We encourage you to read the review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
Conflict over the transfer of Czech light fighter jets to Ukraine
The proposal to supply Czech light fighter jets to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, made on January 18 by Czech President Petr Pavel, met with strong resistance from the government. Prime Minister Andrej Babis denied any willingness to transfer the L-159 aircraft, adding that, according to information obtained from the Minister of Defense, they still have a service life of 15 years and are an important part of the air force’s operational capabilities.
Contrary to earlier reports, according to Czech Foreign Minister Petr Marcinek, the statements made by the Czech head of state during his visit to Kyiv were not consulted with the government. Following the government’s statement, President Pavel pointed out that the issue of supplying the aforementioned fighter jets (manufactured by the Czech company Aero Vodochody) had been on the agenda of both countries for six months, and that the talks in Kyiv were merely a continuation of those discussions. The conflict between the Czech executive authorities points to existing tensions between the negative attitude of the government majority towards Kyiv and the interests of the local arms industry.
Bulgarian president steps down – implications for security
Bulgarian President Major General (ret.) Rumen Radev has stepped down a year before the end of his term and announced the formation of his own political party. The country has been in a state of political crisis for months, caused by inconclusive election results, and the emergence of a new political force led by the popular head of state is expected to change this situation.
The president’s resignation and his potential electoral success could have a significant impact on Bulgaria’s security policy. Radev is known for his skepticism about providing further military and financial support to Ukraine. He also has many years of experience and a wide network of contacts in the Bulgarian national security apparatus as a former commander of the Air Force. If he wins or enters a coalition after the parliamentary elections, defense policy issues will remain one of his priorities.
The head of the Romanian General Staff emphasizes his readiness to support Moldova
The highest-ranking Romanian military officer, General Gheorghiță Vlad, reiterated that in the event of an escalation and a deep security crisis around Moldova, Romania would actively support Chișinău in defending its sovereignty. The military official noted that although Moldova remains a neutral state, in the event of an armed conflict, it is possible to form a “coalition of the willing” with the participation of Romania, which would provide military support, as in the case of Ukraine.
General Vlad’s declaration – another in a series of such declarations in Romanian military circles in recent years – proves that Romania is indeed considering the scenario of an escalation of the Kremlin’s aggressive actions against Moldova and is ready to counteract them. Due to the close ethnic, cultural, and political ties between the two countries, there has been increasing talk in recent years about the possibility of deepening their integration. In recent weeks, a number of prominent Moldovan politicians (led by incumbent President Maia Sandu) have declared their support for the unification of the two countries, should a referendum be held on the matter.
Estonian citizen convicted of spying for the FSB
48-year-old Estonian citizen Vyacheslav Efimov (Russian: Вячеслав Ефимов) was found guilty of collaborating with the Federal Security Service (FSB). He passed on information threatening state security, including information about troop movements and the use of drones. The court in Tartu sentenced him to three years in prison. Yefimov worked as a civilian security guard in the Koidula border crossing area. He had dual citizenship – Estonian and Russian – and lived permanently in Pskov, Russia. He was recruited in 2022 by FSB officer Nikolai Tarasov (Russian: Николай Тарасов).
The border crossing point near the Russian border is a sensitive location and an interesting target for Russian intelligence services. It is not the most important target for intelligence or counterintelligence, but as part of its tasks, the FSB obtains up-to-date information about border infrastructure, Border Guard personnel, and the Customs Service.
In Yefimov’s case, these tasks were most likely carried out by the FSB Regional Directorate in Pskov. Even seemingly insignificant information, such as how the area is protected or the movements of specific individuals, can be of great intelligence value. The data collected by the Russian services can be used in other operations. The case of Yefimov shows that the Russian services are systematically expanding their network of agents. They are looking for people who are susceptible to influence, blackmail, or the desire to earn money. These are often people who, due to their role, do not undergo a full, time-consuming verification process.
Military cooperation between Sweden and Latvia
Latvia and Sweden have announced their intention to significantly expand bilateral cooperation. In mid-January this year, the defense ministers of both countries signed a roadmap for defense development. The cooperation will cover the development of the defense industry, the purchase of weapons, the development of unmanned systems, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the enhancement of airspace security. Sweden’s continued presence in the multinational NATO brigade in Latvia was also confirmed, and closer cooperation in the Baltic Sea was announced.
Latvia has established dynamic cooperation with Sweden, strengthening its security with the support of the Swedish Armed Forces in the NATO mission stationed at the Ādaži base, while also purchasing 18 Swedish Archer howitzers to increase the country’s firepower. As a new NATO member, Sweden has set itself the goal of strengthening its military involvement in the Alliance’s eastern flank. An example of this, apart from strengthening Latvia’s security, is Sweden’s participation in Poland’s submarine procurement program as part of the “Orka” project.
New report by Finnish military intelligence and counterintelligence: Military Intelligence Review 2026
On January 23, 2026, Finnish military intelligence published the Military Intelligence Review 2026 report. It is a study presenting the directions of change in security policy in selected regions of the world, with particular emphasis on the Baltic Sea region and Finland’s security. The Finns identify the Russian Federation as their main adversary and primary threat, which, as a result of the war that began in 2022, provoked a reaction from Western European countries, led to an increase in defense industry production, intensified military reforms, and the formation of new alliances.
Although the report clearly rejects the possibility of a direct Russian attack on Finland in 2026, it does not rule out that, after the end of the conflict, the Russian Federation may escalate its actions against NATO countries over the next few years. It also draws attention to Russia’s ongoing efforts to protect strategically important regions in the Baltic Sea area, in particular the St. Petersburg region, including units and infrastructure located in the Kaliningrad Oblast.
Cyber self-destruction – Russia blocks its own infrastructure
Roskomnadzor (RKN) blocked a total of 439 VPN services by January 2026, an increase of 70% compared to October 2025. During this time, about 70% of VPN providers went bankrupt or effectively ceased operations. RKN blocks VPNs, but Russian government agencies must use them for their work. At the same time, the Russian Federation is investing in a cyber offensive, while, according to Russian experts, its defenses are collapsing. Data shows that since 2022, more than 100,000 IT specialists have left the Russian Federation, and reports assess this exodus as irreversible. Only about 16% of Russian companies have managed to replace Western security solutions. Analyses of the Russian segment of the internet point to serious vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals. Rostelecom leaked the data of all Russian citizens, and at Sberbank, about 90% of customer data was affected by cyberattacks. The import of Chinese IT technology substitutes is failing – about 84% of companies are unable to replace Western solutions. Russian analysts estimate that about 47% of critical civilian infrastructure is vulnerable to external attacks, with over 1,200 vulnerabilities identified in government systems alone. In 2025, losses related to cybercrime will reach approximately 360 billion rubles (an increase of over 20% year-on-year), making it the most common form of crime in the country. According to Russian assessments, offensive cyber operations against Ukraine do not give the Russian Federation a strategic advantage compared to kinetic drone and missile attacks, which are more effective.
This situation is not a temporary crisis, but a structural condition. The VPN blocking system reveals a fundamental problem: those who manage network security resort to solutions that are simple in concept but very costly and burdensome for the infrastructure. Currently, there is a fragmentation of external cyber operations by the FSB–GU (GRU)-SWR operations, conducted without consistent operational coordination. The Russians’ remarkable restraint in choosing targets outside Ukraine (all operations remain below the NATO Art. 5 threshold) suggests that their capabilities are serious and that their restraint is due to temporary operational limitations that can be overcome. The Russian Federation has advanced offensive capabilities, but at the same time a critical defensive weakness, which it is trying to improve at the expense of reducing the efficiency of its own networks. This asymmetry is fundamental to NATO planning. Russia may view the partial isolation of Runet as reducing its own exposure to foreign influence, which may encourage more aggressive cyber operations abroad.
Increase in Kalashnikov’s small arms production in 2026
The Kalashnikov Concern has announced a significant increase in the production of combat firearms in 2026, which have “proven highly effective” in the “special military operation” zone. This mainly concerns a shortened version of the 5.45 mm AK-12K, the Chukavina sniper rifle (7.62 mm), new variants of the AK-15K, and maintaining high orders for the standard AK-12, the basic individual weapon of the Russian Armed Forces. The company declares full fulfillment of state orders for 2025 and entering 2026 with a “record order portfolio” and expanded production capacity.
The increase in Kalashnikov production is a sign that the Kremlin is anticipating a long-term, high-intensity conflict and the need to continuously replenish personnel and equipment losses. The Russians are trying to partially compensate for quality deficiencies (training, air defense, BMS) with the mass of soldiers armed with “reliable” weapons – new versions of well-known designs instead of radical systemic changes. For OPFOR assessment, this means that mass infantry with AK-12K/Chukavina remains the primary firepower, and the Russian military-industrial complex still has the ability to quickly scale simple, proven weapon systems.
Belarus launches comprehensive combat readiness inspection of the Armed Forces
A comprehensive combat readiness check of the armed forces is underway in Belarus. On January 16, Alexander Lukashenko ordered a large, unannounced inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces – the operation is being carried out in stages, with an increasing number of units and personnel involved. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense has launched its own “comprehensive readiness check” under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff. The following are being checked: mobilization of reserves, deployment of subunits, marches on unknown routes, deployment at training grounds, and the ability to carry out combat tasks, with particular emphasis on combating drones and electronic warfare. It is characteristic that Lukashenko personally issues orders to put the armed forces on alert, bypassing the Ministry of Defense, through the Secretary of the Security Council directly to brigade commanders.
The current annual inspection differs from the routine “winter review,” but is a test of the real ability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus to deploy quickly in conditions of tension on the western and Ukrainian fronts. Following the Zapad-2025 exercises, which also included scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons, this is the next stage in testing the functioning of the Russian-Belarusian Union State system at the mobilization and operational level. Lukashenko’s direct orders, bypassing the Ministry of Defense, indicate the centralization of political control and a lack of trust in the classic chain of command. This means that Minsk maintains a real capacity to quickly put selected brigades (land forces and special operations forces) on high alert and move them to the area of potential operations in the direction of Ukraine/the NATO border. At the same time, the scale of control (reserves, mobilization, marches, drone defense) suggests that Belarus is preparing for long-term functioning as a “rear base” for Russian operations, with the option of actively using some of its own forces as a support component.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- Ambassador Bartosz Cichocki, member of the Program Council of the Eastern Flank Institute, analyzes and assesses Poland’s role in Ukraine, the background of the peace talks, and Volodymyr Zelensky’s political game in an interview with the weekly magazine “Wprost” (in Polish).
- Eastern Flank Institute expert Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj gave an interview to the “Rzeczpospolita” daily (in Polish), in which he discussed the Russian Federation’s recent use of an Oreshnik ballistic missile in an attack on Ukrainian infrastructure near the Polish border.
- In an interview with “Rzeczpospolita” (in Polish), EFI Program Council member Gen. Jarosław Gromadziński spoke about the Armed Forces Development Program until 2039 and the change in the philosophy of action towards Russia.
