We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Turkey’s Otokar plans to acquire Romania’s Automecanica
Turkish company Otokar Otomotiv plans to acquire Romanian company Automecanica by purchasing a 96.77% stake for approximately EUR 85 million. Automecanica is an industrial plant with several decades of tradition in the production of land platforms, for which the Romanian government has been seeking an investor for several years. It is highly likely that the Turkish investment is linked to the 2025 contract for the delivery of 1,059 Cobra II light 4×4 vehicles, which were to be supplied by a consortium of Otokar and Automecanica. The condition for the contract’s implementation was to locate production in Romania, but this process has been difficult.
The acquisition of the Romanian company should take place in April this year, provided there are no accounting or legal objections. Otokar’s actions reflect the determination of the Turkish government, which for almost a decade has been taking coordinated steps to strengthen the exports of its own defense industry and maintain a permanent presence in key regions, including the countries on NATO’s eastern flank and the Balkan Peninsula.
Romania publishes list of projects co-financed by SAFE
The Romanian Ministry of Defense has revealed a list of projects co-financed by SAFE. These projects had previously been approved by parliament and the Supreme Council of National Defense (a collegial body comprising the president and key ministers, officials, and officers responsible for security). As part of the package worth approximately EUR 9.5 billion, multi-purpose helicopters, radars, air defense systems, as well as personal weapons and ammunition will be purchased. Over €4.2 billion will be allocated to co-finance road infrastructure important for military mobility, while approximately €2.8 billion will be spent on internal and border security.
The example of Romania shows that communication of expenditure financed by SAFE loans can be transparent, with details of projects being made available to representatives of the legislative authority. The structure of the projects, ten of which will be implemented in partnership with other countries, indicates benefits particularly for French and German defense companies. This reflects Bucharest’s desire to achieve greater balance in its security policy and strengthen its European dimension, as announced by President Nicușor Dan.
Bulgaria seeks to acquire NSM anti-ship systems
The Bulgarian government has approved a project to acquire anti-ship systems equipped with Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) manufactured by the American company RTX and the Norwegian company Kongsberg. The acquisition of the systems will take place under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedure, and the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense will sign two separate contracts – one for the systems themselves, worth USD 205 million, and the other for the command system, worth USD 3 million. No details on the specific value of the contract have been disclosed, but its relatively low value may suggest further purchases, including the acquisition of more effectors.
Bulgaria is another country in the Black Sea basin that has decided to strengthen its coastal defense with NSM systems. Earlier in 2022, Romania acquired similar systems. Since the start of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the US government has consistently treated the Black Sea region as one of the most important elements of NATO’s eastern flank and has sought to strengthen the coastal defenses of both Romania and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government’s decision, despite the ongoing political crisis, demonstrates the durability of Sofia and Washington’s close security relations.
Russian reserves and the dynamics of forming new structures in 2025-2030
In 2025, Russia formed four new divisions: the 68th and 71st Mechanized Divisions and the 55th and 120th Marine Divisions.
The plan envisaged 17 divisions and up to nine brigades. The units formed come from the restructuring of existing brigades (the 25th, 200th, 155th, and 336th brigades), not from new resources. Three of the four new divisions are located in the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Sea. In the north-western direction, the 6th Combined Arms Army and three army corps (11th, 14th, and 44th) are deployed. The planned schedule provides for the postponement of the remaining projects (9 mechanized divisions, 2 artillery divisions, 1 airborne assault division, and 1 coastal defense division) to 2026–2030. Losses on the Ukrainian front are forcing the replenishment of existing units. The contract campaign and small mobilization planned for 2026 will involve around 409,000 soldiers. At the same time, unmanned systems forces are being expanded (to a target of approximately 165,000 personnel in 2026 and 210,000 by 2030). One of the army corps (the 11th or 14th) is to be transformed into a combined arms army in 2026–2027.
The Russian reserve system in 2026 is not a ready-made “second echelon,” but a protracted process of rebuilding the Armed Forces. Much more ambitious plans for 2023–2024 collapsed in the face of real personnel, logistical, and frontline constraints. The key point is that Russia is simultaneously building up its capabilities in Ukraine and in the north-western direction towards NATO, which indicates an expanded strategic model. For the defense planning of the Eastern Flank, this means that the threat is not a passive “reserve” but an actively constructed capability for the future. The pace of expansion is slow but consistent and long-term, which also forces NATO to take a long-term approach to reserves and defense capabilities.
SPK Air Fleet Modernization Plans for 2026 – Reality vs. Ambitions
In 2026, the Russian military-political leadership plans to deliver a total of 82 aircraft and 84 helicopters to the Aerospace Forces (SPK). The aircraft will include: 2 Tu-160M2 strategic bombers, 7 Il-78M-90A tanker aircraft, 47 operational-tactical aircraft (13 Su-57 fighters, 2 Su-30SM2, 17 Su-35S, 15 Su-34NVO frontline bombers) and 26 training aircraft (14 UTS-800 and 12 DA-12T). In the helicopter segment, 59 attack/reconnaissance aircraft (20 Ka-52M, 34 Mi-28NM, 5 Ka-35) and 25 transport-combat and special-purpose aircraft (10 Mi-8MTV-5M, 10 Mi-8AMTSz-W, 5 Mi-8MTRP-1) are to be delivered. -5M, 10 Mi-8AMTSz-W, 5 Mi-8MTRP-1). By 2036, the Russian armament program envisages the production or modernization of approximately 1,400 units of aviation equipment, including the full spectrum of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The figures show a very ambitious scale of effort, especially in the tactical aviation and attack helicopter segment, but there is already a clear contradiction between the declarations and the known industrial, technological, and economic limitations of the Russian Federation, which makes the full implementation of these plans highly problematic.
Belarusian Armed Forces – new structures and plans for 2025-2030
In 2025, Belarus began forming the 37th Separate Special Operations Forces (SSO) Airborne Assault Brigade in the Gomel region (on the border with Ukraine), with one battalion already formed. At the same time, new SSO regiments are being created: an air defense missile regiment – in the final stages of formation, a rocket artillery regiment – approximately 70% complete, and a planned SSO command brigade. All new units are located in the southern direction, described as “the most unstable.” The size of the Belarusian-Russian Regional Military Group (RMG) will not be increased, Minister Khrenin stated in December 2025.
The RGA remains composed of approximately 9,000 Russian soldiers (up to 170 tanks, up to 200 BWP, up to 100 artillery systems). In October 2025, Belarus and Russia approved the Strategic Partnership Program in the military sphere for 2026-2030 and the Cooperation Plan of the Ministries of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation for 2026 (164 events planned). The Defense Plan of the Republic of Belarus and the Plan for the Construction of the Union State for 2026-2030 were presented. The priorities are: counter-battery warfare, radio-electronic warfare, unmanned systems and countermeasures, command and control systems (C2). The West-2025 exercises to date have involved 5,000-7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 1,200-2,000 Russian soldiers (Belarusian data). Exercises by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are planned for October 2026 in Belarus (CSTO) are planned for October 2026.
The Belarusian model of armed forces expansion differs from the Russian one in terms of pace, but not in terms of logic. New structures are created mainly through the reorganization of existing ones, rather than through mass creation from scratch. The direction of concentration is key: while Russia is strengthening its northwestern border with NATO, Belarus is deliberately focusing new units on the border with Ukraine. This indicates strategic complementarity within the RZW – each partner is building capacity where it is most needed for the common defense system. For Poland, this means that the threat is not limited to direct Russian structures, but also includes the coordinated expansion of Belarusian capabilities in the southern theater, particularly in the area of special operations below the threshold of war and raids in the first phase of a conflict (war) with NATO, which increases the operational depth of the entire Russian -Belarusian force arrangement in the western operational-strategic direction of the Union State.
Approximately 500 Belarusian companies cooperate with Russia in the field of military production
According to the 2025 Annual Report published in January this year by the Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau (Latvian: SAB – Satversmes Aizsardzības Birojs) a significant proportion of Belarusian companies are taking advantage of Russia’s growing demand for military production with the intention of immediate use in the war with Ukraine. At the same time, a scenario is being considered to start production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Belarus with an estimated production capacity of around 100,000 units. SAB also emphasizes that Belarus supplies Russia with nearly 480,000 artillery and rocket shells annually, using technologies based on cooperation with China.
Belarusian industry is a very important production base for Russia, which is significant in the context of the international sanctions that have limited Russia’s capabilities in the military sector since the start of the war in Ukraine. A significant proportion of companies, including those traditionally responsible for civilian production, are involved to a greater or lesser extent in the implementation of Russian military contracts. The production of electronic components and control systems plays an important role here.
The annual report of the Constitution Protection Bureau also refers to many other areas related to Latvia’s security, including the protection of classified information, threats to critical infrastructure, and cybersecurity.
Norway takes over the chairmanship of NORDEFCO
At the beginning of 2026, Norway took over the chairmanship of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) from Finland. This cooperation format has been in place for over a decade, focusing on increasing cooperation between the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) in the military sphere through joint exercises and the coordination of arms procurement.
It is worth noting that this format of cooperation includes, for the first time, countries that have become full members of NATO following the accession of Sweden and Finland. The announced direction of activity is towards even closer cooperation and the creation of an integrated defense area in northern Europe. Growing international tensions mean that initiatives in the form of intensive exercises in Arctic conditions and attempts to integrate the diverse weaponry of individual armed forces can be expected. A major challenge for the Norwegian presidency will be the participation of around 25,000 soldiers in the Cold Response 2026 exercise.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- EFI Program Council member Gen. Jarosław Gromadziński gave an interview to the Rzeczpospolita daily newspaper in which he pointed out that Poland does not currently have full autonomy in the area of precision long-range strikes, primarily due to deficiencies in reconnaissance and targeting systems. The entire interview is available in Rzeczpospolita.
- At the invitation of the Cadet Association of the Republic of Poland, EFI Senior Fellow Col. Łukasz Paczesny gave a lecture on the idea of serving Poland. During the conversation, issues arising from the EFI’s concept of Universal National Service were discussed, among other things.
- Information about the meeting can be found at the following link. The EFI report on Universal Public Service can be downloaded here.
