We invite you to read this round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Another unmanned aerial vehicle neutralised by the Romanian Armed Forces
On 20 August 2026, a Romanian F-16 fighter jet neutralised an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) near the Neptun Deep gas platform in the Black Sea – one of the largest gas extraction projects in the region. The drone was armed with an explosive device and was detected by a merchant vessel a few hundred metres from the extraction site, approximately 80 nautical miles east of Constanța. Acting Defence Minister Radu Miruța confirmed that the drone was carrying an explosive device, whilst Ukraine stated that it did not belong to its forces. President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia, whilst European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the incident as part of a “growing campaign of threats”. The incident occurred a few hours after another drone had entered Romanian airspace during the night in the Tulcea area, approximately 13 km east of Galați. Both incidents coincided with a large-scale Russian air strike on Ukraine, in response to which Poland also scrambled military aircraft and activated its air defence systems.
This was the latest in a series of incidents in the Black Sea around the Neptun Deep platform, which is intended to boost Romania’s gas export capacity. A week earlier, the Romanian armed forces had neutralised two Gerbera-type drones drifting near the same gas field within its exclusive economic zone. The incident on 20 August also occurred just four days after a Spanish F-18 shot down another drone over Romania after it had intruded from the direction of Moldova. In light of the above, one can speak of a consistent escalation against Bucharest, which remains a key element of the coalition supporting Ukraine’s defensive war.
End of the presence of US military aircraft at the Bulgarian air base
US KC-135 Stratotanker refuelling aircraft, stationed at Bezmer Air Base, have left Bulgaria. The information was provided by Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov, though he did not specify whether this was a temporary or permanent withdrawal. Two aircraft of the aforementioned type departed on Friday, 21 August 2026. The deployment of US Air Force assets, comprising up to eight tankers and around 250 personnel, was approved by the Bulgarian parliament at the end of July, under the 2006 bilateral defence cooperation agreement, for a period running until the end of September. The aforementioned assets were used in an operation against Iran. The decision was taken despite warnings from Tehran, whose authorities described it as an act of complicity in “aggression and war crimes”. Minister Stoyanov assured parliament that no offensive weapon systems would be deployed on Bulgarian territory, and that the temporary presence of the aircraft did not make Bulgaria a party to the hostilities. Washington has also committed to “minimising the risk” to Bulgarian national security. Prime Minister Rumen Radev assured that the tankers would not take part in direct combat operations against Iran.
The deployment of US aircraft is evidence of the strong security ties between Sofia and Washington. Nevertheless, it has raised concerns amongst local communities regarding threats from Iran. The aircraft’s departure from the Bezmer base came a few days after reports in the Financial Times suggesting that Iranian forces were considering options for strikes against US assets in South-Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria. The decision to authorise the stationing of the tankers coincided with a parallel programme, fully funded by NATO, to modernise the infrastructure at Bezmer and Vrazhdebna as part of the Alliance’s NSIP investment plan, confirming the base’s growing operational role in the regional security architecture.
Increased interest in serving in uniformed services in Slovakia
The Slovak media have observed a growing interest among young people in joining the police and the armed forces. According to the daily newspaper *Pravda*, this trend is the result of higher financial remuneration and professionally run recruitment campaigns targeting the so-called ‘Generation Z’ (those born between 1995 and 2012). The number of applications for admission to the Police Corps rose from 2,395 in 2022 to 7,598 in 2025, whilst the number of successful applicants rose from 784 to 1,221. At the start of 2025, the Police Corps had 18,761 officers with 3,840 vacancies, and by the end of the year: 19,523 officers with 3,078 vacancies (a net increase of 762 officers, which reversed a ten-year downward trend). Police officers receive, amongst other things, one-off recruitment and retention allowances of 5,000 euros and housing support; the three-month recruitment campaign cost 139,600 euros net, with a focus on social media and radio advertising targeting the 18–30 age group and their parents. The average age of new recruits in both services is 26, with 19- and 20-year-olds making up the largest group of new recruits in the armed forces. The armed forces currently number just over 15,000 professional soldiers, with a shortfall of nearly 4,000 posts; nevertheless, by 1 August 2026, 3,300 applications had been received, of which 1,555 people were accepted, against an annual recruitment target of 2,000.
Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák has stated that the armed forces are keen to recruit 1–2 per cent of the population capable of serving in the armed forces. Nine units with the most critical staff shortages have been identified, including the 12th Mechanised Battalion in Nitra, the 13th Mechanised Battalion in Levice, the 21st Mechanised Battalion in Trebišov and the 11th Air Force Brigade. Improving recruitment figures in Slovakia is a realistic prospect; nevertheless, the country is still far from building up a military force of a size commensurate with its growing operational needs, primarily due to budgetary constraints.
Arson attack on the Estonian Milrem Robotics factory
On the night of 14–15 August 2026, a fire broke out in Tallinn’s Lasnamäe district at a building used by Milrem Robotics, an Estonian company manufacturing unmanned and autonomous military systems. Investigators established that the fire was a deliberate and likely premeditated arson attack. On 16 August, the Latvian Security Service (Latvian: VDD – Valsts drošības dienests) launched its own investigation, and on 17–18 August, three suspects were arrested in Latvia. Two were remanded in custody. The suspects are to be handed over to Estonia.
The Estonian authorities are investigating the case as a possible act of sabotage. One line of inquiry concerns Russia’s possible involvement; however, at this stage, no evidence has been made public that would allow the attack to be attributed to Moscow. Milrem has stated that the fire did not affect production or deliveries of systems to Ukraine. The arson attack on the Milrem Robotics facilities should be analysed in the context of several other incidents this year involving the European defence industry. In March, a fire broke out at a factory in the Czech Republic producing, amongst other things, drones and optoelectronic equipment for Ukraine; the investigation also looked into the possibility of Russian sabotage. On 10 August, a fire and explosions occurred at the EMCO facility in Bulgaria, which is involved in the production and storage of ammunition. Meanwhile, on 13 August in Italy, a fire and explosion occurred at the KNDS Ammo Italy plant in Colleferro. In the cases of Bulgaria and Italy, there is currently no evidence of Russian involvement; Italian investigators have found no indications of sabotage. This does not, however, mean that every fire, explosion or incident at an arms factory should automatically be attributed to Russia. Similarly, in the case of Milrem Robotics and the fire in the Czech Republic, Russian involvement remains a hypothesis being investigated by the authorities, rather than an established fact. When assessing the current situation, however, one must take into account previous incidents of sabotage in Europe in which the involvement or perpetration by Russian secret services has been confirmed. These include the arson attack on a warehouse storing aid for Ukraine in Leyton, UK, in 2024; cases being investigated by the security services and the public prosecutor’s office in Lithuania; and activities uncovered in Poland in 2024. Russia is known for using local intermediaries and criminal networks on European territory to carry out hybrid operations. Their aim is to disrupt supplies to Ukraine, increase the costs of protecting critical infrastructure, and instil a sense of threat in countries supporting Ukraine.
Suspicions of collaboration with Belarus surrounding an expert at Lietuvos oro uostai, the company responsible for managing airports (IK) in Lithuania
On 17 August 2026, Oleksandr Lanecki, an aviation industry expert and owner of the consultancy firm Friendly Avia Support, was appointed as an independent member of the board of the state-owned company Lietuvos oro uostai (English: Lithuanian Airports), which manages the airports in Vilnius, Kaunas and Palanga. Within two days, the Lithuanian media revealed details of his previous activities. Lanecki was alleged to have provided consultancy services to Belarusian state-owned companies, and between 2017 and 2023 he worked for an aircraft maintenance firm operating in Russia. He also gave interviews to pro-Russian media outlets, in which he spoke, amongst other things, about circumventing sanctions. With regard to the war in Ukraine, he used the term ‘special military operation’. Laneckij rejected the allegations made against him. On 19 August, the Minister for Transport and Communications, Juras Taminskas, instructed the State Security Department (VSD – Valstybės saugumo departamentas) to carry out an urgent assessment of the candidate. A day later, before the service had completed its vetting, Laneckij resigned from the board, and the minister accepted his resignation. Ultimately, his term of office lasted a mere four days.
The case does not involve espionage – no evidence of Laneckij’s links to intelligence agencies has been uncovered. However, it highlights a potential loophole in the vetting system for individuals appointed to the governing bodies of organisations of significance to national security and critical infrastructure. The vetting carried out by the VSD focuses primarily on threats related, amongst other things, to contacts with intelligence services, terrorist activities or other direct security threats. By contrast, a candidate’s business history, public statements and reputation remain largely the responsibility of the institution conducting the recruitment process. In this case, potential controversies concerning the candidate were uncovered not as part of the recruitment procedure or by the security services, but by journalists who analysed his previous activities. The case may therefore serve as an argument for extending vetting procedures to individuals holding positions within organisations managing critical infrastructure.
Briefing by Estonian military intelligence on the Russia-Ukraine war
On 21 August, Estonian military intelligence assessed that Russia had been losing an average of around 1,400 soldiers a day over the past week, and that for several months its losses have exceeded its recruitment levels by several thousand people a month. There were an average of 231 clashes per day on the front line, with the heaviest fighting taking place in the Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka areas. Russia continued its intensive long-range attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets, whilst Ukraine stepped up strikes deep into Russia and the occupied Crimea, targeting, amongst other things, energy facilities, Bastion-M systems, airports, radar stations, refineries and missile industry plants. According to Estonian intelligence, nearly 240 energy facilities in Crimea have been attacked since 1 July, and the strike on the Progress plant in the Samara Oblast may delay Russia’s Rassvet satellite programme. July was the deadliest month for the Ukrainian civilian population since May 2022 – 437 people were killed and 2,610 were injured. At the same time, the proportion of jet-powered drones in Russian attacks is rising; they now account for as much as two-thirds of all unmanned aerial vehicles in use. The effects of Ukrainian strikes are also being felt in Russia – ten regions are experiencing fuel shortages, whilst attacks on logistical and military infrastructure have led to disruptions to economic activity and the cancellation of some military and patriotic events.
An assessment by Estonian intelligence indicates that the war is entering a phase of increasing depletion of Russian human and infrastructural resources. Russia continues to maintain a high intensity of operations on the front line, but mounting losses, combined with a slower recruitment rate, may, in the long term, limit its ability to replenish its forces. At the same time, Ukraine is increasingly effectively shifting its operations to Russian rear areas, striking the energy sector, the arms industry, airports and logistics. The systematic targeting of facilities involved in fuel and missile production is of particular significance, as it may affect not only the current capabilities of the Russian armed forces, but also the pace of modernisation and space programmes. However, the key factor will be whether Ukraine is able to sustain the scale of these strikes whilst simultaneously holding back Russian pressure on the front line.
Russia – Denis Lamin takes command of the Unmanned Systems Forces
On 21 August, Colonel-General Denis Lamin assumed the duties of Chief of the Unmanned Systems Forces (WSB) by order of Andrei Belousov, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation (RF). Lamin came from the post of Chief of Staff of the Central Military District and, concurrently, Chief of Staff of the ‘Centre’ Group; Vladimir Putin had announced the appointment itself on 5 August during a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). A day later, Aleksandr Sladkov announced that the USB had been finally formed; it reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, and comprises brigades in the military districts, departments within the Ministry of Defence’s academies, and operator training centres.
The institutionalisation of the WSB is a staffing and training process scheduled from December 2024 onwards, rather than a one-off decision. The appointment of the first commander of this new branch of the armed forces, who has experience in both military district and formation staff roles, signals that the Ministry of Defence is building an operational and staff structure with the WSB, rather than merely a technical one. A realistic indicator of capability is staffing levels and training programmes, not press releases – three successive ‘formation dates’ (2024, 2025, 2026) show that institutional maturity is still being achieved from Moscow’s own perspective. The appropriate criterion for assessing the Russian Federation’s drone capabilities on the western front remains the pace at which command staff are being appointed and the pace and scale of training courses for WSB operators and technical personnel.
Russia – nuclear signalling led by the ‘second tier’
On 21 August, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov set out the conditions for dialogue in the post-New START (NST) era – Moscow remains open to dialogue but links this to the ‘normalisation of relations’; it accuses the United States of proposing an unrealistic alternative in the form of a multilateral framework with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and points to the possibility of resuming nuclear tests. On 22 August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected an appeal by some 40 countries, led by the US, for advance notification of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches, assessing the initiative as disrespectful to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. On 24 August, the Russian Ambassador to Sweden, Sergei Belyaev, stated that Russia would have to take into account the possibility of US (NATO) nuclear weapons being deployed on Swedish territory in its military and political planning. On 20 August, the head of the state-owned corporation Rosatom, Alexei Likhachev, announced that the state defence order (Gosoboronzakaz, GOZ) had been fulfilled in full; *Rossijskaya Gazeta* promoted the Project 09851 special-purpose nuclear submarine *Khabarovsk* as a carrier of a new strategic weapons system, whilst *Krasnaya Zvezda* published a doctrinal interview entitled “Nuclear Teeth for NATO 3.0” with political scientist Aleksandr Gusiev.
This is a comprehensive deterrence package being pursued without the involvement of Vladimir Putin or Sergey Lavrov – that is, precisely at a level that falls outside the Western framework. The refusal to participate in the notification regime, whilst maintaining openness regarding the post-NST format, is a model of selective transparency, crucial for assessing the predictability of Russian tests. Extending the ‘list of recipients’ of deterrence to include Sweden seals off the northern Baltic. A weekly convergence – Ryabkov sets out the conditions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shuts down the notification regime, the ambassador opens the Swedish front, Rosatom confirms production capacity, and Krasnaya Zvezda provides the doctrine – this is a model ‘second-tier’ signalling operation, designed for a European rather than an American audience.
Russia – the Federal Security Service and the case of 35 FPV drones from the European Union
On 21 August, the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the arrest of eight people in connection with a plot, foiled in June 2026, to carry out an attack on a strategic facility of the defence-industrial complex (OPK) in the Moscow Oblast using 35 FPV drones smuggled from European Union (EU) countries. Charges were brought under Article 205(2) and Article 205.4(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, relating to a terrorist act and participation in a terrorist organisation. One of the attackers was killed whilst resisting arrest. The FSB also reported that in March 2026, the group had attempted to purchase fibre-optic drones with a payload capacity of up to 20 kg in Moscow. At the same time, in the Murmansk Oblast, a foreign national was detained; he claimed to be a specialist in unmanned aerial vehicles and was attempting to cross the border into Norway illegally – he was allegedly planning to carry out an FPV drone flight over Moscow to determine the coordinates of government buildings, fuel depots and places where people gather.
Two issues are significant. The first is the smuggling of drones from the EU; the second is the shift from FPV to high-payload fibre-optic systems, which are not disrupted by electronic warfare (EW). The escape route taken by the ‘UAV specialist’ – towards the Norwegian border – links the issue of internal security with NATO’s northern border, whilst the publication, dated in Murmansk, falls outside the mainstream media. In Russian rhetoric, this shift in the nature of operations – from reconnaissance to heavy combat payloads – provides sufficient justification for tightening security measures at defence industry facilities and elevating the status of counter-intelligence in the western regions of Russia.
Russia – the Kaliningrad (Königsberg) training and information package
During the week of 17–24 August, the Baltic Fleet (BF) conducted simultaneous exercises covering all layers of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and the defence of its own main base. On 18 August, a special exercise involving all types of Navy (MW) security measures took place at the naval base in Baltiysk under the command of BF Commander Admiral Sergei Lipilin. Rear Admiral Andrei Popov set up stations for hydro-abrasive cutting of hulls, refuelling of ships without mooring at a distance of up to one kilometre from the shoreline, field bathhouses and bakeries, whilst the repair and restoration battalion demonstrated robotic systems built in-house, including those for use in a special military operations zone (SWO). According to the exercise scenario, an enemy sabotage group attempted to breach the base using unmanned boats (BEK) and saboteur divers, whilst visual observation posts detected the targets and directed counter-sabotage forces to their positions. On the same day, reconnaissance and marine assault subunits of the FB carried out parachute jumps in the Kaliningrad Oblast from An-26 aircraft and Mi-8 helicopters, landing on unprepared landing sites. On 19 August, a squadron of the ‘Bastion’ coastal missile system (BRK) deployed in the Leningrad Oblast on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and carried out simulated firings at maritime targets whilst simultaneously repelling sabotage groups at their launch positions. On 21 August, a group of small missile ships (MRK) – the ‘Naro-Fominsk’, ‘Stavropol’, ‘Serpukhov’ and ‘Grad’ – carried out combined launches of ‘Kalibr’ missiles alongside the BRK ‘Bal’, whilst the small anti-submarine vessels (MPK) ‘Kabardino-Balkaria’ and ‘Aleksin’ laid fields of training bottom and anchor mines, after which the minesweepers ‘Lev Chernavin’ and ‘Aleksandr Obukhov’ completed the full cycle of search and destruction. At the same time, between 17 and 21 August, the Kaliningrad-based Klops portal and the Vojennoe Obozrenie website published an analysis of the ‘NATO Land Warfighting Concept’ by US Major Andrew Pingrey – the first stage of the concept involves neutralising Russian air, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and strikes on the Kaliningrad Oblast; the second involves the creation of an ‘autonomous zone’ saturated with robots and drones along the Russian–Belarusian border; the third involves strikes into operational depth. During the same period, military analysts Aleksandr Kots and Yuri Poddubny reported “massive” activity involving around 25 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) aircraft around the exclave, pointing to the latest EA-37B Compass Call II electronic warfare aircraft taking off from Powidz and the Bombardier ARTEMIS II operating from Constanta. General Viktor Sobolev, a member of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, assessed that “the aim of the exercises is to occupy the Kaliningrad Oblast and destroy the Baltic Fleet”, whilst a column by Damir Batyrshin in Klops concluded that discussions had taken place in Lithuania regarding the reduction of the simplified transit time from 24 hours – first to three hours, then to six hours – on the approximately 230-kilometre route from Chernyshevsky to Kamenny Log in Belarus.
This is not a district-level exercise, but a synchronised test of coastal missiles (MRK), a full cycle of mine warfare and base defence in a region that lies in the immediate vicinity of the Polish Navy. The deployment of ‘Bastion’ systems in the Leningrad Oblast – rather than the Kaliningrad Oblast – signals training to seal off the eastern Gulf of Finland independently of the exclave, and thus a scenario involving the isolation of the Finnish and Estonian coastlines. The simulation of the full cycle of mine warfare in the Baltic Sea is of direct relevance to scenarios involving the blockade of shipping lanes and remains a signal that is virtually absent from Western discourse. Anti-sabotage defence in the Baltic is practised as part of material and technical security, rather than as a separate task of base protection – this is the model of the Russian ‘heavy naval base’, which must simultaneously function logistically and defend itself against an asymmetric strike from the sea. Landings at unmarked airfields in the exclave serve as training for a scenario involving the seizure of facilities deep within the territory – a scenario directly relevant to the Suwałki Corridor. The Kaliningrad information loop, conducted in parallel, is closed and predictable – a Western policy document first finds its way into the Russian regional press, then into statements by military correspondents, subsequently to a State Duma deputy, and ultimately serves as justification for exerting pressure on transit. Powidz is explicitly singled out in this narrative, which, for the first time in a long while, places Poland’s base infrastructure squarely within the scope of Russia’s deterrence signalling. Bringing all these elements together in a single weekly overview reveals a coherent Kaliningrad-Baltic package, in which missile, mine, counter-sabotage and airborne capabilities are practised as a single system, whilst the information loop provides the narrative justification for it – if Lithuania’s decision to reduce the transit limit to six hours is adopted, Moscow will have a ready-made pretext for a military or legal ‘response’, and this moment should be treated as a point of escalation until the end of September.
Belarus – combat readiness inspection
On 24 August, the combat readiness inspection of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (AF RB), ordered by the President, continued in one of the artillery brigades. The directive was personally conveyed to the Minister of Defence by Aleksandr Wolfowicz, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus.
The priority of the exercise is deep fire strike and decentralised command, taking into account the experiences of the war in Ukraine and the conflict involving Iran. Unlike the exercises in the first half of the year, the current ones are testing the entire command structure from the Minister downwards. On 19 August, Defence Minister Colonel-General Viktor Chrenin observed, at the Gozhsky training ground – some dozen kilometres from the border with Lithuania – T-72 tank crews from the 6th Guards Mechanised Brigade firing at targets at ranges of 1,400–2,000 metres.
This ‘check from the minister down’ is an operational indicator of greater significance than the training exercises themselves – it is a test of the entire command system’s ability to function in wartime. Wolfowicz, as the official delivering the decree, indicates that the initiative lies with the Security Council, not the Ministry of Defence itself – and thus falls within the same institutional framework that Minsk has been building since the July ‘reorganisation’ of the State Security Committee (KGB). The concentration of activity on the Grodno–Gożsk axis – formerly the Grodno–Brest axis – maintains pressure on the Lithuanian axis and demonstrates that, from a Belarusian perspective, the north-western direction remains the priority operational direction, rather than the Ukrainian one.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- What should an effective Polish military reserve system look like? General Jarosław Gromadziński and Grzegorz Matyasik, members of the EFI team, tackle one of the key issues for the future of Poland’s defence capabilities, presenting two differing perspectives on the organisation and use of reserves on the Zero.pl website. We encourage you to read the interview with Gen. Gromadziński entitled “From disarmament to the Borsuks and Abrams tanks. Gen. Gromadziński on the army: They only wanted 60,000 soldiers” (in Polish) and Grzegorz Matyasik’s response entitled “Let’s not create a reserve army. Let’s build a reserve system. A response to the Zero.pl interview with Gen. Gromadziński” (in Polish).
