We invite you to read our round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Russia – the Foreign Intelligence Service (SWR) as a tool for strategic nuclear signalling towards Berlin
On 20 July, the press office of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SWR) issued a statement claiming that work is being carried out in Germany “aimed at nuclear weapons” – at 30 universities and in six research reactors – and that Berlin is said to be capable of producing fissile material within one to three months and constructing a warhead within a year without conducting a test at a proving ground. The statement named the following companies: Rheinmetall, Diehl, KNDS and Umarex. Following this, Sergey Lavrov (22 July) and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Grushko (21 July), described the matter as “alarming” and announced that they would take it into account in their own military planning. The Russian Information Agency’s (RIA) propaganda channel expanded on this theme in an article entitled ‘A bombshell for the Chancellor’, drawing parallels between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Nazi ‘Wunderwaffe’ programme.
This is not an intelligence leak, but a synchronised information operation involving the SWR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and mainstream media outlets, timed to coincide with the autumn cycle of the Centre-2026 exercises and the first joint Franco-German nuclear drills. Moscow is constructing a doctrinal justification for modifying its own planning – including the tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) component in Belarus – by framing its own pressure in the language of a “response to German revanchism”. The ‘Bundeswehr – Rheinmetall – Nörvenich’ nexus is the crux of the risk: it provides legitimacy for future Russian threats of a strike against Western industrial facilities and bases in the Rhineland. For the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), this is a signal that Moscow is laying the groundwork for an escalation of the nuclear narrative even before the Franco-German exercises this autumn.
Russia – the ‘money instead of mobilisation’ model is entering a deflationary phase
During the week of 20–26 July, further regions announced increases in one-off bonuses for contract soldiers. Novosibirsk – up to 2.9 million roubles with a monthly salary of 224,000 roubles, with the recruitment deadline set for 31 July. Smolensk – up to 2.5 million roubles plus a federal allowance, valid until the end of 2026. Meanwhile, in the Kochyevsky District
of the Perm Krai, the local authority payment has risen from 15,000 to 100,000 roubles, funded from the local authority budget reserve.
The six-fold increase in the municipal rate in the remote Perm Krai is not a gesture of generosity, but a sign that the recruitment plan for the special military operation (SMO) is no longer being met even at district level. A comparison with the Krasnodar rate of 3.9 million roubles from the previous package reveals a clear trend. The Russian model of voluntary conscription is approaching the point of no return – maintaining the pace of recruitment will require either a quiet administrative mobilisation (Vyacheslav Volodin’s proposal regarding ‘gatherings’ for deputies) or a return to compulsory service. This likely means that the window for an ‘unannounced wave’ is narrowing, and every further month of maintaining the current intensity lowers the threshold for a political decision to expand conscription.
Russia – The Security Council and the selection of defence priorities for the autumn
On 23 July, Vladimir Putin held an ad hoc meeting with the permanent members of the Security Council (SC) of the Russian Federation – attended by Mikhail Mishustin, Valentina Matviyenko, Vyacheslav Volodin, Dmitry Medvedev, Anton Vaino, Sergei Shoigu as Secretary of the Security Council, and Andrei Belousov. The previous meeting took place on 17 July and featured a presentation by Lavrov on the Asia-Pacific region. In the days leading up to this, Putin personally contacted Belousov on two occasions, including at the Main Admiralty in St Petersburg on the occasion of Navy Day.
The weekly rhythm of Security Council meetings, combined with Shoigu’s role as secretary and Belousov’s dominance as the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) chief of operations, indicates that the Kremlin is entering a pre-autumn coordination phase – covering the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ (RFAF) Centre -2026 and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) exercise cycle, as well as issues relating to the modernisation of the Navy. It is significant that Nikolai Patrushev has been retained as chairman of the Naval Collegium on the occasion of Navy Day. The issue of the Navy’s modernisation is proceeding in parallel with the modernisation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ land and nuclear components, rather than taking a back seat. This is a signal that elements of planning for next year – including budgeting – are being transferred from the government sector to the security sector, whilst formal economic discussions (the declaration of a ‘profit of 196 billion roubles in June’) serve as a smokescreen. It is worth noting the convergence: seven days of coordinated signals coming simultaneously from the Kremlin, the Ministry of Defence and the Naval College.
Belarus – the FSB’s counter-intelligence campaign and the ‘list of European targets’ as part of information warfare
Last week, the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced at least five separate arrests:
a Russian citizen planning an assassination attempt on a security service officer in Moscow (in exchange for the promise of permanent residence in the European Union); a 21-year-old woman in St Petersburg in possession of an explosive device, who was gathering data on employees of the defence-industrial complex (OPK); an attack on one of the Ural-based plants; three residents of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) suspected of treason; and
a foiled attack in the Stavropol Krai. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation published a list of 21 European targets, namely factories producing drones for Ukraine, prompting the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) to warn companies of a hybrid threat.
This week, the Russian security apparatus is sending a dual message: ‘the external enemy is recruiting our citizens in exchange for an EU passport’ and ‘in response, we are publishing a list of European factories that produce drones against us’. The publication of the list of 21 companies is not an informational gesture, but a targeted one – a signal to European intelligence services that, from this moment onwards, drone manufacturers are being drawn into Russia’s cycle of sabotage and information operations. This corresponds exactly to the Kremlin’s ‘mosaic intelligence’ model: counter-intelligence conducts a public campaign, the Ministry of Defence provides the operational target, and the media disseminate the narrative. For Polish drone manufacturers, this amounts to a practical warning: the Russian list of European companies undoubtedly includes a Polish segment, which has not been publicly disclosed. The pressure is mounting rapidly and requires an immediate strengthening of counter-intelligence safeguards within these organisations.
Russia/China – Joint Sea-2026 moves on to patrol around the Japanese islands
Following the conclusion of the ‘Joint Sea-2026’ exercises (Qingdao, 6–13 July), the Chinese and Russian naval task forces began a joint patrol in the Pacific. By 26 July, expert Song Zhongping estimated that the group had completed around two-thirds of a circumnavigation of Japan and would most likely enter the Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru or Sōya Straits, and exit via Tsushima. On 19 July, a Chinese destroyer conducted live-fire exercises within Japan’s alleged exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the vicinity of Okinotori Rock —
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rejected Japan’s protests, arguing that Okinotori is a rock, not an island. A Chinese expert report explicitly states the aim of the operation: “breaking through the blockades of island chains and straits”.
For the first time, the Sino-Russian patrol around the Japanese archipelago is officially described in Beijing in terms of ‘breaking through the blockades of islands and straits’ – that is, in the doctrinal language of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) vis-à-vis Japan, Korea and the first line of islands. Moscow risks relatively little; it provides tonnage and sends a signal, in return gaining allied legitimacy in the Pacific that it lacks elsewhere. This serves as a reminder that the Russian Navy is being operationally tested in Asia and is honing its skills there, rather than in the Baltic Sea, which, from the same perspective, remains a ‘permanent theatre of political blackmail’ rather than a testing ground for real-world operations. The conclusion is that the Navy will return to the Baltic from the Pacific having developed interoperability procedures with the PLA-N, and that the eastern Pacific is secured by the combined forces of Russia and China.
Belarus – reshuffles in the leadership of the Belarusian Armed Forces ahead of the autumn cycle
On 21 July, Alexander Lukashenko signed personnel decrees: Major General Alexander Mosolov assumed the post of Deputy Minister of Defence for Logistics and Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (AF RB) – replacing Major General Andrei Burdyka, who is retiring to the reserve; Major General Dmitry Bitny became the new Chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, having been promoted from the Western Operational Command (WOC); Major General Alexander Bas is leaving the command of the North-Western Operational Command (NWOC) to join the reserve with the right to wear uniform. The decisions were justified as ‘optimisation ahead of the autumn–winter training period’.
This is a move to position personnel for the cycle of exercises and future Russian operations. The new head of Combat Training comes from the Western Operational Command (ZDO) – that is, from the Polish-Lithuanian sector – and will be responsible for integrating lessons learnt from the Russian ‘Centre-2026’ manoeuvres. The replacement of the head of rear services, whilst bypassing the post of first deputy, indicates that the logistical support system is being reformed – a key factor in hosting Russian formations in Belarus in September and October. The dismissal of the PZDO commander without the appointment of a successor means that the Suwałki direction is moving to a mode of direct coordination with the ZDO of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. It can be assumed that the current personnel reform is not politically motivated, but is operationally integrated with the needs of the Regional Military Group – its aim is to ensure readiness for the possible reception of a Russian contingent on Belarusian territory.
Belarus – Lukashenko ‘reorganises’ the KGB and elevates the role of the Belarusian Secretariat
On 23 July, Lukashenko made personnel changes within the State Security Committee (KGB) and publicly announced the ‘reorganisation’ of the committee by strengthening the role of the State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus (RB RB), Aleksander Wolfowicz and the entire Secretariat of the Security Council: “just as the government oversees the ministries, so the Secretariat is to oversee all the security agencies and report to the president”. At the same time, he emphasised that “foreign intelligence, agents and resident posts” are to report exclusively to the president.
This is the most significant institutional signal of the week coming out of Minsk. Lukashenko is, in effect, creating a supervisory layer above the KGB, whilst retaining for himself an exclusive channel for foreign intelligence and the agent network. The model resembles the late-Soviet structure of dual-track oversight: administrative (the Secretariat/Wolfowicz) and political (the president). It points to two phenomena simultaneously: preparing the system for a transitional period – during which control over the services must be personnel-resistant – and strengthening the Russian-Belarusian axis at the level of foreign intelligence, which in practice is today closely intertwined with the SWR and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GZ/GRU). For the Polish services, the narrow operational window for these changes is significant, as the reorganisation of the KGB’s structures generates an increased number of internal personnel matters and changes in areas of responsibility.
Belarus – territorial defence exercises in the Brest Region as a regional model
On 26–28 July, territorial defence force (OT) exercises were conducted in the Maloryta and Drohiczyn districts of the Brest Region, involving soldiers mobilised from reserve service, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (OMSW) and ‘national mobilisation units’. The exercises covered countering sabotage groups, as well as the use of UAVs and defence against them.
The Maloryta district lies precisely at the junction of the borders with Ukraine and Poland – and thus at the intersection of two directions in which Minsk officially ‘sees no threat’ . The exercise combines elements of conscript forces (Decree No. 247), reserve forces (military registration and enlistment offices) and civilian forces (national mobilisation) – a three-pronged model that Minsk will replicate in other regions this autumn. The explicit emphasis on ‘drones and defence against them’ – this is evidence that, in 2026, the Belarusian National Territorial Defence System (OTK) began – instead of focusing primarily on marksmanship training – to teach anti-drone defence, i.e. a response to the Ukrainian and potentially Polish vectors of precision strikes. The operational conclusion is that, in the event of a border incident, the Belarusian OTK would today be capable of responding independently to small sabotage groups, but not to precision or air strikes – and in this regard, Minsk will remain dependent on Russia.
Suspected espionage in Lithuania targeting military facilities and the defence industry
On 24 July 2026, the Vilnius District Prosecutor’s Office and the Lithuanian State Security Department (VSD) announced the launch of a preliminary investigation into espionage. Charges were brought against a Lithuanian citizen, whose identity has not been disclosed. According to the Lithuanian authorities, the investigation was launched following information obtained as part of operations by the Lithuanian counter-intelligence service, the VSD, concerning an individual who may have been collaborating with the Russian secret services. Investigators’ findings indicate that the suspect independently established contact via the Telegram messaging app with individuals linked to the Russians. He was then alleged to have carried out tasks, relayed via intermediaries, involving the gathering of information on Lithuania’s defence capabilities. The scope of the data collected included military installations, military equipment and its movements.
According to a statement from the public prosecutor’s office, the suspect is alleged to have photographed and passed on information concerning a battalion of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, a company manufacturing military radars and radar systems, as well as the movements of military equipment at Vilnius Airport. He is also alleged to have passed on photographs of military equipment and claimed to be able to obtain similar information whilst in Belgium. Of particular significance in this case is the involvement of the company manufacturing radars and radar systems. The Lithuanian authorities have not disclosed the name of the company; however, such entities are of strategic importance to national security, as their technologies relate to the detection of aerial targets, spatial monitoring, anti-drone systems and air defence capabilities. Information concerning the technical specifications of the radars, their deployment, clients, integration with NATO systems or production capacity could be a valuable source of data for foreign military intelligence. Among the Lithuanian companies operating in this field are, amongst others, ATRI and Altimus-Tech; however, there is currently no official confirmation that either of them was the subject of the suspect’s interest. It is worth noting that the latter company is currently a Polish business entity with its registered office in Warsaw and a factory located in the Vilnius region. The Lithuanian security services assess that the suspect acted deliberately, knowing that the information he passed on would reach a person who might represent the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Under Article 119 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code, espionage is punishable by a prison sentence of between 6 and 15 years.
Suspicions of espionage on behalf of Russia in Latvia
The Latvian State Security Service (VDD) has asked the Public Prosecutor’s Office to initiate criminal proceedings against four Latvian citizens suspected of espionage on behalf of the Russian Federation. According to the VDD, these individuals were systematically gathering information on Latvian territory and then passing it on to Russian intelligence services via
the pro-Russian organisation ‘Baltic Anti-Fascists’ (Russian: Балтийские антифашисты), which operates on the Telegram platform. Four people were arrested as early as January 2026 on the basis of evidence gathered during operational activities. According to the Service’s findings, the suspects were acting deliberately and regularly, gathering various types of information which was then passed on to an organisation linked to Russia, and through it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and other Russian institutions.
It was established that one of the individuals was gathering information concerning the Latvian National Armed Forces, in particular the deployment and strength of military units in the border region with Russia. This individual was also said to have passed on data concerning the support provided by Latvia to Ukraine. The second individual was said to have gathered information on critical infrastructure and transport and logistics facilities. The data passed on included information on hangars and their use at Riga Airport, as well as access procedures and security measures at the site. Furthermore, this individual was alleged to have passed on information concerning the construction of border infrastructure, military mobility operations along the border with Russia, the training of foreign soldiers in Latvia, and selected Latvian citizens. Another individual was reportedly involved in gathering data on specific private individuals. The information included, amongst other things, places of work, education, property holdings and the financial circumstances of selected citizens. It is worth noting that this type of data can be used by intelligence services to identify individuals, assess their susceptibility to pressure, or conduct further reconnaissance of their environment. A fourth individual exploited their position as a security officer to gather information on Latvian residents, organisations and businesses supporting Ukraine. According to the VDD, they passed on, amongst other things, CCTV footage showing people displaying symbols of support for Ukraine, vehicles belonging to voluntary organisations, and cars bearing markings condemning Russian aggression. The data passed on also included personal details, contact numbers and vehicle registration numbers, which could have enabled the identification of individuals involved in supporting Ukraine. According to the findings of the Latvian security services, the information was passed on via the Telegram messaging app and during face-to-face meetings in Russia. The VDD indicated that the organisation “Baltic Anti-Fascists” was being used as an intermediary between local sources of information and Russian security services.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- We encourage you to read the latest analysis entitled “Capacity Shortfalls: Airport Access Roads in the Polish Defence System” (in Polish), authored by Stanisław Kowalski. The study focuses on the role of Airport Access Roads (DOL) in the Polish defence system and their importance in ensuring the continuity of military aviation operations. The analysis presents the current state of the infrastructure, identifies constraints affecting its usability, and outlines courses of action that could enhance the operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces.
- The amendment to the regulations on the protection of critical infrastructure introduces new measures to counter threats posed by drones. In the latest analysis entitled “Are critical infrastructure facilities protected against drones?” (in Polish), Grzegorz Matyasik, an EFI expert, discusses the new powers granted to critical infrastructure operators, highlightsthe practical challenges associated with their implementation, and draws attention to gaps that may still limit the effectiveness of the anti-drone defence system. We encourage you to read it.
- Russia is consistently increasing its mobilisation potential without announcing a formal mobilisation. The mechanisms of this process and their significance for the security of Poland and NATO are analysed by Lt Col (ret.) Maciej Korowaj, an EFI expert, in the study “Creeping Mobilisation – Russia is building up its reserves without declaring mobilisation” (in Polish), which was produced as part of the “Fog of War” series. The publication outlines how the Russian reserve training system operates, the role of the DOSAAF organisation, and the legal changes supporting the rebuilding of human resources, whilst also indicating what lessons Poland should draw from the Russian mobilisation model.
