We invite you to read our round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania signs contracts for new helicopters and radars
On 17 July 2026, the Romanian Ministry of Defence signed two contracts financed through the EU’s SAFE loan, with a total value of over 1 billion euros. The first contract, worth over €800 million, covers the purchase of 12 Airbus H225M Caracal helicopters in a multi-role configuration (fire support, reconnaissance, surveillance, tactical protection, airborne assault). Deliveries are to be completed by 2030. The second order, worth approximately €250 million, concerns 12 Thales Ground Master 200 MM/A air surveillance radars, capable of detecting aircraft, drones and missiles at short and medium ranges, including low-flying targets. Both contracts are accompanied by industrial cooperation agreements: Airbus will establish a final assembly line at the IAR Brașov (Ghimbav) facility. From 2030, the helicopters assembled there are to supply both the Romanian armed forces and export markets. Radar manufacturer Thales will expand its operations in Romania, including the creation of around 1,000 high-value jobs in the development of radar hardware and software, with local production of antennas and integration onto vehicle platforms. According to the acting Minister of National Defence, Radu Miruță, contracts under the SAFE programme have so far reached a value of €7.5 billion.
The orders were managed centrally by the French Ministry of Defence as the contracting authority under the SAFE joint procurement programme, which – as Miruță emphasised – enabled a significantly lower price for the helicopters to be secured than would have been possible through direct procurement. Earlier, in June 2026, Romania had already signed a preliminary agreement for Airbus helicopters under the same programme. The IAR Brașov plant has for decades been primarily involved in the production and maintenance of PUMA helicopters; the current contract marks its integration into Airbus’s global production chain. From the Romanian government’s perspective, the key point is that both contracts include binding offset commitments – technology transfer, the establishment of an assembly line and the creation of hundreds of high-quality jobs. However, the contracts are not part of a broader strategy, such as developing proprietary products based on the acquired expertise.
Greek parliament ratifies military cooperation agreement with Bulgaria
The parliament in Athens has ratified a military cooperation agreement with Bulgaria, enabling support for the Greek air group in conducting maritime patrol missions over the Black Sea. Under the terms of the agreement, Bulgaria will provide air traffic control services for these operations and has undertaken to support the deployment of Greek aircraft and aircrews at Bezmer Air Base. As confirmed by the Bulgarian news agency BTA, the inter-ministerial agreement (between the defence ministries of both countries) was signed back in 2021, and the Bulgarian side completed the ratification process four years ago. The current vote in Athens concludes the ratification process on the Greek side. Military experts link the patrol flights to NATO’s ‘adapted forward presence’ strategy, which aims to strengthen deterrence and defence readiness on the south-eastern flank. The initial decisions to strengthen the Alliance’s presence in this region were originally taken at the 2016 NATO summit.
The finalisation of the agreement coincides with the parallel strengthening of Bezmer’s infrastructure, funded by NATO (modernisation of the base under the NSIP and the development of local infrastructure for the planned multinational brigade). Bezmer, alongside the Novo Selo training area, is thus becoming an operational hub of growing regional importance, having previously hosted a NATO multinational battlegroup. Although the agreement with Greece is not formally a new commitment – but rather the finalisation of a bilateral agreement concluded five years ago – its ratification in July 2026, coming hot on the heels of the decision to fully fund the modernisation of Bezmer, is no coincidence and is in line with the base’s growing role as a regional NATO operational hub on the south-eastern flank.
The Czech Republic takes delivery of its first Embraer C-390 aircraft
The Czech Air Force has officially taken delivery of the first of two Embraer C-390 Millennium medium transport aircraft it has ordered. This comes 20 months after the purchase agreement was signed in October 2024, worth approximately 11.3 billion CZK (approx. 508 million USD). The aircraft arrived in Prague on 6 July 2026 following a 14-hour transfer flight from Embraer’s factory in Gavião Peixoto, Brazil, escorted by Gripen fighter jets on the final leg of the journey. The handover ceremony was attended by Defence Minister Jaromír Zůna, Chief of the General Staff General Miroslav Hlaváč, Commander of the Air Force General Petr Tománek, and the CEO of Embraer Defence & Security, Bosco da Costa Junior. The aircraft has a payload capacity of up to 26 tonnes, can carry 80 soldiers or 64 paratroopers, has a cruising speed of approximately 470 knots and is equipped with an in-flight refuelling system (it can both refuel other aircraft and be refuelled itself), the ability to land on unpaved runways, and modules for medical evacuation and search-and-rescue operations. The Czech aerospace industry – Aero Vodochody – has been part of the production consortium since the development phase, manufacturing, amongst other things, rear fuselage components, the cargo ramp and the cabin doors. The second aircraft ordered is due to be delivered to the Czech Republic in 2027–2028.
Until now, the Czech air transport fleet has relied mainly on the smaller, twin-engine CASA C-295, whose payload capacity and range proved insufficient for larger loads. In Europe, this aircraft is already in service with, amongst others, Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands and Austria, whilst Sweden and Slovakia have also expressed interest. Embraer is actively expanding its sales activities in Eastern Europe, as reflected, amongst other things, by the June agreement on industrial cooperation with the Polish company WZL-2 regarding the maintenance and technical support of the KC-390. The model being promoted represents potential competition for the C-130 Hercules, manufactured by the American firm Lockheed Martin, which is currently in service with the Polish Air Force.
Changes in the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has decided to make a change to the post of Minister of Defence of Ukraine and to dismiss the popular and highly regarded Mykhailo Fedorov. Although he had held the post since January this year, he had won the affection of the public and the respect of the troops as an advocate of modern solutions, far-reaching reform of the ministry, and a resolute fight against corruption. Recently, M. Fedorov had fallen out with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, whom he blamed for excessive casualties among Ukrainian forces, as well as for commanding the army in a Soviet-style manner. V. Zelensky’s decision has sparked considerable controversy in Ukraine, particularly as M. Fedorov’s successor was to be the current Minister of the Interior, Ihor Klymenko, who is regarded as a loyal executor of the presidential administration’s will. Rallies in support of the dismissed minister were held in a number of Ukraine’s largest cities, whilst Ukrainian politicians – and even some senior military commanders – publicly voiced their opposition in large numbers. In the face of these events, Volodymyr Zelenskyy changed his plans and offered the post of Defence Minister to Yevhen Khmara, who has been heading the Security Service of Ukraine since January this year.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s personnel decisions are clearly linked to his plans to maintain a key position on the Ukrainian political scene. For this reason, the head of state is systematically eliminating potential rivals, regardless of their role in the war with Russia and in reforming the state (a similar approach was taken, for example, with General Valeriy Zaluzhny). Among the allegations levelled at Mr Zelensky’s inner circle, which have been circulating in the Ukrainian media for some time, were, amongst other things, Mr Fedorov’s ambiguous stance regarding his bid for the presidency, as well as the related issue of the former minister building, within the Ministry of Defence, a team of political and image advisers political and image matters, tasked with ensuring M. Fedorov received adequate media coverage. Appointing J. Chmara to a post within the Ministry of Defence will, in turn, allow the presidential office to place a figure fully controlled by the Presidential Administration at the head of the SBU, thereby tightening its grip on the country’s political and economic life.
Positive outcomes of Franco-Ukrainian talks on defence cooperation
The Presidents of France and Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on the sidelines of France’s National Day celebrations on 14 July and the accompanying political talks, agreed on a number of areas for further cooperation. These included announcements regarding the delivery to Ukraine of the first Dassault Rafale aircraft in 2028–29 (according to media reports, this will involve 16 aircraft). The aircraft in question will be supplied under a framework agreement signed in 2025, which provides for the delivery of up to 100 aircraft. Ukraine is also set to receive a licence to produce Aster 30 missiles for the SAMP/T medium-range air defence systems, SCALP long-range cruise missiles, and AASM glide bombs. According to announcements, Ukraine is also set to become the first recipient of SAMP/T NG systems capable of countering ballistic missiles, and will receive two additional batteries of the older generation. E. Macron also declared that deliveries of missiles for these systems would be expedited as much as possible.
Despite the increasingly advanced Ukrainian-French cooperation, its actual form will evolve over time, with next year’s presidential election proving a pivotal moment. The outcome of that election will determine whether the projects currently under discussion in Paris will actually be implemented or remain ‘on paper’.
Ukrainian findings regarding the Russian S8000 Banderol cruise missile
Serhiy Beskrestnov, alias ‘Flash’, an adviser to the Ukrainian Minister of Defence, has published on his Telegram profile Ukrainian findings regarding the latest Russian S8000 Banderol cruise missile. According to these findings, the Russians are aiming to achieve a production capacity of 120 units per month, as well as to extend the missile’s range to 500 km from the current approximately 300 km. The primary platform for the missile is the Orion unmanned aerial vehicle, which operates in Russian airspace. Variants involving the launch of the Banderol missile from various types of helicopters are also to be considered. The weapon is equipped with a 50-kilogram warhead, is guided by satellite navigation (which makes it vulnerable to electronic warfare), and also features an autonomous navigation system. The missile is designed to fly at an altitude of 400–2,000 metres as standard, descending to 200 metres immediately before impact. Its manoeuvrability has been rated highly; it is said to require only around 2,500 metres to turn round. In the conclusion to his post, S. Beskrestnov described the Russian design as a “low-cost manoeuvrable missile with a small warhead”.
The S8000 Banderol missile is yet another example of low-cost weaponry introduced into the armed forces of both countries during the war in Ukraine. Given the nature of the hostilities, which have taken the form of a war of attrition, both Kyiv and Moscow are seeking effective alternatives to standard weapon systems, amongst other things to reduce the costs of the conflict.
Russia – Ministry of Defence Collegium: risk assessment, the 2027–2036 armaments programme and the systematic scaling up of drone forces
On 17 July, Defence Minister Andrei Belousov chaired a meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defence Collegium to review the first half of 2026. Deputies were instructed to present the “expected results and risks” threatening the fulfilment of tasks; the parameters of the 2027–2036 state armaments programme were reiterated, with the aim of reducing costs by 1–2 per cent annually. Specific figures were given: since the start of the year, over 8,000 specialists in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been trained; drone deliveries to the armed forces have more than doubled year-on-year; 45 training complexes have been installed at 14 military academies; and the Military University of Engineering and Technology has been established. The meeting was attended by the President’s aide, Alexei Dyumin.
A formal instruction to report ‘risks’ in the implementation of tasks is a rare, public indication of tensions in the execution of the state defence order – likely at the intersection of funding (cost pressure of 1–2 per cent per year) and production capacity. At the same time, data on the doubling of UAV deliveries and the large-scale training of operators confirm that the adoption of drones is the main vector of structural adaptation within the Russian Armed Forces, already institutionalised at the level of military education. Dyumin’s presence indicates direct Kremlin oversight of the armament process. For the eastern flank, this means that the Russian Federation’s strike and drone capabilities will continue to grow regardless of the course of events in Ukraine.
Russia – reserve forces without mobilisation – 140,000 trained in six months, expansion of DOSAAF
At a meeting of the Ministry of Defence, General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov reported that in the first half of 2026, over 140,000 military personnel were trained in reserve regiments and at training grounds, and over 40 practical exercises were conducted; for the first time, a methodological and training assembly was held at the 362nd reserve regiment, and 107 commanders of assault sub-units were included in the training on a rotational basis. DOSAAF (Russian: ДОСААФ – Добровольное общество содействия армии, авиации и флоту) is the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Navy – a Russian socio-state organisation whose stated aim is to strengthen national defence and security. The organisation has increased the number of military specialities covered by its training from 20 to 30 and has trained over 18,000 future conscripts, including operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground-based robotic systems.
Russia is expanding the capacity of its reserve and pre-conscription training system without announcing ‘mobilisation 2.0’ – a scale of 140,000 per half-year (potentially ~280,000 per year) creates a pool capable of both replenishing losses and rapidly deploying new tactical units. The inclusion of drone specialisms within DOSAAF shifts reserve generation to the pre-conscription stage, reducing costs and shortening the training cycle following a potential call-up. This is a ‘creeping mobilisation’ model: mobilisation capacity grows, whilst the political threshold for formal mobilisation remains uncrossed – which will make it more difficult for NATO to issue early warning indicators.
Russia – nuclear signals: Lavrov on ‘exchange of strikes’, threats of ‘special measures’ against the Baltic States
On 17 July, RIA quoted Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s position (in the context of Chancellor Merz’s remarks on a possible ‘new nuclear doctrine’ based on a German -French rapprochement), that the current situation carries the risk of a direct NATO-Russia clash, which “could quickly escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes”. In the context of the week: on 8 July, State Duma deputy Aleksandr Tolmachev warned that the deployment of nuclear weapons near the Russian Federation’s borders (including in the Baltic states) would necessitate a “regime of special security measures” provided for – as he claims – in the military doctrine; Peskov’s remarks about “retaliatory measures” were cited .
This week’s nuclear rhetoric is directed at two targets: the European debate on “Euro-deterrence” (Lavrov attacks the German-French project, attempting to stifle it at the conceptual stage) and the Baltic states (Tolmachev/Peskov – doctrinal pressure on the weakest link in the flank). The distribution of roles is telling: the most heated threats are made by secondary actors (a Member of Parliament), whilst the Foreign Minister uses the language of ‘risk’, maintaining a semblance of responsibility. This is a classic calibration of escalation signals – maintaining fear without committing to any obligations. This situation requires monitoring for any shift from rhetoric to tangible actions (troop deployments, nuclear force exercises).
Russia – FSB treason cases, a wave of railway sabotage, a foiled assassination attempt on a Ministry of Defence officer
The FSB reported the arrest in Crimea of two Russian citizens who, on behalf of the Ukrainian security services, were gathering data on air defence positions and troop deployments – cases under Article 275 of the Criminal Code (treason). On 17 July, the Investigative Committee charged a 17-year-old from the Sverdlovsk Oblast with sabotage (setting fire to signal boxes in Yekaterinburg); on the same day, the Ministry of Internal Affairs revealed the arrest in Moscow of two foreign students who, for 300 USD, had set fire to signal boxes belonging to the Moscow Railway. On 9 July, the FSB foiled an assassination attempt on a senior Ministry of Defence officer in Moscow – a Russian citizen (born in 2001) recruited by the Ukrainian security services was detained.
The picture of the week confirms an ongoing, low-cost sabotage campaign conducted by recruiting one-off operatives online (minors, foreign students, paid rates in the region of hundreds of dollars) – a model that is difficult to neutralise using conventional counter-intelligence methods, as it lacks permanent networks. The concentration of FSB cases around the Crimean air defence system and the Ministry of Defence’s command staff indicates the priorities of Ukrainian intelligence. It is significant that the Russian security apparatus is forced to spread its resources between protecting railway infrastructure (war logistics), refineries and personnel. It should be noted that the Russian Federation may apply an identical playbook against NATO countries.
Belarus – the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence as the core of Minsk’s strategic message
On 13 July, Andrei Bogodel of the Belarusian Military Academy stated that any violation of the state border would be met with an “immediate response using the full defence potential”, recalling that Belarus possesses tactical nuclear weapons and the “Oreshnik” system, and that during a recent joint Belarus-Russia nuclear forces exercise, control of the nuclear forces had been transferred to the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces; he added that “practically half the world” would stand behind Belarus. This is in line with Lukashenko’s statement (published on 12 July) that “only a state with a strong, well-armed army can be truly sovereign”, and that “Oreshnik” and tactical nuclear weapons have become “a significant factor in strategic deterrence”.
The most significant element of Bogodel’s statement is not the threatening rhetoric itself, but the reinforcement of the argument that control over the nuclear component is being transferred to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus during joint exercises – the narrative of ‘sharing’ nuclear capabilities is intended to bolster the credibility of Minsk’s deterrence whilst simultaneously structurally linking Belarus to the Russian nuclear planning system. The division of roles (the military expert formulates operational threats, whilst Lukashenko addresses the doctrinal level) points to a coordinated campaign, not isolated statements. For Poland, it is crucial that Belarus’s deterrence message is fully synchronised with Russian nuclear signalling from the same week
Belarus – the border as a tool of pressure – the Border Committee’s daily narrative about bottlenecks caused by Poland and Lithuania
Information. On 13 July, the Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus (BC RB) reported that 810 passenger cars were waiting to enter Poland at the Bruzgi, Bierestowica and Brest border crossings, accusing the Polish side of processing only 28 per cent of the quota; approximately 140 cars and 170 lorries were queuing at the Lithuanian border crossings. On 14 July, the BC reported a total of over 1,100 vehicles waiting to enter the EU, with the Polish side processing 36 per cent of the quota for lorries and the Lithuanian side 19 per cent.
The Lithuanian Border Guard’s statements form part of a daily information campaign: precise figures and percentages of the ‘unmet quota’ create a seemingly technical, objective narrative blaming Warsaw and Vilnius for travellers’ hardships. This narrative serves three functions: to discredit Polish border policy within the Baltic States, to generate public pressure on the EU side (the diaspora, hauliers) and to lay the groundwork for escalating the border issue at an opportune moment. The absence this week of reports in regime-controlled sources regarding a new wave of migratory pressure does not mean it has subsided – border pressure remains, and the media narrative surrounding it is being maintained.
The Chinese narrative framework – NATO in crisis, Poland merely a statistic in the arms race
Chinese media reported on the NATO summit in Ankara through the prism of divisions. Trump was reported to have called the allies “disappointing” and threatened to withdraw US forces from Europe; it was noted that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and Greece had increased their defence spending, whilst European members had announced arms contracts worth at least US$50 billion. The Global Times described NATO’s highlighting of the “Chinese missile threat” as a “naive and pathetic” pretext for the alliance’s expansion in the Asia-Pacific (Global Times). Xinhua’s reports on the war in Ukraine are based almost exclusively on statements from the Russian Ministry of Defence, such as the claim that “146 Ukrainian drones were shot down in 12 hours”.
The framework of Chinese media commentary is consistent. NATO is a “Cold War relic” plagued by a crisis of cohesion, whilst the war in Ukraine is reported in step with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s communiqués – which makes Chinese news agencies, in effect, a channel for amplifying the Russian perspective on the battlefield to audiences in the Global South. It is telling that Poland and the Baltic states appear solely as items in expenditure statistics, with a complete absence of hostile analysis – Beijing avoids opening a separate narrative front against Warsaw, treating the eastern flank as an internal NATO problem. This asymmetry (amplification of the Russian Federation’s message whilst maintaining neutrality towards Poland) defines the PRC’s current position in the information war.
Letter of intent regarding the development of the Patria TRACKX tracked armoured personnel carrier
On 7 July 2026, during the NATO summit in Ankara, Finland, Latvia and Norway signed a letter of intent concerning cooperation on the development and potential joint procurement of the Patria TRACKX light tracked armoured vehicle. The agreement paves the way for the exchange of information on the project’s progress, the results of field trials and future procurement decisions. The vehicle was designed as part of the FAMOUS programme, co-funded by the European Defence Fund. The TRACKX, for which series production is planned to begin in 2027, is designed to transport up to 12 troops, operate in Arctic conditions and cross water obstacles.
The signed letter, which paves the way for the three countries to engage in deeper cooperation on the development of a light tracked transporter, represents a further step towards consolidating cooperation between the defence industries of the Nordic and Baltic countries and establishing a joint industrial and logistical base for the land forces of NATO’s northern flank. Standardisation of equipment between Finland, Norway and Latvia may in future simplify training, logistical support and the conduct of joint operations in harsh climatic conditions. The project also strengthens European capabilities in the production of armoured vehicles and reduces the region’s dependence on suppliers from outside Europe.
Warnings of sabotage in Norway
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST – Norwegian: Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste) warns that Russia has significantly increased its readiness to carry out offensive operations and is planning acts of sabotage against Norwegian critical infrastructure, particularly logistics facilities supporting Ukraine and civilian installations. These actions could be carried out by individuals or organisations with no formal links to the Russian security services. The PST has drawn the attention of Norwegian businesses to the need to step up security at facilities and infrastructure of strategic importance. Potential warning signs mentioned include, amongst others, suspicious surveillance of facilities, unexplained technical failures, attempts to tamper with monitoring systems, and repeated attempts to make contact via social media with employees who have access to sensitive information.
The PST’s warnings point to a shift in the nature of the threat from Russia – away from traditional intelligence activities towards hybrid operations utilising local operatives. Of particular importance is the protection of critical infrastructure and the private sector, which is increasingly becoming the target of destabilising activities aimed at undermining the defence capabilities of NATO member states. According to the PST, businesses in particular should actively assess their own risks, identify vulnerabilities in physical, digital and organisational security, and prepare procedures to respond to potential disruptions to their operations.
