We invite you to read our round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania among the initiators of a new international defence funding framework.
On 7 July 2026, President Nicușor Dan announced that Romania would be a co-founder of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) . This new multilateral financial institution was initiated by Canada, whilst the other signatories to the letter of intent are: Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. These countries will jointly develop the initial framework and projects carried out under the Bank’s auspices. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasised that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had highlighted the need for the capacity to produce armaments at the pace and scale required to replenish stocks. The DSRB is intended to provide long-term, low-cost financing for defence projects, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence sector. According to initial plans, the institution is to operate with a budget of approximately US$134 billion. As a founding member, Romania will host one of the bank’s regional offices. The launch of the new project is scheduled for 2027.
Romania’s accession to the DSRB forms part of a strategy to diversify the sources of funding for the modernisation of the defence sector, given Bucharest’s limited fiscal space. The status of founding member and the hosting of a regional office strengthen Romania’s negotiating position regarding future offset mechanisms and may facilitate access to low-cost capital for the domestic defence industry. This is an area in which Romania has not yet put forward many initiatives of its own, relying instead on imports of key weapon systems from abroad. No other G7 countries apart from Canada were among the signatories to the letter of intent. In recent weeks, the creation of another financing mechanism (the Multilateral Defence Mechanism), initiated by the United Kingdom, has been announced; Poland and Finland, amongst others, are set to join it.
Expansion of Bulgarian air bases using Alliance funds
The Bulgarian government has approved the expansion of the Vrazhdebna (near Sofia Airport) and Bezmer (near Yambol) air bases as part of the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). The planned investments will be fully funded by the Alliance, without placing any burden on the Bulgarian budget. The aim is to increase the capacity of both bases to accommodate allied forces and equipment, and to improve interoperability with NATO. Bezmer has previously benefited from NATO investments totalling nearly 30 million euros (extension of the runway to accommodate larger transport aircraft such as the C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules). Infrastructure is already being developed in the area for the planned multinational allied brigade, and the Bulgarian-American Novo Selo training ground, which hosts US troops, is already operational.
From Sofia’s perspective, using the NSIP programme to modernise air bases is a win-win situation. Firstly, it helps to ease the strain on the state budget, which is operating under crisis conditions. Secondly, it reinforces Bulgaria’s undoubted asset on the international stage, namely its strategic location, for example in the context of US operations in the Middle East. At the same time, the expansion of the Bezmer base to accommodate a multinational brigade, in conjunction with the strengthening of Bulgaria’s role in the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Group, confirms Sofia’s consistent positioning as a key player in the Black Sea region.
The development of the Black Sea mine countermeasures framework
On 8 July 2026 in Ankara, during the NATO summit, Bulgarian Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov signed a memorandum with the defence ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands regarding the transfer, free of charge, to Bulgaria of seven mine-hunting vessels – three Dutch (Alkmaar-class) and four Belgian (Flower-class), both of which originated from the joint Tripartite project. These vessels became surplus to requirements following the entry into service of new ships under the Belgian-Dutch rMCM programme. Bulgaria will cover the costs of commissioning and maintaining the vessels. On the same day, Stojanov signed an amendment to the memorandum establishing the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Group with the defence ministers of Romania and Turkey, extending its mandate to include surveillance and reconnaissance for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure.
Bulgaria already has two Dutch minesweepers, purchased in 2021. The acquisition of these new vessels significantly strengthens its fleet. The expansion of the trilateral group’s mandate addresses the growing threat to undersea power and communications cables in the Black Sea. The expansion of the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Group’s remit is yet another example, in the past year, of strengthened cooperation within the Bucharest–Sofia–Ankara triangle and of Turkey’s growing role as a state bolstering the security of NATO’s eastern flank.
The ongoing dispute over defence competences in the Czech Republic
The dispute between two branches of the Czech executive came to the fore during the recent NATO summit in Ankara. President Petr Pavel and Prime Minister Andrej Babiš flew to the summit on separate government aircraft, unable to agree on how the state should be represented. On 22 June, the government decided to exclude Pavel from the official delegation, arguing that it is the executive branch that should present the country’s position on defence and foreign affairs, thereby breaking with the established practice of presidential participation in summits since the country’s accession to the Alliance. In protest, Pavel invoked Article 63 of the Constitution and lodged a complaint regarding the division of powers with the Constitutional Court. On 24 June, the Court provisionally ordered the government to allow the President to attend, without ruling on the merits of the case. The government complied with the ruling but maintained that Babiš would lead the delegation and take part in the main sessions, whilst the presidential delegation was limited to a small team.
A side effect of the ensuing dispute can be seen in Prime Minister Babiš’s announcement, made just before his departure for Ankara, that the government would increase the defence budget by USD 1.7 billion in 2027, which is intended to enable the country to meet NATO’s 2 per cent of GDP defence spending threshold for the first time. The new funds are to be reallocated from the budgets of other ministries. The Prime Minister’s move can be seen as an attempt to bolster his image in the area of security, given the earlier cuts to the defence budget, which were criticised by President Pavel – a retired general and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.
Intensification of Russian and Ukrainian air strikes
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Russian Armed Forces/Ukrainian Armed Forces) have intensified strikes on targets deep behind enemy lines. The Russian Armed Forces primarily use ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and glide bombs for this purpose (in the immediate rear of the front line and in border areas). The Ukrainian Armed Forces, on the other hand, use almost exclusively drones, occasionally supplemented by missiles (Storm Shadow, FP-5 Flamingo, etc.). The targets of the strikes, however, differ significantly. The Russians are focusing on shelling densely built-up areas, sowing terror amongst the civilian population of Ukraine. This was the case, for example, with the attacks on 6 and 8 July this year, which mainly targeted multi-storey residential blocks in Kyiv. Among the damaged facilities were the capital’s tram depot, one of the buildings of Taras Shevchenko National University, and a maintenance base belonging to the DTEK energy group. In addition, further transhipment terminals belonging to the logistics company Nova Poshta (in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih) were also attacked, as were further petrol stations in the southern and eastern regions of the country (over 200 such facilities have already been destroyed since the start of this year). Since almost the beginning of July, there have also been daily attacks on hydrocarbon extraction infrastructure in the north-eastern regions of the country: Kharkiv, Sumy and Poltava. The attack on Vyshneve, near Kyiv, on 6 July this year has had the most serious consequences to date. As a result, the Russians most likely struck a storage facility or a site for the production or assembly of missiles belonging to the state-owned defence conglomerate Ukroboronprom, leading to a series of powerful secondary explosions. Consequently, buildings (mainly residential) across an area of 13 ha were damaged, and many people were killed or injured.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are very consistently pursuing a strategy of striking targets in the Russian Federation’s oil sector. Over the past week, refinery and petrochemical facilities in Yaroslavl, Ust-Luga, Omsk, Saratov, Ilsk and Nizhnekamsk; fuel depots in Tver, Kerch, Azov and the Stavropol Krai; transhipment terminals in Kerch, Taganrog and the Rostov Oblast; and pumping stations on the fuel pipeline in Bashkortostan and the oil pipeline in Ufa. Furthermore, tankers operating in the Black and Azov Seas are attacked on a daily basis, particularly those supplying fuel to the Crimean Peninsula. Between 6 and 10 July, the Ukrainians attacked 26 tankers, a tugboat and a bulk carrier. As a result of these actions, the Russian authorities have tightened fuel export regulations, imposing an embargo on the sale of diesel abroad (according to the Financial Times, the Ukrainian attacks have reduced refining capacity by 40 per cent, and the fuel crisis has already affected 50 per cent of Russians). The volumes of fuel imported from Belarus are also at record levels. In June, this amounted to 181,000 tonnes of petrol (a 500 per cent increase compared with May), 77,000 tonnes of diesel (+150 per cent) and 16,000 tonnes of aviation fuel (+220 per cent). At the same time, attacks are continuing on Crimea’s energy infrastructure, including targets in Sevastopol, Simferopol, Kerch, and the onshore receiving station of the Kuban–Crimea power bridge. These attacks have resulted in severely limited access to electricity, as well as increasingly widespread problems with internet and water supplies. Road and rail crossings, as well as military installations (missile launchers, radars, air bases and communications hubs), are also under constant attack on the peninsula.
The intensification of air and missile strikes by both sides stems from a significant slowdown in ground operations. Kyiv and Moscow are well aware that they lack the manpower and equipment required to achieve a breakthrough on the front line. The strategy of both sides therefore involves striking high-value targets (Ukraine) or civilian targets (Russia) to force the other side to make concessions or to persuade it to negotiate. It is highly likely that the scale and effectiveness of these attacks will increase, due, on the one hand, to shortages of air defence capabilities and, on the other, to the increasingly sophisticated strike systems possessed by both sides and the constant adaptation of how they are used.
Controversy surrounding the murder of the suspected perpetrator of the Monaco bomb attack
Doubts are mounting regarding the case of the attack on the Ukrainian-Cypriot businessman Vadym Yermolayev and his family in Monaco (29 June this year). The alleged perpetrator of the attack, Ukrainian citizen Anastasia Berezovskaya, was murdered on 6 July this year near Kyiv. According to official statements from the police and the public prosecutor’s office, the perpetrators of the crime were two Ukrainian citizens: Vladyslav Reut, an active officer of the Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR), and Vitaliy Zhukovych, a former SBU officer. They are alleged to have made multiple transfers to A. Berezowska’s bank and cryptocurrency accounts. They also stated that they had not informed their superiors of their contacts with her. A. Berezowska is said to have been abroad from 22 March this year until 1 July this year, returning to Ukraine by coach immediately after the assassination attempt. The case of A. Berezowska and the assassination attempt in Monaco has attracted considerable attention in Ukraine, but has not yet prompted any comments on the matter from state authorities.
There are three main theories regarding the attack in Monaco and the murder near Kyiv, each of which is compromising for the Ukrainian security services. According to the first hypothesis, A. Berezowska was acting on the orders of the military intelligence service HUR and carried out the attack on V. Yermolayev, who was accused of collaborating with the occupying authorities in Crimea. Subsequently, due to her knowledge of the case, she was eliminated by the Ukrainian security services, and the case was framed as a criminal matter, intended to divert attention from the government’s involvement in the assassination. This hypothesis is supported by the modus operandi characteristic of the Ukrainian security services (previously observed, for example, during the assassinations carried out in Moscow), as well as the growing assertiveness and even defiant attitude of the Ukrainian authorities towards their allies (another example of which is the issue of commemorations of members of the UPA and OUN). According to the second hypothesis, both perpetrators of the murder were acting on behalf of criminal organisations that wished to eliminate V. Yermolayev due to his highly probable involvement in large-scale fraud schemes allegedly carried out by the businessman’s son (via a fictitious call centre). In this scenario, W. Reut and W. Zhukovych recruited A. Berezovskaya, presumably under the HUR cover story, and subsequently eliminated her. In the third scenario, the least likely, V. Reut and V. Zhukovych were acting on the orders of the Russian secret services, and their main objective was to provoke a crisis in Ukrainian-French relations. The current state of knowledge does not allow for a definitive conclusion as to which of these hypotheses is correct. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that this issue will be at the top of the agenda during Ukrainian-French talks at V. Zelenskyy’s forthcoming visit to Paris.
Ukraine is strengthening its systemic resilience in the face of attacks on the country’s energy sector
The Ukrainian authorities are taking further steps to ensure, at least in part, that the country’s needs for electricity and heat generation are met during the winter season. The Ministry of Energy is, amongst other things, carrying out a campaign to distribute energy equipment (generators, transformers, modular boiler units, cogeneration equipment, boilers) – sourced from its own purchases and international aid – to local authorities, public bodies, businesses and organisations. From the latter source, 4,314 units of equipment have been obtained this year, donated to Kyiv by the EU, Azerbaijan, Japan and China. A further 1,000-plus units are due to arrive in Ukraine in the near future. Meanwhile, Kyiv is constructing emergency power supply systems in the city that run on diesel. By the start of the heating season, their capacity is set to reach 40 MW; so far, three installations with a combined capacity of 15.6 MW have been built. Meanwhile, modern combined heat and power systems with a capacity of 18 MW have been installed in one of the city’s heating plants. The mayor, Vitali Klitschko, is expecting financial support from the government and a simplification of the rules governing the purchase of essential equipment. The development of distributed energy is also underway. Since the start of the year, 70 onshore wind turbines with a total capacity of 414.8 MW have been installed in Ukraine. According to industry forecasts, a real investment boom in this sector will come in the coming years, during which it is planned to connect the following to the grid: 1.4 GW (2027), 1.7 GW (2028) and nearly 2 GW (2029), with the aim of reaching 10 GW from wind power alone by 2033. Furthermore, investors are allocating increasing amounts of funding to the development of energy storage facilities at wind farms, as well as to the installation of photovoltaic systems.
In the face of Russia’s effective campaign to destroy Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure (particularly conventional power stations and combined heat and power plants), coupled with a lack of adequate air defence and anti-aircraft capabilities, the development of distributed energy sources—including solar and wind power, as well as energy storage facilities—is one way of enhancing the country’s resilience. Together with maintaining capacity in the nuclear and hydroelectric sectors, this may allow for at least a partial alleviation of problems with electricity supply. At the same time, the district heating sector (particularly in large cities) remains an unresolved issue, as it cannot be replaced quickly.
Citizens of NATO countries will be able to serve as Estonian soldiers in the event of war
On the initiative of over 50 members of the Estonian parliament (Est. Riigikogu), a draft amendment has been proposed to the Act on the Estonian Defence League (Est. Kaitseliit) and the Act on Military Service. The amendments will allow citizens of NATO member states who are members of the Defence League to voluntarily take up a wartime post with a military rank, following the taking of a military oath. This obligation arises solely at the individual’s own request and following a decision by the Defence Resources Agency (KRA, Estonian: Kaitseressursside Amet). The draft does not create a new legal institution, but extends to foreign nationals a mechanism already in place for Estonians exempt from military service; at the same time, it clarifies the rules on wearing a uniform and expands the role of supporting members in crisis operations.
In this way, Estonia aims to strengthen allied cooperation within NATO, facilitate the integration of troops from member states and increase the reserve pool in the event of a threat. Non-NATO countries (including Ukraine) are treated differently due to legal considerations, security issues and the nature of the alliance. Estonian lawmakers are proposing amendments that would allow citizens of other NATO member states who are already members of the Defence League (Kaitseliit), to voluntarily undertake military service obligations and, in the event of war, to hold posts requiring a military rank. This move is intended to strengthen the readiness of both Estonian territorial defence, and the armed forces as a whole, by providing foreign members with a clear legal pathway to participate in the defence of Estonia. Participation would be entirely voluntary. The amendments do not introduce compulsory military service (conscription) for citizens of NATO countries.
Norwegian JSM missiles from Kongsberg for Canada
Norway’s Kongsberg will supply the Canadian Air Force with the Joint Strike Missile (JSM). The contract, worth NOK 4.7 billion, was signed on 30 June 2026 without the buyer being disclosed; the client was not identified until 8 July, when Prime Minister Mark Carney announced the contract, worth approximately CAD 800 million, during the NATO summit in Ankara. The missiles will arm the Canadian Air Force’s future fleet of F-35As (the number of aircraft has not been specified). The JSM remains the only missile of its class capable of fitting into the F-35A’s internal weapons bay, thereby preserving the carrier’s stealth capabilities. The purchase is taking place whilst the fate of the entire Canadian programme remains undecided: of the 88 aircraft ordered, 16 have been firmly contracted, and the purchase of Gripen aircraft is also under consideration. Kongsberg has also announced offset investments in Canada, including CAD 76.5 million in the maritime sector. Current users of the JSM include Norway, the USA, Japan, Australia and Germany; Belgium is acquiring the missile separately through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme.
The procurement of European armaments for the American F-35 platform forms part of Canada’s strategy of cautious diversification of its supply sources away from Washington. The Canadians are pursuing this strategy in parallel with expressions of interest in the Swedish Gripen and the selection of the GlobalEye early warning system. Ottawa is not withdrawing from the F-35 programme, but is consistently reducing its dependence on a single supplier. It is significant that the decision on armament has been made ahead of the decision on the number of aircraft. The purchase of JSM missiles for a fleet whose final size has yet to be determined shows that the F-35A component will remain regardless of the programme’s scale – as many as sixteen aircraft are set to be equipped with the capability to strike maritime and land targets at a range of over 350 km. Poland has been conducting market consultations regarding an anti-ship missile for the F-35 (and potentially the Husar) since July 2024, but has not yet made a final decision. Meanwhile, it already possesses NSM missiles, from which the JSM is derived, which would provide a ready-made logistics chain. A week before the Canadian purchase was announced, Romania joined the NSM/JSM procurement coalition, alongside the US, the UK and Norway.
Difficulties in manning the German Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania
In July 2026, the project to permanently deploy a German brigade in Lithuania is proceeding along two tracks. Lithuania is on schedule with the construction of the infrastructure, whilst the Bundeswehr is struggling with a shortage of troops ready for overseas service. On 10 July, the European Investment Bank approved full funding for the construction of a military base in Rūdninkai, worth 290 million euros. The base, designed to accommodate around 4,000 soldiers and 750 civilian staff, is due to be completed by the end of 2027. The Lithuanian authorities emphasise that the project is proceeding according to schedule. On the German side, staffing shortages remain the main problem. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has admitted that it will not be possible to staff the brigade exclusively with volunteers and has announced the possibility of conscripting soldiers. The shortages are particularly acute in combat battalions and support units, and are estimated at around 1,000 soldiers. The situation is further complicated by a change to the German system of overseas allowances, which came into force on 1 July and as a result of which Lithuania has been moved to a lower pay bracket. This means lower allowances for soldiers at a time when the Bundeswehr is actively seeking personnel to serve in Lithuania. There are currently around 1,800 German soldiers stationed in Lithuania. By the end of 2026, their number is set to exceed 2,000, whilst the brigade’s full operational readiness is scheduled for the second half of 2027.
The project’s greatest challenge is no longer infrastructure, but the Bundeswehr’s ability to fill its posts. Lithuania is meeting its investment commitments, whilst Germany must contend with a growing staffing problem. If Germany decides to deploy troops as ordered, this will set an important precedent and confirm that honouring its NATO commitments is becoming a priority despite staffing constraints. At the same time, there is no indication that the timetable for the brigade to achieve full operational readiness in 2027 will change.
Belarus shuts down relay stations for Russian drones following Zelenskyy’s ultimatum – new implications in July
In mid-June 2026, Kyiv issued Minsk with a one-week ultimatum to dismantle the relay stations on Belarusian territory which the Russian military had been using to control drones striking Ukraine. From 22 June, the devices ceased to function, as confirmed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, citing reports from the General Staff and intelligence services. The Belarusian website “Fłagsztok” noted the absence of Russian attack drones near the Belarusian-Ukrainian border for three consecutive days. Tactical effect: the Russian army’s ability to guide drones in real time to targets in Ukraine’s border regions has been drastically reduced.
The disconnection of the relay stations is one of the most tangible gestures of Lukashenko’s independence from Moscow in 2026. The decision is motivated by a desire to avoid Belarus being directly drawn into the conflict and potential Ukrainian retaliatory strikes. From a strategic perspective, this means that Minsk is setting clear limits on its role as Russia’s ‘silent partner’ – it maintains political alignment with the Kremlin but limits its operational contribution to the war. The question of whether the equipment has been physically dismantled or merely deactivated remains unresolved and will determine the permanence of this change.
Belarus – Defence Minister announces 25-day territorial forces exercises in districts bordering Ukraine
From 7 to 31 July 2026, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence is conducting scheduled training exercises with territorial forces reservists in the Malorytsky and Drohiczyn districts (Brest Region). Both districts border Ukraine directly. The Ministry has indicated that the main focus is on: territorial defence tasks under martial law, the protection of personnel and facilities against unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), the training of command staff, and the formation, preparation and deployment of “ополчения” (people’s militia) units.
The location of the exercises (districts with direct access to the Ukrainian border) and the focus on protection against drones confirm that Minsk regards Ukraine as a real threat to its own territory – and not merely as a backdrop for supporting Russia. The activation of people’s militia units near the border is a development worth monitoring: it may be part of building up reserves for Belarus’s territorial defence or – in a pessimistic scenario – preliminary preparations for supplementary mobilisation.
Belarus – New Deputy Minister of Defence – staff rotation
On 8 July 2026, President Lukashenko signed a decree appointing Major-General Vladimir Bezhy (previously Head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Belarusian Armed Forces) to the post of Deputy Minister of Defence. By a separate decree, Major-General Aleksander Naumienko was relieved of this post and transferred to the reserve with the right to wear his uniform and decorations.
The promotion of an officer responsible for combat training to the post of Deputy Minister of Defence signals that the Belarusian leadership is prioritising the operational readiness of the armed forces at the expense of administrative functions. This is significant in the context of maintaining a high level of operational readiness following the conclusion of ‘Zapad’ in 2025 and the participation of Belarusian units in the OUBZ component of the autumn ‘Centre-2026’ exercises – the appointment of Bieży indicates that the ministry wishes to have, at the highest level, someone who is thoroughly familiar with the realities of the training ground and bilateral procedures with Russia. Naumienka’s ‘soft’ transfer (with his privileges retained) confirms that this was not a matter of a loss of political trust, but rather a functional rotation. It will be worth monitoring whether Bieży retains oversight of preparations for the autumn exercises – this will define the map of the actual centres of decision-making within the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Belarus – call-up of territorial defence reservists in the Brest Region (7–31 July)
In the Maloryta and Drohiczyn districts of the Brest Region, scheduled call-ups for the training of territorial defence reservists are taking place from 7 to 31 July 2026. The Belarusian Ministry of Defence has outlined the objectives: to refresh the skills of the command staff, to prepare reservists for their designated tasks, and to practise procedures for forming people’s defence units (народное ополчение) under martial law conditions, with particular emphasis on protection against drones.
The Maloryta and Drohiczyn districts lie directly on the border with Poland and Ukraine – this is the most sensitive section of Belarus’s border with NATO. The inclusion of ‘protection against drones’ in the training programme is unprecedented for the territorial forces and demonstrates that the people’s defence doctrine is evolving towards scenarios typical of the 2008 Georgian-Russian war and the war in Ukraine since 2022. The scale of the training (24 days) suggests more than just standard assembly exercises – it may be an attempt to build a permanent training infrastructure for mobilised reservists and a means of maintaining readiness between major cycles of strategic manoeuvres (following the conclusion of ‘Zapad’ in 2025). The Polish General Staff and the Territorial Defence Force should monitor movements in this region during the second half of July.
Belarus – the situation on the border with Poland and Lithuania – growing queues
On 7 and 9 July 2026, the Belarusian State Border Committee reported growing queues of vehicles heading towards Poland and Lithuania. On 9 July, 480 lorries and 220 passenger cars were waiting to enter Poland and Lithuania; Polish border crossings were processing only 29 per cent of the traffic, whilst Lithuanian ones were handling 56 per cent. On 13 July, BelTA reported the start of Polish Army exercises in north-eastern Poland, lasting until 14 July, involving the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel on public roads.
The Belarusian side is consistently building a narrative of the ‘militarisation’ of neighbouring countries, using both daily border data (queues) and reports of Polish military exercises. The formula, repeated for several months – juxtaposing ‘economic obstacles imposed by NATO’ with ‘the movement of military equipment near the border ’ – serves as an operational pretext for potential counter-measures: the intensification of border patrols, the deployment of additional forces or the resumption of migratory pressure. It is worth noting that the exercises conducted by Poland’s 16th Division in Podlasie (13–14 July) were immediately reported by BelTA – this indicates that the Belarusian side is maintaining constant monitoring of Polish military activity, presumably also utilising its own intelligence resources and those of its Russian partner.
Russia, Belarus – protocol on simplifying military-technical cooperation
On 9 July 2026, President Putin submitted for ratification by the State Duma a protocol amending the 2009 agreement on the development of military-technical cooperation with Belarus (signed on 23 December 2025 in Moscow). The document abolishes the requirement to obtain import and export licences and expands the list of organisations authorised to participate in defence cooperation.
The de facto abolition of licensing procedures means that Russian-Belarusian defence industry integration is entering a phase of full symbiosis – Minsk is becoming a reserve production and maintenance base for the Russian defence complex, outside the control of export control regimes. The consequences will be: greater difficulty in identifying the end-users of Belarusian systems (MZKT, Peleng, KB Radar) in the context of sanctions; the possibility of faster delivery of Belarusian components to the Russian production line; and the potential use of Belarusian facilities to produce ‘mirror’ components subject to sanctions. For the sanctions strategy, this is a turning point requiring a reconfiguration of the lists of entities subject to restrictions.
Russia – OUB staff consultations
On 7–9 July 2026, staff-level talks were held in Russia between representatives of the OUBZ states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) concerning the “Mutual Assistance -2026”, the special reconnaissance exercise “Poisk-2026” and the logistics exercise “Eszelon-2026”. The manoeuvres are scheduled to take place at the Chebarkul training ground from 28 September to 3 October 2026, synchronised with the Russian strategic staff exercise “Centre-2026”.
The coincidence of “Centre-2026” with the OUBZ cycle in Chelyabinsk suggests that the Kremlin is using allied exercises to consolidate its rear in Central Asia. The Chebarkul training ground lies in direct proximity to the North Kazakh corridor, which allows for the training of deployment and logistics scenarios along the Eurasian axis. For NATO’s Eastern Flank, it is significant that the OUBZ is being drawn ever more deeply into Russia’s strategic cycle – this tests Russia’s ability to simultaneously engage its Asian allies (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) whilst maintaining its commitment on the western front. This is a multi-front scenario that should be taken into account in Polish analyses of the capabilities of the RZW (Regional Military Group) of Russia and Belarus.
Russia – Law No. 232-FZ amends the provisions on state defence procurement
8 July 2026. Federal Law No. 232-FZ of 4 July 2026, amending the 2012 Law ‘On State Defence Procurement’, was published in the Official Gazette. It was passed by the State Duma on 24 June and approved by the Federation Council on 1 July 2026.
Another amendment to the State Defence Procurement Act (GOZ) so soon after the previous one indicates that the state leadership recognises problems with liquidity and control over the execution of defence contracts. This is an important signal that the funding regime for the defence-industrial complex is entering a phase of a entrenched war economy – the latest amendments are of a technical and operational nature and signal adjustments rather than a systemic breakthrough. To analyse the production capacity of the Russian defence sector, it will be necessary in the coming months to monitor restrictions on private companies’ access to contracts and changes to pricing mechanisms.
Russia – Defence spending at one-third of the federal budget
According to the draft federal budget for 2026–2028, defence expenditure in 2026 is set to amount to approximately 13 trillion roubles (close to one-third of the budget), whilst expenditure on security and law enforcement agencies is set to amount to approximately 4 trillion roubles. The federal budget deficit for the first half of 2026 stood at 5.73 trillion roubles, or 2.5 per cent of GDP (an increase of 2.35 trillion year-on-year) – partly due to accelerated funding for military contracts.
Reaching the point where one-third of the budget is allocated to defence marks a historic milestone – the last time Russia recorded a similar level was in the 1980s. The accelerated funding of contracts in the first half of the year (as reflected in the scale of the deficit) suggests that the Ministry of Defence is demanding faster delivery of supplies, presumably to build up material reserves for the long-term maintenance of increased troop numbers. Russia plans to continue its confrontation with the West at least in the medium term, and the end of the war has not been factored into the budgetary framework.
Russia – Meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council on information security
Information: On 10 July 2026, President Vladimir Putin chaired an operational meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council via videoconference, devoted to “threats and challenges to the Russian Federation’s information security associated with the development and implementation of new information technologies”. The subsequent part of the meeting was held behind closed doors.
The Security Council’s focus on “new information technologies” should be interpreted as a starting point for accelerated regulation of artificial intelligence in the security sector and the consolidation of the Russian segment of the internet (RuNet). This signal coincides with data from “Kaspersky ICS CERT” showing a 31 per cent increase in cyberattacks on Russian industry (RBC) – Russia perceives itself as the target of a digital campaign, whilst at the same time being its main player. It is worth monitoring what new requirements will be imposed on Russian telecommunications and cloud computing operators – these could open up new vectors for attacks on European infrastructure.
Russia – Arrests and sentences in the defence ministry – the purge continues
Last week, the Moscow Garrison Court sentenced Colonel Yuri Zakharenko (Head of the Military Security Service of the Ministry of Defence) to 8 years in a penal colony and a 5-year ban on public service for abuse of office and financing extremism (a scandal involving 300 million roubles) , whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Baranov was sentenced to 10 years in a maximum-security penal colony for abuse of office and accepting a bribe (Kommersant, Vechernaya Moskva). It was also revealed that Major-General Aleksandr Dembicki, former commander of the 44th Army Corps of the Leningrad Military District, had been detained in connection with the private military company ‘Yastreb’, which defrauded 90 contract soldiers of over 8.8 million roubles.
These convictions and arrests are a continuation of the systemic ‘purge’ within the Ministry of Defence that began following Sergei Shoigu’s departure. The case of General Dembicki concerns the Leningrad Military District – a military district of key importance for the Baltic and Finnish theatres – which confirms that the process extends to frontline structures, and not just departments in Moscow. The focus on “abuses and PMCs” is significant: the Ministry of Defence is bringing order to the grey area in which private military companies competed following Prigozhin’s downfall. For the analysis of LOW’s combat capabilities, it is important to note that the rotation of commanders within army corps hinders long-term planning – and this, in turn, complicates the maintenance of operational readiness on the Baltic and Finnish fronts, which are crucial to the security architecture of NATO’s Eastern Flank.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- In an interview with Newsmax Polska, Dr Piotr Woyke, director of the Eastern Flank Institute, commented on announcements regarding the launch of missile production for Patriot systems in Ukraine and the prospects for the development of the Polish defence industry. As he emphasised, declarations regarding technology transfer should be viewed with caution, as the success of such projects depends on the details concerning the scope of cooperation, technology protection and the organisation of production. According to the director of the IWF, Poland is consistently expanding the scope of its production of Patriot system components – launch containers are already being manufactured domestically, a missile maintenance centre is under construction, and the government is seeking to launch production of PAC-3 MSE missiles. However, even if the project proves successful, full localisation of production should not be expected. Partial localisation is more likely, and its implementation may take around 2–3 years. We encourage you to read the full article.
- The Zero.pl portal has published an opinion piece by Michał Dworczyk on the strategic aspects of Poland’s decision to transfer missiles for the ‘Patriot’ system to Ukraine. The Chair of the IWF Programme Council emphasises that the support provided to Ukraine following the start of Russian aggression played a significant role in shaping the security situation in the region – it helped to limit Russia’s military potential and strengthened the position of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, he points out that the changing geopolitical conditions require systematic analysis and assessment of decisions taken in the field of security and defence policy. We encourage you to read the full text of the opinionavailable on the Zero.pl website.
- We encourage you to read the report “Building Poland’s Resilience within the Framework of NATO’s New Spending Targets”, co-authored by Krzysztof Michalski, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute. The report, prepared by the Casimir Pulaski Foundation in collaboration with the Polish Dual-Use Chamber, analyses the possibilities for utilising the 1.5 per cent of GDP earmarked for security and civil resilience within the framework of NATO’s new spending targets. The publication focuses on ways of translating additional financial outlays into a tangible increase in the state’s capabilities in the areas of security and resilience. The authors identify key areas for investment, including the development of a shelter system, the protection of critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, civil preparedness, innovation and the strengthening of the dual-use industry. The report also emphasises the need to establish consistent principles for defining the state’s resilience and to set out a catalogue of eligible expenditure in the new National Security Strategy, as well as to implement mechanisms for accounting for funds based on measurable indicators.
- In an interview entitled “The Political-Economic Motive Is the Most Likely”, published by Monaco Hebdo, Maciej Korowaj, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF), analyses the attempted bomb attack in Monaco on the Ukrainian businessman Vadym Yermolayev. He presents three possible scenarios, pointing out that the most likely motive is a political-economic one linked to the war in Ukraine and business interests. At the same time, he emphasises that these are analytical hypotheses, not the findings of an investigation. The full interview can be found at the following link:
