The war in Ukraine has significantly changed the role of snipers and marksmen, and has revolutionized the way they operate. However, these changes did not occur immediately upon the outbreak of the conflict; rather, they were the result of other processes of critical importance on the Ukrainian-Russian battlefield, including, in particular, the widespread use of drones. Despite this, the role of soldiers in these specialties—especially snipers—has not only not diminished but is, in fact, growing in certain sectors.
In the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Land Forces (motorized and mechanized units), marksmen are standard components of every infantry squad, providing fire support for the squad in long-range combat. They report directly to the squad leader. Sniper teams of one to three personnel are occasionally assigned at company level within the Ukrainian Land Forces. These teams are typically formed from designated marksmen who have demonstrated exceptional marksmanship and fieldcraft skills. A company-level team is usually subordinate to the platoon commander, who is on duty in a more important or more difficult sector. At the battalion level, sniper squads or platoons are generally formed. Formally, they report to battalion commanders; in practice, however, they most often report to the commanders of reconnaissance or operations sections. Tasks also evolve at this level—reconnaissance missions take on greater importance, and the elimination of targets most often involves high-value targets or enemy snipers. Consequently, the soldiers serving in these units undergo specialized training and are usually equipped with better gear than at lower levels. Sniper platoons (and, rarely, even companies) also exist at the brigade level. In such cases, they report directly to brigade commanders, and their operations are usually directed by the heads of reconnaissance sections. The role of such subunits is to carry out special missions (primarily reconnaissance) and to coordinate with the battalions to which they have been assigned. The description of the above structures is for illustrative purposes only and may vary significantly among different subunits, which are extremely heterogeneous within the Ukrainian Forces. Additionally, it should be noted that differences also exist within the Airborne Forces (where snipers play a greater role than marksmen and are more frequently deployed for special missions, reconnaissance, and deep infiltration behind enemy lines) and the Territorial Defense Forces (which consist mainly of marksmen and very rarely have their own sniper teams). A completely separate issue is that of the Special Operations Forces and the special units of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), in which the role and tasks of sniper teams strictly correspond to those typical of such subunits.
How the Role of Snipers on the Battlefield Has Changed
Russia’s frontal assault on Ukraine in February 2022—one of the objectives of which was the rapid capture of major Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv and Kharkiv—unequivocally demonstrated the importance of snipers and marksmen in supporting defensive operations. By taking up positions in urban areas or on the outskirts of cities, soldiers in these specialties were able to inflict significant casualties on Russian forces. In memoirs from that period, Ukrainian soldiers emphasize the crucial importance of snipers and marksmen, particularly in the battles around Irpin and Hostomel. They also highlight the soldiers’ contributions to disrupting the Russian Armed Forces’ stretched supply lines. After the Russians withdrew from Kyiv and Kharkiv and concentrated their forces in southern and eastern Ukraine, the importance of soldiers in these specialties on the battlefield temporarily declined. The Russians, who at that time had vast reserves of artillery and ammunition, conducted massive, unguided shelling from long distances, which made it impossible for sniper teams to approach covertly, remain hidden, and operate effectively. However, the situation began to change as early as 2023, when restrictions on the use of artillery led to a reduction in the distance between the warring parties. This made it possible to deploy snipers on a larger scale once again. This state of affairs persisted until drones—particularly FPV drones—became widespread on the front lines, forcing the most significant changes to date in snipers’ operations, which form the basis of their activities today.
The most significant of these changes concerns the evolution of the tasks assigned to sniper teams.
In light of the widespread use of various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as the increased availability of thermal imaging devices on the front lines, the use of snipers as “hunter-killers” against all live targets has been significantly curtailed. Currently, shots are fired exclusively at high-value targets: officers and commanders, machine gun and anti-tank missile crews, and enemy sniper teams. The high risk of a sniper being detected after firing a shot virtually precludes the elimination by sniper teams of enemy soldiers not performing key tasks. Exceptions include situations where snipers/marksmen provide cover for subunits defending positions (e.g., in urban areas) or retreating, as well as when they protect key lines of communication, the maintenance of which prevents the encirclement of defending units.
Analysts monitoring the war in Ukraine estimate that, on both sides of the conflict, snipers have killed approximately 15,000 soldiers. Compared to the total number of casualties—which, according to some estimates, reaches as high as 650,000 soldiers—this accounts for about 2% of those killed. Nevertheless, the psychological aspect of snipers’ and sharpshooters’ activities cannot be overlooked. In publications dedicated to their service, the Ukrainian side often emphasizes that the elimination of even a single soldier by a sniper team can have a very negative impact on the morale of an entire subunit. This is especially true in situations where such an operation is carried out at a certain distance from the front lines or in a relatively calm area. Similar observations can also be found in the Russian information sphere, which points to instances of panic breaking out in Ukrainian subunits after snipers eliminated the command post of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit.
Russian sources point to the growing role of snipers in neutralizing (or damaging) high-value equipment used by the enemy. According to information available in Russian-language media, Russian Armed Forces snipers have a proven track record of permanently neutralizing helicopters, radars, and missile launchers. At the same time, the elimination of unmanned aerial vehicles has been identified as one of the priorities in both combat operations and sniper training in Russia. This applies in particular to UAVs on the ground awaiting missions, those in hover, or those moving at relatively low speeds. By leveraging the unique capabilities of snipers and marksmen—namely, the covert ability to engage targets from long distances, including deep behind enemy lines—this could become another crucial element in countering UAVs. Training of this kind is set to encompass the entire Russian Armed Forces, with particular emphasis on marksmen and snipers. Russian propaganda is already reporting successful shootdowns by snipers of, among others, Baga Jaga (Vampir)-type multirotor UAVs.
Despite the front lines being saturated with drones, both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces also deploy sniper teams for reconnaissance purposes. Reconnaissance snipers are usually the first to take up positions in the area of planned offensive operations, sometimes conducting reconnaissance of the assigned area for extended periods. In certain cases, they may also be used to direct and correct artillery fire, as well as to assess the effects of strikes carried out.
New modus operandi
In all the cases described above, sniper teams can operate only under conditions of maximum secrecy. Due to the presence of drones, movement to positions usually takes place at night or in adverse weather conditions, which requires team members to have excellent skills in navigating rough terrain. Deployment takes place even several days before a given operation to allow time to find and secure the optimal position, as well as to change it in the event of an unexpected threat or other difficulties.
One of the most significant changes that has occurred since 2022 regarding sniper teams is the increase in their size. Currently, classic sniper pairs (sniper–spotter) are relatively rare on the front lines, while teams of 3 or 4 are becoming increasingly common. In this expanded configuration, the additional soldier is responsible for providing cover for the team—usually armed with a machine gun—and/or for camouflaging and securing the positions occupied by the group, including through the use of explosives. In the Ukrainian Forces, the fourth member is usually a medic. This team composition stems from ukrainian experience, which shows that medical evacuation of a sniper or spotter is often impossible or extremely difficult, and the wounded soldier’s only chance of survival is to be treated on the spot.
On both sides of the conflict, there are instances where several sniper teams are deployed simultaneously. This provides greater firepower and allows for the planning of operations that increase the chances of achieving their objectives. At the same time, such teams are able to disperse quickly after completing a mission to minimize the risk and extent of friendly casualties.
Technology in the Service of the Sniper
Both sides of the conflict have undergone a veritable revolution in the weapons and supporting equipment they use. In 2022, the standard equipment of ukrainian snipers consisted of SWD rifles and even AK-74M rifles fitted with PSO-1optical sights. Only the special units of the Security Service of Ukraine (Alfa) and the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR) possessed a small number of western-made rifles. As part of western military aid, within just a few weeks of the outbreak of the war, thousands of western precision weapons began arriving in Ukraine, including the full range of Heckler & Koch sniper rifles as well as american SR-25s. This situation did not change in the following months, resulting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces now fielding at least several dozen types of sniper rifles of various types and manufacturers.
Among them, in addition to those mentioned above, the most common include the ukrainian Zbroyar Z-10, Snipex T-Rex, and Fort-301 rifles, as well as the american Barrett M82 and Savage 110. A similar situation exists with regard to optical equipment, with products from Schmidt & Bender and Leupold being the most highly regarded. On the russian side, in addition to the entire spectrum of post-soviet weaponry, rifles such as the DXL-3/4/5, Raptor Tactical, and Kord 12.7 mm are playing an increasingly important role. In the field of optoelectronics as well, domestic products play a special role, including those manufactured by Dipol and Navigator. The use of advanced electronic equipment—such as cameras, ballistic computers, tactical tablets, and camouflage gear, including equipment that protects against detection by heat-seeking devices—is standard for both sides. A new development, however, is the introduction of drones into sniper teams’ equipment. They are used both for targeting and reconnaissance, as well as for securing their own positions.
Conclusions
The changes that have occurred in the tactics for deploying snipers and marksmen since the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine should be reflected in updated training programs for the armed forces of NATO countries, including the Polish Armed Forces. This applies in particular to marksmen, whose training should more closely resemble that prescribed for snipers, especially in terms of camouflage and securing their own positions. At the same time, issues related to the operations of soldiers on a battlefield saturated with unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as thermal and night-vision equipment, should be incorporated into these training processes immediately. Particular attention should be paid to expanding sniper teams to include additional soldiers with specialties such as engineering, medical support, or drone operation.
The Ukrainian experience indicates that consideration should be given to creating subunits composed of sniper teams as early as the mechanized/motorized battalion level. This, in turn, would require increasing the Polish Armed Forces’ training capacity for preparing snipers and marksmen, such that dedicated centers for this purpose would be established in all brigades (focused on training marksmen) and divisions (dedicated to snipers). In addition to standard marksmanship and sniper training, the curriculum should also cover those elements of the modern battlefield that have been identified in Ukraine, such as those related to the use and countermeasures against UAVs by marksmen and snipers. In this context, it would also be essential to ensure adequate infrastructure at individual garrisons, as well as sufficient stocks of small-arms ammunition. Training centers subordinate to operational forces could also train territorial service soldiers specializing as marksmen, and those among them who demonstrate exceptional aptitude could be selected for sniper training.
An additional, but no less important, issue is conducting a detailed analysis and testing at the central level of the equipment used by snipers/sharpshooters, taking into account those types of weapons, ammunition, and specialized equipment (optics, thermal imaging, cameras, ballistic computers, drones, and camouflage and thermal-signature-suppression equipment) that best meet the demands of the battlefield. In the next step, the knowledge gained should be widely disseminated within the Polish Armed Forces and among allied forces, and an appropriate level of equipment procurement should be ensured to meet both the plans for expanding the Armed Forces and the training needs of the reserves.
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