We invite you to read this round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania tightens its airspace defence rules
At the end of July 2026, Romania significantly tightened its response to violations of its airspace by Russian unmanned aerial vehicles. Having previously limited itself mainly to monitoring, identifying and escorting objects linked to Russian attacks on Ukraine, the Romanian armed forces have now begun more decisive actions, including physically engaging them. Between 24 and 26 July, the Romanian Air Force carried out operations against three drones that had entered Romanian airspace in connection with Russian strikes on Ukraine. One of the incidents took place in the Buzău county area, where a drone was destroyed over an uninhabited area. Further incidents involved subsequent violations, including a drone shot down over the territorial waters of the Black Sea near Sulina. One of the downed drones was identified as a Russian Shahed/Geran-type drone.
Romania’s change in response was prompted by the growing number of incidents involving Russian drones near its borders. Following a period of cautious monitoring and efforts to avoid escalation, Bucharest has moved towards a more active defence of its airspace, backing military actions with diplomatic measures towards Russia. This decision demonstrates that airspace violations are viewed not merely as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, but as a direct challenge to the security of Romania and NATO’s entire eastern flank.
Deployment of US KC-135 aircraft at Bezmer Air Base in Bulgaria
The deployment of US KC-135 Stratotanker refuelling aircraft has begun in Bulgaria. The first aircraft, together with their crews, have already arrived at Bezmer Air Base in the south-east of the country. The decision to station them there temporarily was taken in July, when the parliament in Sofia approved the government’s proposal. The approval covers up to eight aircraft, around 250 personnel with personal weapons, and the necessary airfield equipment. The mission will run from late July to early October 2026.
The deployment of the KC-135s to Bezmer illustrates how purely logistical factors have become a significant element in international tensions today. Air-to-air refuelling aircraft do not carry out offensive operations, but they enable other aircraft to extend their operational range. In the context of the conflict in the Middle East, their presence on the territory of a NATO ally effectively increases the flexibility of the US Air Force, even if take-offs and refuelling take place outside Bulgarian airspace. Sofia’s decision is based on a 2006 agreement and does not formally go beyond its scope. At the same time, it highlights the constraints faced by allied states: on the one hand, alliance commitments and pressure to make infrastructure available; on the other, the risk of escalating diplomatic tensions (Iran’s protest) and local tensions (opposition from residents).
NATO medical exercise in Estonia – Vigorous Warrior 2026
In June 2026, Estonia hosted the NATO exercise Vigorous Warrior 2026 – the Alliance’s largest multinational exercise dedicated to medical support for military operations. For nearly two weeks, around 2,000 participants from 38 NATO and partner nations practised the full chain of care for the wounded – from administering first aid on the battlefield, through triage, stabilisation of casualties and medical evacuation, to treatment in field hospitals and the coordination of further care between countries. A significant proportion of the scenarios were carried out in cooperation with the civilian healthcare system, testing the ability to operate jointly in high-intensity conflict conditions. The exercise programme incorporated lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine. The functioning of medical services was tested in an environment threatened by missile and drone attacks, communications disruptions and cyber-attacks. New technological solutions were also tested, including the use of unmanned platforms for evacuating the wounded, digital systems for monitoring patient flow, and methods to enhance the resilience and reduce the detectability of field hospitals.
The exercise confirmed that the military healthcare service is one of the key elements of the state’s defence capabilities. The efficient triage and evacuation of the wounded, and ensuring the continuity of treatment, directly contribute to maintaining the combat capability of the armed forces. Vigorous Warrior 2026 also demonstrated that an effective medical support system requires the full integration of military and civilian structures, as well as the use of modern technologies that enhance the resilience of the entire system against enemy actions.
Former Swedish IT consultant working with the Swedish Armed Forces convicted of attempted espionage
On 29 July 2026, a court in Stockholm found a 34-year-old man, a former IT consultant for the Swedish Armed Forces (2018–2022), guilty of attempted espionage on behalf of Russia.
Whilst working for the army, he had access to classified information. In the autumn of 2025, he travelled to Moscow, where he attempted to pass this information to the FSB and the GRU in exchange for protection and possible Russian citizenship. The court found him to be suffering from serious mental disorders and ordered compulsory psychiatric treatment in a secure facility. Parts of the case file remain classified.
A former Swedish IT consultant who provided services to the Swedish Armed Forces has been convicted of attempted espionage. The case highlights the growing interest of the Russian intelligence services in individuals with access to technical information, military infrastructure and ICT systems. We previously reported on this case in “Eastern Flank Review” (8–13 January 2026), highlighting it as an example of the threats to the Swedish security system and attempts by Russian intelligence services to infiltrate the defence community. This case confirms that protecting information in the military sector requires not only control over one’s own structures, but also effective oversight of the entire supply chain and private entities with access to sensitive data. The case concerns Ramín Antonio Tellebond (born 1992), a Swedish citizen from the Mellansverige region, a former civilian contractor working with the Swedish Armed Forces, and an IT specialist running the consultancy firm Ratobs AB. Having access to information relating to national security, he is alleged to have travelled to Moscow in November 2025, where he offered to pass on classified information to the Russian security services in exchange for political asylum and Russian citizenship. During the proceedings, he was also charged with additional offences relating to the harassment of an employee of the Swedish Defence Radio Establishment (Försvarets radioanstalt – FRA) and acts intended to result in murder. The Tellebond case forms part of a wider trend of activity by Russian intelligence services targeting the Swedish security sector. Previously, the case of the brothers Peyman and Payam Kia caused a major stir. The elder of the two, Peyman Kia, was an employee of the Swedish military intelligence service MUST (Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten) and was convicted of passing information to the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU. This case demonstrated that threats can originate both from individuals employed directly within state structures and from civilian specialists operating within the defence sector’s sphere of influence. Russian intelligence services are seeking not only individuals with access to classified state structures, but also technical specialists, systems administrators, IT service providers and employees of companies collaborating with the military. Against a backdrop of increasing militarisation in the Baltic Sea region and the growing importance of digital technologies, the private sector is becoming one of the key areas requiring counter-intelligence protection.
Danish general takes up post as commander of NATO-Ukraine JATEC (Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre)
Danish General Flemming Mathiasen has taken up the post of Commander of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) in Bydgoszcz. He has replaced a Polish general in this role, continuing the development of the first-ever joint institution between NATO and Ukraine, whose task is to translate lessons learnt from the Russian- -Ukrainian war into practical solutions for Alliance member states. JATEC achieved full operational readiness in 2026 and serves as a centre for analysis, training and the exchange of experience between NATO and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The centre collects and analyses lessons learnt from combat operations, draws up recommendations regarding changes to doctrine, training and military equipment, and supports the preparation of troops to conduct operations in the context of modern high-intensity conflict.
Under General Mathiasen’s command, one of the main priorities will be to further develop cooperation with Ukraine in areas such as the use of unmanned systems, air defence, electronic warfare, cyber defence and logistics. Another key task will be the rapid sharing of frontline experience with NATO countries, so that they can adapt their training programmes, procedures and the development of military capabilities to the changing nature of modern warfare. The appointment of a Danish general to the command highlights the international nature of JATEC and Poland’s growing role as one of the key centres for NATO’s cooperation with Ukraine. The centre in Bydgoszcz is becoming a vital element in the Alliance’s adaptation to the threats posed by Russia’s war, as well as a platform for incorporating Ukrainian experience into the defence planning and training of NATO member states’ armed forces.
Migration pressure on Estonia
Estonia is facing a sharp rise in migration pressure, which the authorities describe as part of Belarus’s hybrid activities supported by Russia. In the space of a single week, the Estonian authorities detained 63 irregular migrants, whilst 39 such cases were recorded in the whole of the previous year; since the start of 2026, the number of detainees has already risen to 102. The Estonian authorities estimate that migratory pressure will continue at least until the end of summer, whilst favourable weather conditions allow migrants to travel.
Most migrants reach Estonia via the Latvian-Belarusian border, which – according to Tallinn – remains the weakest link in the protection of the EU’s external border in the region. Estonian authorities emphasise that migrants are being deliberately directed towards the border by the Belarusian authorities, and that items seized from those detained included ladders, large fence cutters and cutting tools, which is said to indicate the organised nature of the operation. In addition, attention has been drawn to instances of tunnels being dug beneath border infrastructure on the Lithuanian side, which – according to the authorities – require a level of preparation beyond the capabilities of individual migrants. We may be witnessing a shift in the focus of hybrid migratory pressure, moving it from the Polish-Belarusian border section towards the Baltic states. This may be linked to the tightening of controls at Poland’s borders with Lithuania and Germany, which is prompting people-smuggling organisers to seek new routes. Most of those apprehended in Estonia are no longer found at the border, but in the Tallinn area – in hotels, at the port and on routes leading to ferry terminals – which indicates that Estonia is primarily becoming a transit country for migrants heading further into Northern Europe. The Estonian authorities emphasise that the mounting migratory pressure is placing a strain not only on the police and border guards, but also on the courts, interpreters and local authorities responsible for the care of those claiming to be minors. In the government’s view, this phenomenon constitutes a hybrid operation aimed at exerting pressure on the Baltic states and destabilising their security and administrative systems.
Continued personnel changes at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence
On 29 July this year, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to appoint two new deputy defence ministers – Liubov Galan (born 1996) and Serhiy Boiev (born 1983). The former will be responsible for personnel matters, including mobilisation and recruitment, training and staff development, healthcare and social affairs, as well as the legal framework for military service. In her role, she is set to draw on her extensive experience of working on behalf of the armed forces within non-governmental organisations – Frontline.Care (since 2022), which provides equipment assistance to soldiers, and Princip (since 2023), which ensures that the rights of those serving in the army are upheld. Meanwhile, S. Bojew has taken up the post of Deputy Minister of Defence for European Integration, a role he had left just over a dozen days earlier. He has held deputy ministerial posts within the Ministry of Defence since 2024, having served as Deputy Minister for Strategic Industry since 2023. In previous years, he worked for international financial corporations, both in Kyiv and abroad.
The changes at the Ministry of Defence are the result of the government reshuffle and the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov. Whilst the appointment of L. Galan is primarily a public relations move designed to improve the Ministry of Defence’s tarnished image by appointing someone from outside the ministry – a very young individual with an unambiguously positive track record as a volunteer in the Armed Forces – the return of S. Bojew carries internal political significance. It is likely that he was dismissed from the Ministry of Defence following some sort of dispute with the previous minister (three days before M. Fedorov’s resignation) and received the backing of the Office of the President of Ukraine (S. Bojew is a member of the so-called Office of the Commander-in-Chief (the wartime body responsible for directing Ukraine’s defence)).
The UK is to supply electronic warfare systems for Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has announced that London will provide Ukraine with technology designed to make it more difficult to detect unmanned aerial vehicles. According to the announcement, this is to be an electronic warfare solution to be fitted to Ukrainian long-range drones carrying out attacks on targets deep within Russian territory. The official announcement of this support took place during Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the UK, which preceded his meeting with Donald Trump at the White House. It has not been specified what type of solution London will supply, but according to the BBC, it will be the Stone Cloak system, which is also set to form part of the new British Breakstope cruise missiles. Stone Cloak is a tablet-sized device which, when mounted on a drone, is designed to jam radar systems and make it more difficult for air defence and air defence systems to detect and destroy the drone.
The Stone Cloak case demonstrates that British support for Ukraine is independent of political changes in London. For the United Kingdom, maintaining the long-standing principle of balance on the continent – which was significantly disrupted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – remains crucial. For this reason, continued support for Kyiv is to be expected, at least until the end of the Labour Party’s term in office. One uncertainty would be how the situation might develop should Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party come to power; however, even in that scenario, it is unlikely that support for Ukraine would be abruptly withdrawn.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the United States
On 28–29 July this year, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the US to attend the funeral of Senator Lindsey Graham. During his visit, he also held a meeting at the White House with Donald Trump, met with senators in Congress, and met with representatives of the US defence industry. The talks took place shortly after a significant propaganda success for the Ukrainian authorities: the visit by Laura Loomer, a blogger and commentator associated with the MAGA movement, during which the President of Ukraine granted her an interview. According to statements from both sides, discussions centred on the continuation of US military aid to Ukraine, the possibility of producing missiles for the Patriot system in Ukraine, and diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war in Ukraine.
Despite the lack of tangible results from V. Zelenskyy’s visit to the United States, the course of the visit – particularly the meeting, which took place in a cordial atmosphere in the Oval Office – may have a positive impact on Ukrainian-American relations. The US media report that Donald Trump has changed his attitude towards Volodymyr Zelenskyy and now regards him as an effective and tough politician. Trump’s change of stance was influenced in particular by the campaign of long-range strikes, which had a significant impact on the performance of Russia’s oil industry, including an overall decline in production and the availability of fuel products. Nevertheless, the US President’s personal traits, including his volatility of mood and views, make it impossible to predict whether this shift will prove to be long-lasting.
An additional 25,000 military posts and the creation of military engineering sub-units within the Russian army
On 27 July, Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 578 increasing the total strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF) by a further 25,000 posts, with effect from 1 August. The total strength of the AF RF currently stands at 2,426,130 posts, including 1,535,000 military posts. The decree also establishes new construction sub-units within the structure of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Andrei Belousov stated that “commanders of military districts should be given an additional tool for the construction of special-purpose facilities”.
The Russian war economy is entering a phase in which not only new line battalions are being formed, but also engineering and construction units subordinate to military districts. This is a sign that in 2026 and 2027 the Kremlin intends to build military infrastructure independently in the Western, Leningrad and Moscow military districts – barracks, training grounds, ammunition depots, access roads – without waiting for civilian contractors to make their production capacity available. This can be interpreted in two ways. Domestically, the Kremlin maintains the narrative that ‘there is no mobilisation’ and legitimises the transfer of some conscripts to construction battalions. Externally, it is demonstrating that the Russian army is increasing its capacity to establish a permanent military presence along NATO’s borders. Construction units are a classic Russian tool for developing training and storage infrastructure ahead of a major cycle of exercises, starting with Centre-2026 and West-2027.
Lavrov and Grushko on ‘Europe preparing for war’
On 29 and 31 July, Sergey Lavrov and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Aleksandr Grushko, stated in comments to the Russian media that “Europe is stirring up war” and that the joint Franco-German nuclear exercises “are not routine exercises, but preparations of infrastructure for conventional and nuclear war at a tactical level against the Russian Federation”.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rounding off a narrative that began with a statement by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SWR) regarding a ‘German nuclear bomb’ in mid-July. The structure is classic. First, the intelligence service – the SWR – publishes ‘evidence’; then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs translates this into political language – ‘Europe is brewing a war’ – and subsequently the Security Council provides a doctrinal justification for its own increased state of readiness. The joint exercises between Berlin and Paris provide Moscow with a convenient hook, as they allow the Russian narrative to link the ‘French umbrella’ with German revanchism into a single propaganda target. The risk for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) lies in the fact that any further European exercise involving strategic weapons could be used as a trigger for public Russian nuclear signalling – including test launches of missiles from the Strategic Rocket Forces (SSR) arsenal – even outside the Centre’s -2026 cycle, but most likely in synchronisation with its progress.
Russian Security Council meeting and the ‘active defence’ doctrine in response to sanctions
On 30 July, the permanent members of the Security Council, chaired by Vladimir Putin, discussed the economic situation, whilst Dmitry Medvedev publicly called for ‘active defence’ against the West’s ‘long-term sanctions aggression’. Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council, presented a paper on the ‘economic component of national security’.
The introduction of the phrase ‘active defence’ against sanctions into the official language of the Security Council is a new development. Until now, the Kremlin had framed sanctions in theocratic and ‘adaptive’ terms – adaptation and the redirection of trade. ‘Active defence’, on the other hand, implies legal and operational readiness for offensive actions in the economic sphere and special operations, including the requisitioning of assets, expropriation, infrastructure sabotage, pressure on transit countries, and information attacks on European export sectors. Shoigu’s presentation in his capacity as Secretary – rather than Prime Minister Mishustin – shows that the economic sphere is formally being placed under the direct supervision of the security services. It must be assumed that in the second half of 2026 there will be an escalation of Russian asymmetric actions targeting pipelines, ports and telecommunications networks of NATO member states, which will be justified internally by the doctrine of ‘active defence’ in the economic sphere.
Russia/Belarus – Vasilyev, the CSTO ‘nuclear umbrella’ and the RB Special Operations Forces in Kazakhstan
On 31 July and 3 August, Alexander Vasilyev, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), stated that “Russia will assist Belarus in the event of provocations at the border”, and that the CSTO doctrine “permits the use of nuclear weapons to defend allies”. During the same period, a Belarusian Special Forces contingent travelled to Kazakhstan for the CSTO exercise “Summit of Brotherhood-2026” at the Koktal training ground from 3 to 9 August.
This week, Vasilyev has been the Kremlin’s chief spokesperson on nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space, and his two statements form a coherent doctrine. The first concerns Russian assistance to Belarus in the event of a ‘border provocation’ – this lays the groundwork for the possible deployment of Russian forces in the event of an incident along the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian axis. The second concerns the permissibility of using nuclear weapons in defence of allies – this extends the Russian nuclear umbrella to all member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, including Kazakhstan, into which a Belarusian Special Forces contingent is currently entering. This should be interpreted as a political message signifying that, in the autumn of 2026, Russian nuclear deterrence will not be limited to the European theatre but will be extended to the entire Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The ‘Summit of Brotherhood’ exercise serves as a vehicle for this – under its cover, Moscow can test Vasilyev’s doctrinal assertions politically without incurring the costs of a Western response.
The 37th Special Operations Brigade in Gomel as a new unit on the southern flank of the Belarusian Armed Forces
On 2 and 3 August, the commander of the Special Operations Forces (SSO) of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Colonel Aleksander Ilukiewicz, publicly confirmed that the formation of the 37th Independent Airborne Assault Brigade of the SSO was nearing completion in the Gomel area; this brigade is intended to secure the southern sector of the Union State as part of the Regional Military Group (RZW). Ilukiewicz assumed command of the SSO on 9 January 2026, replacing Major General Wadim Denisenko, who was transferred to the reserve.
The 37th Brigade fills a structural gap that arose following the redeployment of the 103rd Vitebsk Brigade’s operational focus towards the north-west during the 2024 cycle. According to reports, the new unit is to comprise airborne, reconnaissance and assault units, as well as a newly formed drone unit. The Gomel location of the SSO brigade is a signal to Ukraine and Kyiv as a projection of force, and to the Regional Military Group of the Union State as a component of a joint advance into Volhynia in a potential scenario for the Centre-2026 exercises. The formation of the SSO brigade in the region bordering Ukraine is, in Belarus’s planning for 2026, a decision that cannot be interpreted outside the context of the Union State – Minsk would not have established an airborne assault brigade in Gomel without prior coordination with Moscow; this means that the southern direction is no longer ‘passive’ in the Belarusian defence model, but is becoming active as a component of power projection within the framework of the Union State’s Regional Military Group.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- It is worth reading the new commentary entitled “All quiet on the eastern front” (polish version) by Eastern Flank Institute expert Col. (ret.) Łukasz Paczesny, concerning the missile that entered Polish airspace on the night of 29–30 July 2026. The author raises questions not only about whether the Polish Armed Forces responded appropriately, but also – equally importantly – whether the public had been adequately prepared and warned of the impending threat. On this occasion, he revisits the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the events of September 2025, when a coordinated violation of Polish airspace by a group of unmanned aerial vehicles took place.
- We also encourage you to read the analysis by Grzegorz Matyasik, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute, entitled ‘Are critical infrastructure facilities protected against drones? Options for the effective protection of critical infrastructure facilities and mandatory protection following the amendment to the Crisis Management Act’ (polish version). The author examines whether current legal and organisational arrangements allow for the effective protection of strategic facilities against threats posed by unmanned aerial systems. The text discusses new opportunities for critical infrastructure operators to build C-UAS (Counter-UAS) capabilities and highlights existing limitations relating to response times, procedures for the use of anti-drone measures, and gaps in the protection of certain facilities vital to national security. This analysis is particularly relevant in the context of the war in Ukraine, where drones have become one of the main tools for reconnaissance, sabotage and attacks on infrastructure.
- Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Maciej Korowaj, an expert at the Eastern Flank Institute, stated in an interview with Polsat News that Poland should rebuild its reserve system and introduce universal defence preparedness for the public. In his view, this need not mean compulsory military service, but should also include the development of civil defence, the training of rescue workers and specialists, and the preparation of residents – including foreign nationals permanently residing in Poland – to act in crisis situations. The expert also emphasised that the greatest challenge lies in the hybrid operations conducted by Russia “just short of war”, for which Poland is still not fully prepared. More information can be found at this link (polish version).
