We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
The Czech Republic is looking for new wheeled armoured personnel carriers
The Czech Ministry of Defence has announced plans to acquire new wheeled armoured personnel carriers to replace the 8×8 Pandur II vehicles, which were introduced in 2010. The service history of these vehicles, manufactured by GDELS, has been marred by numerous operational problems. The 107 Pandur II transporters form the basis of the Czech mechanised formations and replaced the post-Soviet BMP-2 vehicles. The planned acquisition of new systems is expected to take place in 2029-30.
The Czech armed forces are consistently modernising their armoured and mechanised formations, as reflected in the recently concluded contracts for Leopard 2A4 and 2A8 tanks, as well as CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. The acquisition of new wheeled armoured personnel carriers is another large-scale project, the value of which may exceed EUR 0.5 billion. The German Boxer and Finnish Patria vehicles are almost certain to be competitors in the potential tender.
Preparations for the next edition of the SAFE programme
The European Commission is considering launching the next edition of the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) low-interest loan programme. The widespread interest of Member States in co-financing from the above-mentioned initiative has led the Commission to analyse a number of options, from extending the existing mechanism to involving the European Investment Bank more extensively in lending activities. Unconfirmed information suggests that proposals for further action will be presented in late spring this year.
Eastern NATO member states such as Poland and Romania were among the largest recipients of the first edition of the SAFE programme, but to date, no details have been disclosed on how the projects that received funding were selected, and in the case of selected countries, not even information on the subject of the loans. For the time being, there are no reports on the financing conditions under the successor to SAFE, but it seems likely that the subject of loans will continue to be limited to products from member states.
Controversy surrounding the transfer of Slovak MiG-29 tactical aircraft to Ukraine
Slovak President Manuel Pellegrini assessed that the transfer of MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine in March 2023 was a ‘strategic mistake’ due to the lack of a ready successor to this weapon system in the air force. The head of state’s words refer to a case conducted by the Slovak prosecutor’s office, which investigated whether the 2023 donation (as well as the transfer of S-300 air defence systems) did not expose the state to an excessive loss of defence capabilities – Bratislava received financial support from the European Union and a discount on the purchase of American weapon systems in return. The prosecutor’s office found no irregularities in these actions.
As in neighbouring Czech Republic, the issue of military aid to Ukraine is an important and highly polarising topic in public debate in Slovakia. The current ruling coalition points out that support for Kyiv was organised on unprofitable terms. At the same time, the arms industries of both countries have benefited significantly from the export of products and services (mainly repairs) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Between 2008 and 2024, Estonia convicted the most of its citizens on charges of espionage.
A report published by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) in January 2026 indicates that between 2008 and 2024, Estonia convicted 19 of its citizens on charges of espionage. Seventeen of these individuals collaborated with Russia, and two with China. In total, the authors of the study analysed 70 such cases involving Europeans. A significant proportion of those convicted did not have access to classified material. In many cases, individuals were recruited to conduct surveillance, take photographs or pass on sensitive information. The case of Estonia is unique due to the clear overrepresentation of cases related to the military and defence.
For many years, Estonia has been conducting very intensive counter-intelligence activities, focusing mainly on Russia. There are also cases of convictions of persons recruited by Chinese intelligence. Counter-intelligence structures operate in two state institutions. The Estonian Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet) is responsible for civilian counterintelligence, while military counterintelligence operates within the Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service (Kaitseväe luurekeskus) operating within the Estonian Armed Forces. Among the most famous cases of convicted Estonian citizens from 2008-2024 are soldiers Deniss Metsavas and Pjotr Volin from 2019 – cooperation with the GRU, Aleksei Dressen (2012) – cooperation with the FSB, Herman Simm (2008) – cooperation with the SWR.
Latvian counterintelligence VDD reports in its annual report on travel bans to Russia and Belarus for employees of state institutions
The annual Threat Report for 2025, published yesterday by the Latvian State Security Service (Latvian: Valsts drošības dienests- VDD), reports on legal regulations in force since last year regarding travel bans to Russia and Belarus for selected professional groups. The Law on Restricting Activities Threatening National Security came into force on 11 July 2025 and stipulates that certain categories of persons, primarily employees of state institutions, are prohibited from travelling to Russia and Belarus. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Security Service (VDD) has regularly warned the public about the high risk of intelligence and recruitment activities and has been involved in drafting this law.
The statutory ban applies to groups and individuals at risk of interest and recruitment by foreign intelligence services. This group includes Latvian armed forces personnel, civil servants, law enforcement officers, The ban on travel to Russia and Belarus applies to groups of people at the highest risk of interest and recruitment by foreign intelligence services, such as civil servants, law enforcement officers, Armed Forces (NAF) personnel, critical infrastructure workers and others. The ban also applies to transit through the territory of Russia or Belarus. The introduction of this ban is intended to limit the ability of Russian and Belarusian security forces to establish direct contact with Latvian citizens in the territory of these countries, where Latvia has limited opportunities to protect its citizens. Failure to comply with this provision is grounds for termination of employment contracts. Trips to high-risk countries are only possible in exceptional circumstances after obtaining the relevant consent.
New information about the Military Counterintelligence Department of the FSB
Today’s report by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (est. Välisluureamet) ‘International Security and Estonia 2025’ updates information on the role of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Military Counterintelligence Department (Russian: Департамент военной контрразведки – DVKR, VKR).
Officers of this structure perform the most serious tasks in relation to military and paramilitary structures in the Russian Federation. In the context of the ongoing war with Ukraine, officers operate within the military counterintelligence structures of the Southern Military District. The VKR also operates within the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the National Guard, the Federal Protection Service (FSO), as well as the militarised rescue units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
It should be recalled that the scope of competence of Russian military counterintelligence goes far beyond the standard and common understanding of the role of counterintelligence in democratic systems. VKR officers may conduct operations outside the Russian Federation, wherever Russian troops are or may be deployed. Estonian intelligence also emphasises that gaining counterintelligence and intelligence experience in armed conflict zones is a natural and desirable condition for promotion within the FSB’s military structures. It is undoubtedly worth noting the risk of this group of officers being involved in activities aimed at increasing the security of Russian military operations. These officers undergo professional training at, among others, the Novosibirsk FSB Institute in Novosibirsk and the FSB Institute in Yekaterinburg, after which they gain practical operational experience in war zones over the course of their subsequent years of service. Looking at the resources of the eastern secret services from this perspective should have an impact on the training programmes implemented and on the process of gaining operational experience by officers of the western secret services, including the Polish services.
Russian Security Council – floods, fires, infosphere
On 6 February, a meeting of the permanent members of the Russian Security Council was held in the Kremlin, attended by the leadership of the FSB, SWR, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Officially, the topics discussed were flood and fire prevention and ‘information security in the sphere of communications and mass media’.
The selection of participants suggests that the actual topics were control of the infosphere, regulation of telecom operators and strengthening cyber defence as an element of the Russian Federation’s territorial defence.
The meeting confirms that the Kremlin treats the information sphere as a strategic area requiring the same protection as critical infrastructure. The combination of environmental issues with the infosphere masks decisions on further centralisation of communication surveillance, the development of mechanisms to isolate the Runet, and the construction of a ‘digital defence territory’.
Russian training projects for 2026 – regionalisation and integration of force components
Against the backdrop of preparations for the Centre-2026 strategic manoeuvres, there has been an expansion of a number of local and regional military and law enforcement exercises. In February, the Project 1155M frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov will take part in the Russian-Indian Milan-2026 manoeuvres in the Bay of Bengal, an operational and diplomatic undertaking aimed at consolidating Russia’s presence in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Moscow has proposed joint Caspian manoeuvres to Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, with a scenario that provides for the protection of economic infrastructure and shipping routes – in practice, a military reinforcement of Russia’s zone of control in the Caspian Sea basin. At the internal level, exercises involving the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the military and police are being intensified, confirming the ongoing integration of internal security and territorial defence functions. At the same time, reservists are being trained in the protection of critical infrastructure – transport, energy and industrial hubs – in scenarios involving sabotage and drone attacks. Rosgvardia has launched a new training cycle focused on combat and law enforcement operations in urban environments.
This year’s exercise plan indicates further decentralisation and functional integration of the Russian Federation’s security system. Russia is shifting its focus from large-scale staff manoeuvres to a network of regional exercises, combining the military, services and reserves in a comprehensive ‘territorial defence’ model.
There is also a visible attempt to strengthen the capacity to respond to hybrid and sabotage threats, both through exercises on Russian territory and by maintaining maritime activity in priority areas (Indo-Pacific, Caspian).
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- On 4 February, we published an analysis entitled ‘Time for a discussion on counterintelligence. Commentary on the detention of a Ministry of Defence employee”, written (in Polish) by EFI expert Col. (ret.) Łukasz Paczesny.
- The arrest of a Ministry of Defence employee suspected of espionage was also discussed by our team’s experts in interviews with the Polish media. Col. (ret.) Łukasz Paczesny gave an interview to the Rzeczpospolita daily. Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj commented on the case in an interview on the Onet Rano programme.
