We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Corruption charges against the Chief of the Romanian General Staff
On June 2, Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) charged General Gheorghiță Vlad, Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, with complicity in abuse of office. According to prosecutors, in July 2025 Vlad allegedly “through acts of aiding and abetting” facilitated the drafting and signing—by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Training, Lieutenant General Iulian Berdili—of a request to the Ministry of Education to increase the number of state-funded spots at the National University of Physical Education and Sports. This action was alleged to have exceeded legal authority, as it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Directorate for Human Resources Management within the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the number of spots was to increase, and among the beneficiaries was, among others, the daughter of one of Gen. Vlad’s associates. Gen. Vlad has served as Chief of the General Staff since November 30, 2023.
The indictment of the highest-ranking officer in the armed forces damages Romania’s image, especially during a period of intensive technical modernization of the army and political instability. Although the case does not concern modernization contracts, it complicates Bucharest’s negotiating position in future talks with foreign entities, including those funded by the EU’s SAFE program. The case will also be subject to political maneuvering related to attempts to form a new coalition majority or a potential election campaign should early elections be called.
Rheinmetall finalizes a €5.7 billion arms package with Romania
On June 2, the German company Rheinmetall announced the signing of a package of contracts with Romania worth a total of €5.7 billion (approx. $6.6 billion), covering nearly 300 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, Skyranger turret modules, ammunition, and surface ships. These orders, which are massive by Romanian standards, were financed through loans granted under the EU’s SAFE program. Rheinmetall announced the expansion of its long-standing production capabilities in Romania, technology transfer, and investments amounting to several hundred million euros; deliveries are scheduled for 2028–2030. Romania will become the second user of the Lynx on NATO’s eastern flank, following Hungary (which ordered 218 vehicles in 2020).
The finalization of the contract, despite earlier reports of pricing disputes surrounding the Lynx offer, confirms that Bucharest has decided to make Rheinmetall one of its most important partners in a wide-ranging program to modernize its armed forces. Contracts for the German company will account for over one-third of the total amount borrowed under SAFE, amounting to €16.68 billion (the second-largest beneficiary of the program after Poland). The production location and technology transfer are part of Rheinmetall’s broader strategy, which includes expansion on NATO’s eastern flank.
Marine drone explosion in the port of Constanța
On June 5 of this year, a marine unmanned aerial vehicle exploded in the civilian section of the port of Constanța, near the headquarters of the Romanian government agency ARSVOM. The device, reported around 6 a.m., detonated on its own around 10:30 a.m., after the area had been secured and evacuated. No casualties were reported. President Nicușor Dan confirmed that the drone was part of a Ukrainian military operation against Russian forces and veered off course after the Ukrainian side lost control due to Russian electronic warfare. Information provided by Ukraine in the morning enabled a preemptive evacuation, and four Ukrainian drones that had gone out of control self-detonated (one in the port, one at sea under Coast Guard observation, and two approximately 145 km east of Constanța). Dan noted that this is the second serious incident on the Romanian coast this week, following the detection of a sea mine and coming a few days after a Russian-made drone struck a residential building in Galați.
The incident exposes the vulnerability of Romania’s port and coastal infrastructure to the collateral effects of military operations in the Black Sea, even when the source of the threat is systems belonging to a party that Bucharest supports. The handling of crisis communication is telling: authorities emphasize the efficiency of the response and the flow of information from Kyiv, while cautiously attributing the incident to Russian aggression. This series of incidents paints a picture of mounting risks in the Black Sea region and will strengthen the case for expanding anti-drone and anti-mine capabilities in the region. In response, Ukraine announced it would send an expert on countering unmanned aerial vehicles to Romania.
Bulgaria denies supplying sea mines to Ukraine
On June 5, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov denied that Bulgaria had supplied sea mines to Ukraine. The minister noted that specific types of military aid to Ukraine are classified information, and support is provided based on resolutions of the National Assembly, decisions of the Council of Ministers, and agreements between the defense ministries of both countries. Stoyanov confirmed that Bulgaria had provided Ukraine with air defense systems as part of various aid packages, and that detailed information could be made available in accordance with the procedure set forth in the law on the protection of classified information. In response to questions about the security of the Black Sea coast, the minister assured that Bulgaria possesses the capabilities to protect its own airspace and coastline, controlling them independently—including through the use of MiG-29 fighter jets and air defense crews on duty. Regarding the drone explosion in Constanta, he reported that a Bulgarian helicopter was conducting reconnaissance over Bulgarian maritime territory at the time.
The minister’s statement reflects Sofia’s delicate position, where support for Ukraine remains the subject of sharp internal debate—the question to the minister was posed by a lawmaker from the pro-Russian Vazrazhdane party, and the declaration itself is intended to have a calming effect domestically. Radew’s government maintains a balanced line between growing skepticism toward Kyiv and the preservation of stable relations, which benefit, among others, the Bulgarian defense industry. The juxtaposition of the declaration on independent coastal defense with the incident in Constanta suggests that Sofia is attempting to preempt concerns about the spillover of Black Sea threats onto Bulgarian territory.
Stabilization on the Ukrainian-Russian war front
According to a report by the Ukrainian analytical group Deep State, in May of this year, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) likely lost more territory than they managed to gain. According to the authors, the Russians occupied approximately 14 km² of Ukrainian territory, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) recaptured a larger area (the exact size was not specified). This means that the RFAF’s territorial gains are the smallest since the fall of 2023. Nevertheless, the number of attacks carried out by the RFAF increased by over 37%, reaching a total of approximately 7,000. Most often, however, these attacks are carried out unprepared, by small groups of soldiers, and often even by individuals acting alone. The most difficult situation is expected to unfold in the Konstantynówka area, where, according to some analysts and bloggers, the Ukrainian side is losing control not only of the city center but also of the surrounding area.
However, other entities analyzing territorial gains dispute Deep State’s estimates, such as the Russian outlet Creamy Caprice, which claims that in May, the Russian Armed Forces captured 209 km² (compared to 329 km² in April). At the same time, attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) behind enemy lines are intensifying. In the immediate vicinity of the front, the main targets are fuel tankers in the area between Mariupol and the Crimean Peninsula. According to photographic data collected by OSINT analysts, the total number of destroyed vehicles is reported to have exceeded 270. Meanwhile, long-range strikes on oil industry facilities led to the imposition of a six-month embargo on aviation fuel exports from Russia, intended to secure its supply ahead of the summer season. Supply restrictions were also introduced in the occupied territories and in the regions of the Belgorod and Kursk oblasts bordering Ukraine. In May alone, the SZU and Ukrainian special services (primarily the SBU) carried out approximately 16 successful strikes on refineries and petrochemical plants in Russia. Facilities in Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, and Perm were reportedly among those targeted.
The current situation on the front is highly unlikely to change in the short term. This stems, on the one hand, from the limited manpower of both sides necessary to attempt a significant change in the situation on the battlefield, and on the other hand, from the fortification works carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces on key sections of the front. It should therefore be expected that both Kyiv and Russia will focus their efforts on air strikes, both long-range and in the rear of the combat zone.
The cabinet of ministers of Ukraine will review the list of enterprises of special importance to the state
The Ukrainian government has adopted a package of legal amendments requiring individual ministries and state institutions to review enterprises on the list of organizations critical to the functioning of the economy and the state during martial law. By being classified in this group, these enterprises can exempt some of their employees (necessary for the enterprise’s operation) from mobilization into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In accordance with the adopted regulations, individual state institutions (including in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy) must prepare a revised registry of criteria for classifying entities as critical by June 10 of this year. Then, starting July 1 of this year, government agencies will begin assessing previously registered enterprises against the new guidelines. This process is scheduled to be completed by September 1 of this year.
The actions of the Cabinet of Ministers are part of tightening the state’s mobilization system. This is because the recruitment of employees by various types of enterprises is one way to avoid conscription into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These actions—both the registration of individual companies and subsequently of selected employees—are often accompanied by corruption. Awareness of the abuse of both practices is quite widespread, which is worsening public sentiment in Ukraine, especially among those who voluntarily joined or were mobilized into the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and their families.
New products of the Ukrainian defense industry
The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MOU) has approved another 175 types of military equipment and ammunition for use in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This became possible after these products were registered in the Official Resource for the Codification of Weapons and Military Equipment (Офіційний ресурс для кодифікації озброєння та військової техніки; https://mil-tech.mod.gov.ua). The largest categories of equipment are: unmanned aerial vehicles (nearly 60 types), ammunition (over 40 types), and armored vehicles (18 items). In addition, reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems, unmanned ground vehicles, specialized vehicles, engineering machinery, and logistics equipment have been added to the registry. According to the MOU’s statement, 93% of the products approved for use are domestically manufactured.
The registration of 175 types of military equipment and ammunition does not mean that all of them will go into mass production and subsequently be supplied in large numbers to military units. Their inclusion in the register will only allow for the commencement of real-world battlefield testing and the selection of those products that best meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other formations. Nevertheless, it is highly positive that nearly all of these products are the result of work by Ukrainian companies. The high pace of their activities is also evidenced by the nearly daily announcements from various companies and startups regarding the development of new types of equipment. Just last week, reports emerged, among other things, about work on the Tarantula FPV drone defense system (by Rovertech) and plans to develop precision air munitions in Ukraine (BlueBird Tech).
Easing of tensions in ukrainian-hungarian relations
On June 3, Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced that Budapest and Kyiv had reached an agreement on guaranteeing linguistic, educational, and cultural rights for the diaspora residing in the Zakarpattia Oblast. In return, Hungary is to lift its blockade on the start of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. Budapest also announced that it would no longer block the reimbursement of expenses incurred by member states in providing aid to Ukraine from EU funds. Another sign of improved Hungarian-Ukrainian relations is the full restoration of operations on the southern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline. According to data from the state-owned company Ukrtransnafta, in May of this year, the volume of crude oil transported via this infrastructure to Slovakia and Hungary amounted to 165,000 barrels per day and met the demand of customers in Central Europe.
Both Kyiv and Budapest will seek to foster a more positive climate in their bilateral relations. For Hungary, it will be important not only to resolve minority issues but also to increase the volume of goods sold to Ukraine and expand the transit of Ukrainian products through its territory. For Kyiv, in turn, the greatest priority will be to unblock those initiatives within the EU and NATO that could improve Ukraine’s military and economic situation, initiatives that Viktor Orbán’s government has effectively blocked.
French fighter jet shoots down drone over Latvia
Once again in recent months, an unmanned aerial vehicle heading toward Latvian airspace has been shot down. On June 8, a Rafale fighter jet on combat duty as part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission and stationed at the Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania was scrambled following the detection of an unidentified drone approaching from the direction of Russia and Belarus. After it entered the NATO air defense responsibility zone, a decision was made to shoot it down. This occurred in the Rogovka area in eastern Latvia.
The incident confirms the ongoing threat to the airspace security of the Baltic states and NATO’s growing readiness to use kinetic measures against unidentified aerial objects that may pose a threat to the population or critical infrastructure. The event is part of a series of incidents observed since 2024 involving the unintentional or deliberate incursion of unmanned aerial vehicles from Russian and Belarusian territory into the territory of NATO’s eastern flank. According to information provided by the Latvian National Armed Forces, the incident resulted in no casualties or material damage. An analysis of the UAV’s wreckage is underway to determine its origin and the nature of the incident. Preliminary assessments by Latvian authorities indicate that the UAV’s flight may have been linked to the influence of Russian electronic warfare systems jamming navigation signals in the border region. One hypothesis is that, as in the case of the drone shot down in Estonia by a Romanian F-16, the UAV in this instance also originated from Ukraine, which is conducting operations in the area of ports in northwestern Russia.
Suspected espionage activities in Finland
The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) has provided the Central Bureau of Investigation (KRP) with information regarding suspected intelligence activities within Finland. In this case, the target of the espionage is not the Finnish state itself, but rather actions benefiting or harming another country. According to investigators, this activity could harm Finland’s international relations.
The investigation into this matter began as early as April 2026, and these activities are of a highly sensitive nature. Neither SUPO nor the Police are providing further details, citing the secrecy of the investigation. The circumstances of the incident, the suspect’s nationality, and country of origin are unknown. It is unclear what information may have been of interest to him. The case has been classified as a crime of treason, punishable by up to 6 years in prison.
The arrest of major Sossonkin (FSB) – a power play over Africa?
The Lefortovo Court in Moscow approved the arrest of FSB Major Alexander Sossonkin, an officer of military unit No. 26047, most likely subordinate to the Fifth Directorate (FSB) responsible for the post-Soviet space and external operations. Sossonkin was linked to Redut (formerly the Wagner Group) structures in Africa. Independent Russian media report on the expansion of Igor Sechin’s faction within the FSB’s military counterintelligence and attempts to take over African operations from military intelligence (GZ). Neither the FSB nor official sources have commented on the arrest.
The case offers a glimpse into the intensifying factional struggle within Russian intelligence services. Interpreted as part of the FSB–GZ power struggle for control over operations conducted as part of joint special operations in the Sahel, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR) supervised by the Center, it signifies a destabilization of the balance within Russia’s power projection structures. It may also be a precursor to a broader purge within the FSB—a structure traditionally linked to the presidential camp.
Lukashenko – “demobilization” as a smokescreen
In a speech on June 5, Alexander Lukashenko announced the “demobilization” of some units of the Belarusian Armed Forces, presenting the decision as a gesture of restraint in the face of “Western escalation.” At the same time, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense confirmed exercises involving approximately six thousand reservists from the Western Operational Command (Grodno); a series of nuclear exercises with the Iskander-M was completed in May; and a joint meeting of the collegiums of the Belarusian KGB and the Russian SVR in Kaliningrad confirmed the deepening of intelligence integration.
The declaration on “demobilization” is a smokescreen for Western audiences—the actual combat readiness of the Belarusian Armed Forces continues to be enhanced through a series of exercises. Lukashenko employs a proven dual-track approach: rhetoric of caution toward the West and the OSCE while maintaining operational integration with the Russian Federation. For Poland’s threat assessment, the informational value of the declaration is minimal—what remains significant are the consistent indicators of year-round exercises by Belarusian Armed Forces units.
Structural recruitment crisis – down 20% in the first quarter of 2026
Regional budget data indicate that in the first quarter of 2026, Russia signed contracts with approximately 70,500 volunteers—an average of 800 per day compared to 1,182 in the same period of 2025. The trend persists with estimated losses of 250–300 killed per day. Analyses point to a systemic collapse of the commercial model—bonuses have increased by 40%, but they do not compensate for the losses or the perception of an indefinite contract. Authorities are expanding informal recruitment targets to the police, universities, and regional administrations.
For the first time since the 2022 reform, Russia is losing more soldiers than it is recruiting. If the trend continues in the third quarter, the Kremlin will face a choice between formal mobilization and accepting a reduction in offensive capabilities. For NATO, this is an indicator of the depletion of human reserves—a limitation on Russian military projection.
Appointments in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus – strengthening the Operational Command Branch
On June 1, 2026, Lukashenko signed personnel decrees – Col. Pavel Prasol was appointed head of the General Staff’s Communications Directorate, and Maj. Gen. Vadzim Romaniu was promoted to the newly created position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Command. The reorganization stems from experiences in the war in Ukraine—the implementation of automated management systems and intensive communications exercises. Earlier, on January 9, Maj. Gen. Vadim Dienisenko, commander of the SOO for 12 years, retired to the reserve and was replaced by Col. Ilyukevich. Since March 3, Dienisenko has headed the MIC department within the Standing Committee of the Union State.
The strengthening of the C2 division within the General Staff of the RB Joint Forces is a mirror image of Russian operational planning structures—an element of deepening interoperability within the Regional Joint Forces. Dienisenko’s promotion to the Union State structures means that an experienced SOO officer is taking control of the joint armament program.
First confirmed involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces on Russian territory – sappers in the Kursk oblast
On June 4, 2026, Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Chinszetejn stated that Belarusian specialists are participating in the demining of the Kursk Oblast—a territory that has been the subject of a Ukrainian operation since August 2024. Soldiers from the Belarusian Armed Forces Demining Center (military unit No. 97108) were involved in these operations in 2026. The unit is normally responsible for demining Belarusian territory. This marks the first official confirmation of the presence of Belarusian military personnel on Russian territory in an area of active hostilities.
Belarus’s crossing of the threshold of military non-involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict—even in a demining role—raises questions about the extent of its previously undocumented involvement. From the Polish perspective, this should be viewed as confirmation that Minsk is de facto making an operational contribution to the war despite its outward facade of neutrality.
Military district reform – Leningrad and Moscow military districts and the threat to NATO?
The 2024 reform restored the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts in place of the Western Military District. An analysis of activities in 2026 indicates that the new military districts function as structures supporting recruitment, logistics, and reserves for the Special Military Operation (SMO)—the front in Ukraine—rather than as independent components capable of preparing an offensive against NATO countries. The gap between the authorized strength and actual offensive capabilities is significant. Nevertheless, the Leningrad Military District’s participation in the Russian Federation’s strategic forces exercises on May 19–21 sets a precedent—it indicates that the district is also beginning to perform offensive functions against NATO, rather than merely serving as a supply reservoir for conducting the Special Military Operation.
The reform is a return to the Soviet military district model, not a modernization of the Russian Armed Forces. For Poland, this means that the Leningrad Military District is not currently an independent offensive threat (in the North-Baltic direction), which increases the coordination of Russian forces on the approaches to Finland, the Baltic states, and the Polish border (Kaliningrad). The inclusion of the Leningrad Military District in nuclear scenarios requires a reassessment of its capabilities—as this indicates that it is not solely a structure for safeguarding the Strategic Missile Forces.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- IWF expert Grzegorz Matyasik has published a new article on how to manage personnel within a universal defense system and how the Swedish model differs from the Polish one. We recommend reading the article on the association’s website @ObronaNarodowa, available at this link.
