We encourage you to read the review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
Romania’s new defense minister requests an increase in the defense budget
Romania’s new Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Radu Miruţă has requested an increase in planned defense spending in 2026 due to the deteriorating security situation, including the effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine on the country’s eastern border. This year’s defense budget is expected to amount to approximately 2.7% of GDP, which represents an increase compared to the 2025 expenditure level of approximately 2.3% of GDP. The minister also announced measures to increase the ministry’s spending efficiency, including reducing the share of personnel costs in the defense budget, but without lowering salaries in the sector.
Miruţă represents the liberal USR party and is a relatively young politician who emphasizes his engineering experience. Given the growing importance of security issues in Romanian politics, his appointment as deputy prime minister and defense minister should be seen as a success. Maintaining the course of increasing defense spending and emphasizing modernization issues will be positively received in the region and among Romania’s most important allies, the United States and France.
Romania and Croatia join military support program for Ukraine
The governments of Romania and Croatia have declared their intention to join the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) initiative, under which American weapons are being purchased for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Bucharest has pledged USD 59 million, while Zagreb has pledged USD 18 million. In total, 24 countries are already participating in the initiative, pledging a total of approximately $4.3 billion in aid.
The PURL is a key element of the military support system for Ukraine, in line with the United States’ desire to increase the role of European countries in donations to Kyiv. Romania’s accession as the second largest country on NATO’s eastern flank was widely expected, both on the Ukrainian and American sides.
Shake-up in the Ukrainian government
At the turn of 2025 and 2026, there were significant personnel changes in Ukrainian government structures and in positions important from the point of view of national security. Major General Kyrylo Budanov, former head of military intelligence (HUR), took over as Chief of the Presidential Administration, and Major General Oleh Ivaschenko became his successor. Within the cabinet, the appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov was announced, who is to move from the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation to head the Ministry of Defense. The current Minister of Defense, Denys Shmyhal, is to take over managerial duties in the field of energy. Changes are also expected in the civilian Security Service of Ukraine, with Vasyl Maluk stepping down as its head.
The scale of the changes in the Ukrainian government structures is the largest since the beginning of the war and shows the dynamics of the political situation in Kyiv following the dismissal of the influential former Head of the Presidential Administration, Andriy Yermak, under pressure from attempts to negotiate a ceasefire with the Russian Federation and changes in relations with the US, as well as the difficult situation on the front. The appointments also suggest the use of proven high-ranking officials with high personal popularity (Budanov, Fedorov) to improve the ratings of the entire government camp.
Further damage to critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea
The beginning of the new year brought two crisis events that took place in the Baltic Sea, in the area of responsibility of Estonia and Latvia.On January 2, 2026, in Latvian territorial waters, a fiber-optic cable connecting the city of Šventoji in Lithuania with the port of Liepāja in Latvia was damaged. The fiber-optic cable belongs to the Swedish company Arelion, owned by the investment company Polhem Infra. The incident did not have a significant impact on communications users in Latvia. The Latvian police and border guards boarded the ship suspected of causing the damage.
A few days earlier, on December 31, 2025, in the morning, an undersea telecommunications cable was damaged in the Estonian exclusive economic zone. The infrastructure belonged to the Estonian operator Elisa. The ship Fitburg, owned by Fitburg Shipping Co. Ltd., is suspected of involvement in the incident and was detained by the Finnish border guard before noon on the same day. The ship’s crew and the shipowner are under investigation. According to maritime shipping records, the Fitburg was heading for one of the ports in Israel.
In the case of the incident in Latvian territorial waters, there is currently no information about deliberate action on the part of the ship’s crew (the name of the ship has not yet been disclosed). It has also not been confirmed that this ship caused the disaster. However, it is known that no one was arrested as a result of the crew members’ interrogations. The damage itself was probably caused by weather conditions and possible technical defects in the equipment. A similar scenario occurred a year earlier in the Karlskrona area, when an undersea cable was damaged by the cargo ship Vezhen (flagged in Malta) owned by the Bulgarian company Navigation Maritime Bulgare. At that time, despite initial suspicions of sabotage, final investigations showed that the cause was the ship’s anchor, which damaged the cable.
In the case of the Estonian incident, the situation also remains uncertain. However, it is worth noting that Shipping Co. Ltd., the company responsible for the incident on the border between Estonian and Finnish territorial waters, is affiliated with the Turkish entity Albros Shipping & Trading Ltd, based in Turkey. The main owner of this company is Raim Alekperov, an Azerbaijani citizen registered in Turkey, known for carrying out contracts for Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. One of its subsidiaries, Albros-Petersburg, is registered in St. Petersburg. One of Alekperov’s ships, Amur 2515, visited the port of Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2017. As a result of the Finnish authorities’ intervention against the Fitburg ship, 14 people were detained, two of whom were arrested. It is therefore likely that new circumstances will arise in the case.
A similar incident occurred in early December 2025, when the EastLink2 cable was damaged with the involvement of the tanker Eagle S.
Suspicions of espionage among fishing vessel crews in Norway
Brigadier General John Olav Fuglem, commander of the newly formed Norwegian Finnmark Brigade, reported an increasing threat from Russia, consisting of reconnaissance of critical infrastructure and gathering information on military exercises. At the end of 2025, in the Kirkenes area, the Norwegian military detected individuals posing as sailors among the crews of Russian fishing boats and trawlers, suspected of conducting espionage activities.
The Finnmark Brigade is a new unit, formed in August 2025, one of two brigades of the Norwegian army, with approximately 25,000 active-duty soldiers (professional and conscripted). Its creation and location in the far north are the result of new defense plans and the identification of global and regional threats. The main locations where soldiers are stationed are in Porsanger and in the municipality of Sør-Varanger, in close proximity to Kirkenes. The reported incidents are part of the brigade’s main tasks, i.e., the defense of northern Norway. Currently, there is no publicly available detailed information about possible arrests of persons suspected of espionage. It is worth noting that the Consulate of the Russian Federation has been operating in Kirkenes since 1993. In recent years, employees of this diplomatic mission have been identified as persons associated with, among others, the FSB. In addition, between 2022 and 2025, there were cases of the Russian navy being used to conduct reconnaissance of Norwegian territory in this area. Reports from Norwegian counterintelligence and intelligence services highlight the threats associated with the unusual nature of Russian diplomatic missions in the region, as well as the importance of Finnmark as a key area for NATO’s early warning system.
Increase in the age limit for reservists in Finland
At the beginning of January, regulations raising the upper age limit for reservists from 60 to 65 come into force in Finland. This decision was finally made by the President on December 22, 2025. In view of the increased threats resulting from the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, this is one of the most important changes concerning the strengthening of the Finnish armed forces’ capabilities.
In Finland, whose defense system is based on compulsory military service, the planned changes will affect the size of the reserve forces. Their number will increase by approximately 125,000 by 2031. Finland currently has approximately 870,000–900,000 reservists out of a population of approximately 5.5 million. The Ministry of Defense emphasizes that reaching a level of approximately 1 million reservists is intended to strengthen deterrence against Russia. The country’s model of total defense, based on compulsory military service for men and voluntary service for women, is an interesting point of reference in the discussion beginning in Poland on the need to restore universal military training or broader involvement of citizens in serving their country.
FSB takes over detention centers – a return to the KGB model
On January 1, 2026, a law came into force transferring control of centrally administered detention centers (СИЗО) to the Federal Security Service (ФСБ). Key facilities have returned to the FSB system: Moscow’s Lefortovo and Matrosskaya Tishina, as well as detention centers in St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar, and Chelyabinsk. The director of the FSB has been given the right to independently establish internal regulations, conditions of detention, and rules for the transport of suspects. Suspects of the most serious crimes against state security: treason, espionage, terrorism, and extremism, will be held in isolation. The heads of the FSB SIZO (СИЗО ФСБ) gained the authority to conduct investigative activities, which means that investigative and penitentiary functions are concentrated in one body.
The decision is a de facto return to the KGB-era solutions from before 2006, when Russia transferred SIZO (СИЗО) to the Federal Penitentiary Service as part of its commitments to the Council of Europe. The centralization of investigation and prisons in one hand violates the fundamental principles of the rule of law and creates conditions for increased repression. Russian human rights defenders and foreign experts warn that the combination of operational and penitentiary powers could become “the basis for a new Gulag system” in which detainees will have no access to independent legal oversight.
Strategic exercises “Center-2026”
The main event of the 2026 training year will be the “Center-2026” strategic staff exercises. Previous similar maneuvers took place in 2019. Particular attention will be paid to the preparation of specialists in Unmanned Systems and radio-electronic warfare units. By the beginning of the training year, more than 300 training grounds and training sites equipped with modern equipment had been developed. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov announced the continuation of work on “stabilizing the situation at the global and regional levels” and “sustainable development of the army and navy.”
Joint exercises with the armed forces of friendly countries are planned.
Strategic exercises of this format traditionally precede key military operations and test the combat readiness of the entire command system. The “Center-2019” maneuvers took place in the context of preparations for intensified activities in various theaters of operations. The current exercises, with an emphasis on unmanned and radio-electronic forces, point to a new model of warfare in which autonomous systems and electronic warfare will be of decisive importance. The expansion of training grounds and infrastructure is evidence of long-term preparations for high-intensity conflicts. Russia is learning to wage modern warfare—and it is doing so systematically.
Creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces – a new type of Armed Forces
In November 2025, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation officially announced the creation of a new type of Armed Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. The deputy commander of the new forces, Colonel Sergei Ištuganov, confirmed that the organizational structure had been defined, a commander appointed, command bodies at all levels established, and regular regiments and other subunits formed. Minister Belousov announced that the formation would be completed in 2026. According to Ukrainian data, approximately 80,000 soldiers currently serve in the Unmanned Systems Forces, and the plan for 2026 is to increase this number to 165,500, and by 2030 to approximately 210,000. August 2025 was considered a turning point, when Russia achieved a twofold advantage over Ukrainian forces in the use of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. Deliveries of drones equipped with artificial intelligence components, enabling automatic target tracking and autonomous navigation, began.
The institutionalization of the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch of the Armed Forces represents a fundamental reorganization of the Russian army and is a direct response to the experiences of the war in Ukraine. The creation of this type of force demonstrates Moscow’s recognition of the importance of asymmetric warfare based on unmanned strike systems. The target number of 210,000 soldiers by 2030 indicates that Russia is preparing for a long-term conflict in which autonomous combat systems will play a key role. The implementation of artificial intelligence in drones marks a new stage of technological escalation and a potentially dangerous precedent for future armed conflicts.
Expansion of the Armed Forces structure – divisions, brigades, regiments
At a meeting of the Ministry of Defense’s collegium on December 17, 2025, Minister Belousov presented the scale of organizational changes in the Armed Forces. In 2025, 5 divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments were formed. In 2026, it is planned to create another 4 divisions, 14 brigades, and 39 regiments. The first stage of forming the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts has been completed. These structures were created as a result of the division of the Western Military District and are responsible for the security of key regions. The Moscow District covers Moscow, the Moscow Oblast, and 17 other oblasts (including Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, and Smolensk), while the Leningrad District covers St. Petersburg, the Leningrad Oblast, Karelia, the Komi Republic, the Murmansk Oblast, Kaliningrad, and the incorporated Northern Fleet. The territories of the occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson have been formally incorporated into the Southern Military District.
The scale of the structural reorganization is unprecedented and indicates a long-term strategy to transform the Russian army into a war machine capable of conducting multi-domain operations. Each division has 10,000-15,000 soldiers, and each brigade has 3,000-5,000. The intensive pace of forming new units means that by 2027, Russia will have a much larger army than before the start of the so-called “special military operation.” The creation of new military districts and the inclusion of occupied Ukrainian territories in them is not only a symbolic gesture of annexation, but also a practical preparation of the command infrastructure for further offensive operations. Moscow is not planning a defensive strategy – it is expanding its potential for escalation.
Implementation of the Russian Armed Forces armament program – full execution of the 2025 plan
First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov announced on January 2, 2026, that the plan for the supply of weapons, military equipment, and special technology for 2025 had been fully implemented and that production resources for 2026 had been secured. In 2024, defense industry companies delivered over 4,000 armored and tracked vehicles, 180 combat aircraft and helicopters, and over 1.5 million unmanned aerial vehicles of various types. In 2025, a record number of Su-35S multi-role aircraft were produced (the exact number remains a secret). Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin ordered “very strict” control of prices and delivery times for defense orders, emphasizing the priority of timely deliveries of the most sought-after weapon designs.
The defense procurement system is functioning smoothly, which testifies to the full mobilization of the Russian defense industry. The numbers are impressive: 1.5 million drones per year is an industrial approach to warfare, in which unmanned aerial vehicles have become a mass weapon of destruction. The priority treatment of deliveries and the implementation of price control systems indicate that Russia’s economy is fully subordinated to military objectives. The announcement of deliveries of drones equipped with artificial intelligence marks the beginning of a new phase in the technological arms race. Russia has no problems with production—it has a strategy of industrial war of attrition.
The Center for Military-Sports Training and Patriotic Upbringing of the Youth “Voin” (“Воин”) – militarization of youth
The “Voin” Center for military-sports training and patriotic education of youth, established on December 1, 2022, is rapidly expanding its activities. It currently operates in 21 regions of Russia, has trained over 108,000 students, including over 50,000 in 2025 alone, and 449 instructors, about half of whom are participants in the “special military operation.” In 2026, three new regional branches are planned to open: in Karelia, Primorsky Krai, and Amur Oblast. By 2030, the Center is expected to cover all 89 regions of the Russian Federation. Training programs include fire, tactical, and engineering preparation, drone piloting training, tactical medicine, and the basics of national security. Participants are young people aged 14–35.
The “Voin” Center is a modern version of Soviet paramilitary structures, adapted to the realities of the 21st century. The militarization of young people from the age of 14 is reminiscent of totalitarian models in which generations were raised to serve the state and be ready to fight. Mass training in the use of weapons, drones, and military tactics creates a reservoir of future soldiers and signals a long-term strategy of preparing society for war. The plan to cover all regions by 2030 indicates that Russia does not expect a quick end to the conflict—it is preparing a generation for decades of confrontation.
A package of repressive laws – tightening political control
On January 1, 2026, a series of repressive laws came into force.
Those deemed “foreign agents” will pay income tax at a rate of 30% instead of the standard 13-22%, while losing all tax breaks. A single administrative violation may result in criminal proceedings (previously, two violations within a year were required). From March 1, 2026, the Prosecutor General’s Office has been granted the right to block bank accounts, freeze funds, and restrict the right to manage real estate and vehicles for persons convicted in absentia abroad for “discrediting the army,” “violating the territorial integrity of Russia,” or “calling for sanctions.” The age for taking the oath of citizenship has also been lowered from 18 to 14.
The repressive package is another step towards the full normalization of authoritarianism in Russia. The tax, judicial, and administrative systems are becoming tools of political control and elimination of opponents of the regime. The mechanism of confiscating the property of persons convicted in absentia means that Russian citizens abroad can be unlawfully deprived of all their assets without a real trial. Lowering the age of the civic oath to 14 is a deliberate indoctrination of young people and preparation of a generation raised in the cult of the state and readiness for sacrifice. Russia is building a mobilization society in which loyalty to the authorities is a condition for survival.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- Michał Dworczyk, Chairman of the IWF Program Council, gave an interview to Polish Radio Three and commented on the US special operation in Venezuela from the perspective of Poland’s interests.
- IWF expert Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj gave an interview to the Defence24 portal. The year 2027 occupies a key place in Russian strategic planning. The reforms and decisions of 2024–2025 indicate preparations to achieve full systemic readiness of the Russian Federation for the next phase of confrontation with the West.
