and in Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad Oblast.
The investment in Novaya Vilga is strategically more significant than its scale suggests – it is a deliberate move to close a gap in the map of Russian force deployment along the border with NATO following Finland’s accession to the Alliance. The simultaneous expansion of facilities near Pskov and Kaliningrad indicates a systematic increase in operational readiness across the entire arc from the Baltic to the Arctic – within the Leningrad Military District – rather than an isolated infrastructure project.
Russian Ministry of Defense: Over 20,000 Logistics Drones for the Troops by 2026
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated on June 12, 2026, that over 20,000 transport and logistics drones will be delivered to frontline units this year, while also highlighting a significant expansion of the range of unmanned aerial vehicles being produced. By comparison, earlier plans from 2023 called for reaching an annual production of 18,000 logistics drones only by 2026, meaning that actual deliveries exceed the original projections. At the same time, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that on June 7, 2026, air defense systems destroyed 500 Ukrainian aerial drones within 24 hours, and on June 11, 798 unmanned aerial vehicles were shot down in a single day.
Belousov’s announcement is not merely a PR statement – 20,000 logistics drones represent a qualitative shift in the frontline supply system, reducing the vulnerability of Russian convoys to Ukrainian strikes. The simultaneous increase in the effectiveness of Russian air defense in countering Ukrainian UAVs suggests that Russia is intensively implementing lessons learned from the campaign and integrating electronic warfare systems with area defense.
Russia’s record war spending – 46% of the federal budget in the first quarter of 2026
In the first quarter of 2026, Russia allocated approximately 5.9 trillion rubles (approx. $75–83 billion) for war efforts, accounting for 46% of total federal budget expenditures—the highest quarterly level since the start of the full-scale invasion. Compared to the same period the previous year, the increase was approximately 30%. On June 10, 2026, the State Duma passed amendments to the Budget Code, granting the government the right to increase spending and incur debt above the established limit without amending the budget law. Total war-related spending since 2022 has exceeded 53 trillion rubles.
The State Duma’s decision on budget deregulation is an anti-crisis measure – it formally removes the legal barrier to financing escalation even without a new budget law. In practice, this means that the Kremlin can respond to any change on the front lines or diplomatic pressure with a sudden increase in spending without a mandatory parliamentary procedure, which shortens the decision-making cycle in war management.
Belarusian Ministry of Defense: risk of global conflict “extremely high”
At a meeting of the CSTO Council of Defense Ministers in Moscow on June 2, 2026, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin stated that the likelihood of an armed conflict directed against Russia and Belarus and its transformation from regional to global is “крайне высока” – extremely high. Khrenin pointed to the expansion of NATO’s military presence along the borders of the Union State, assessing this as direct preparation for an armed conflict. At the same time, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (RF) Shevtsov reminded the forum that in 2025, NATO conducted over 120 alliance exercises and over 700 at the national level, most of them near the borders of the Union State.
Khrenin’s statement is more than standard deterrence rhetoric – it comes in conjunction with the deployment of the forward “Oreshnik” base in Belarus and recent joint nuclear force exercises, creating a coherent message of escalation directed simultaneously at the West and at its own public. Its strategic goal is to maintain pressure on NATO to abandon further support for Ukraine ahead of a potential diplomatic summit.
Russian-Belarusian Declaration on Readiness to Use Nuclear Weapons in Defense of the Union State
On June 9, 2026, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin publicly stated that Russia and Belarus are ready to use all available means, including nuclear weapons, to protect the Union State against the backdrop of NATO’s expanding presence along the borders of both countries. This is part of a series of events including joint Russian-Belarusian nuclear exercises held May 19–21, 2026, in which Putin and Lukashenko personally participated via videoconference with units responsible for the combat use of nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Shevtsov confirmed at a meeting of the Committee of Secretaries of the CSTO Security Councils that “Oreshnik” is deployed on Belarusian territory, citing this as an element of deterrence policy.
The accumulation of signals – nuclear exercises, Galuzin’s statement, and confirmation of “Oreshnik’s” deployment – creates a calibrated deterrent narrative of maximum threshold tension. This pattern is characteristic of the Russian doctrine of escalation for the sake of de-escalation. The goal is not a real threat of nuclear weapons use, but rather to force political and military limits on the Western side ahead of potential negotiations.
Belarusian Ministry of Defense and CSTO: “Unbreakable Brotherhood–2026” exercises in Belarus
In early June 2026, the second round of staff organizational consultations for the CSTO’s multilateral peacekeeping exercises “Unbreakable Brotherhood–2026” (Нерушимое братство–2026), scheduled for fall 2026 in Belarus. Concurrently, a special CSTO exercise codenamed “Barrier–2026” is planned, dedicated to the elimination of biological and chemical threats. General Gerasimov previously confirmed that a total of six joint CSTO exercises are planned for 2026 – three on Russian territory, two in Belarus, and one in Kazakhstan – and the CSTO Secretariat reported that the total number of planned activities exceeds 60, including eight exercises at various levels.
The concentration of CSTO exercises on Belarusian territory – both conventional and nuclear – serves a dual purpose. First, to maintain the operational readiness of forces on the western flank. Second, to reinforce the narrative regarding the legitimacy of Russia’s military presence in Minsk. For Poland and the Baltic states, the key message is that Belarus is assuming a more active role as a CSTO training ground, rather than merely serving as a Russian logistical outpost.
Putin: “Union Shield–2027” – announcement of joint nuclear exercises for 2027
During a video conference with the staff of the nuclear exercises on May 21, 2026, Vladimir Putin announced that in 2027, Russia and Belarus would conduct large-scale exercises under the code name “Union Shield–2027” (Щит Союза–2027), placing them within the series of CSTO nuclear and rapid reaction force exercises from 2026. Putin mentioned the planned exercises “Vzaimodeistvie–2026” on Russian territory and “Nenarushimaya Braterstvo –2026” in Belarus as a demonstration of coalition integration. Lukashenko, while personally participating in the May–June nuclear exercises, simultaneously stated publicly on June 11, 2026, that the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East could end as early as 2026.
The contradiction between the escalating nuclear exercises and Lukashenko’s diplomatic signals about a possible end to the conflict is superficial – it fits into the classic pattern of Russia’s strategy aimed at destabilizing Western calculations. This involves simultaneously maintaining nuclear pressure and opening a window for negotiations in order to maximize the West’s compliance in a potential peace process.
Espionage in the Swedish Armed Forces
The Swedish Prosecutor’s Office has filed an indictment with a Stockholm court against 34-year-old Ramin Antonio Tellebond. In connection with the trial that began on June 15, it was revealed that this former civilian contractor for the Swedish Armed Forces worked in IT and had access to critical national security information. He has been charged with attempted espionage on behalf of Russia. The prosecution alleges that in November 2025, he flew to Moscow, where he offered classified information to Russian intelligence services in exchange for asylum and Russian citizenship. Additionally, the man will face charges of harassing a security officer at the Swedish Armed Forces’ Radio Electronic Service (Swed. Försvarets radioanstalt – FRA) and of acts intended to commit murder.
The trial, which is now beginning and has been classified due to the nature of the case, is generating enormous interest among the Swedish public. It represents yet another blow to the country’s security system. This case follows the high-profile trial of brothers Peyman (b. 1980) and Payam (b. 1987) Kia, convicted of long-term collaboration with Russian military intelligence (GRU). The older of the two was an employee of Swedish military intelligence (MUST), from which he had been removing classified documents for years. Furthermore, in May 2025, a diplomat suspected of collaborating with Russian intelligence services was detained in Sweden. The man currently facing charges, who has been in custody since January 4, 2026, is Ramin Antonio Tellebond (born 1992), originally from the Mellansverige region. He is a Swedish citizen born to a mixed Iranian-Swedish couple, who graduated with a degree in computer science from Karlskrona and ran the consulting firm Ratobs AB. There is also confirmed evidence that previously – between 2014 and 2019 – he operated a sole proprietorship in Australia.
The Estonian company Milrem Robotics has launched a new assembly line for THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles in the Netherlands
The Estonian company Milrem Robotics, in collaboration with the Dutch group VDL Defentec, has launched a final assembly line for THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles in Born, the Netherlands. The facility serves as a final system integration site and is part of a European distributed manufacturing model, in which components are manufactured in Estonia and final assembly takes place in the Netherlands, increasing supply chain flexibility and the ability to scale production. The launch of the line in Born is part of the Dutch military support initiative for Ukraine, which includes the delivery of over 150 THeMIS systems funded and coordinated by the Netherlands, with the participation of Milrem Robotics and industrial partners, including VDL Defentec. The assembly line was designed to allow for increased production rates depending on operational needs and delivery schedules. THeMIS is a modular, tracked unmanned platform weighing approximately 1.5 tons, designed to support ground forces. The system can be used in various mission configurations, including logistics tasks such as supply transport, medical evacuation (CASEVAC), reconnaissance and surveillance, engineering support, and – in select variants – weapons system integration.
The platform has been under development since the mid-2010s by Milrem Robotics and is in use and undergoing testing in several NATO and partner countries; its deployment in Ukraine since 2022 has provided experience in high-intensity operational conditions, primarily in the areas of logistical and evacuation support. For Estonia, this project means strengthening its position in the unmanned ground systems segment, developing industrial cooperation within NATO, and increasing export capabilities through a distributed production model involving Estonia and the Netherlands.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- The Eastern Flank Institute participated in the expert conference “Personnel Reserves of the Polish Armed Forces – Experiences, Challenges, and Directions for Development” (in Polish), organized by the National Security Bureau in cooperation with the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The aim of the conference was to develop recommendations supporting the development of a modern state mobilization and resilience system. Among the speakers at the Expert Debate on the issue of the state’s personnel reserves in the face of contemporary threats and experiences of armed conflicts was Piotr Woyke, director of the Eastern Flank Institute.
- We encourage you to read the analysis by EFI expert Grzegorz Matyasik on the possibility of reinstating compulsory military service in Poland (in Polish). The study presents the potential consequences of such a reform, discusses the organizational and investment challenges associated with it, and indicates what training capabilities could be achieved in the first years of its implementation.
