We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Romania to create second logistics hub to support Ukraine
Major General Maik Keller, deputy commander of NATO’s military support unit for Ukraine (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine Command, NSATU), has confirmed that a second logistics hub is being prepared in Romania. It will open in January 2026, and its main purpose will be to relieve the similar center in Rzeszów, Poland, which has been operating since 2022. The new location will facilitate the effective distribution of equipment provided by NATO member states, including supplies planned for next year by the United States under the PURL program (American equipment financed by European countries).
Romania consistently presents itself as an alternative to Poland as a route for delivering military and humanitarian support to Ukraine, as well as a reliable export partner for Kyiv. The establishment of a logistics center in Romania reduces the dependence of NATO member states and Ukraine on Poland in terms of military support logistics, but Rzeszów remains a key center, if only because of the procedures already in place to increase its security (e.g., in the area of air defense).
The Czech Republic confirms the continuation of ammunition purchases for Ukraine in 2026.
The new Czech Defense Minister, Gen. (ret.) Jaromír Zůna, confirmed that Prague’s program of procuring ammunition for Ukraine in “third countries” will continue next year. At the same time, he publicly supported the position of his country, Hungary, and Slovakia, which negotiated an exemption from the new EU funds for Kyiv, pointing out that it is necessary for Ukraine to implement more effective resource management.
Both the Czech and Slovak governments are trying to remain pragmatic in their approach to further military support for Ukraine. On the one hand, they are faced with public expectations and the deteriorating attitude of their own electorate towards Kyiv. On the other hand, military support initiatives to date have allowed the Czech Republic in particular to obtain additional funds and business opportunities for its domestic defense industry.
The growing role of unmanned maritime vehicles in Ukrainian defense industry exports
During Portuguese Prime Minister Luis Montenegro’s visit to Kyiv on December 20, a strategic partnership was signed for the joint production of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). According to the provisions of the document, both countries will work towards the production of systems (probably similar to the Magura family of drones already in operation) for the Portuguese and Ukrainian navies.
Ukraine has already signed a similar agreement with Greece, and unmanned maritime vehicles are also being tested or prepared for co-production in Poland, among other countries. This is in line with the liberalization of export regulations in Ukraine, which has been observed for several months and will allow for the larger-scale offering of operationally tested, cost-effective, and relatively easy-to-implement military technologies on foreign markets. At the same time, after a period of dominance by aerial drones, there is a noticeable increase in interest in unmanned maritime systems, which can be used not only for combat or reconnaissance missions, but also as an effective tool for monitoring, for example, maritime energy infrastructure.
Lithuania to start production of anti-tank mines
In December 2025, a contract worth €22.8 million was signed for the supply of anti-tank mines to the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The decision to award this contract to Eksplosita UAB is a clear step towards the development of the domestic defense industry and the strengthening of Lithuania’s defense capabilities. The anti-tank mines produced are a type of defensive weaponry that has a significant impact on stopping the movement of a potential aggressor’s troops.
The Lithuanian company Eksplosita UAB, selected to carry out the contract, has not previously produced this type of weaponry. This is its first military contract since its establishment in 2016 as part of the Milsa Group, one of the largest producers of dolomite and granite in Lithuania, with over 60 years of experience in the extraction and processing of mineral resources. It is worth noting that Lithuania plans to allocate significantly more funds – estimated at around €500 million – to the production of mines. These activities are to be intensified in 2026, after the expiry of the Ottawa Convention, which Lithuania denounced in 2025 which prohibits the production of anti-personnel mines. It can therefore be assumed that Eksplosita UAB, which is developing new production capacities, will also be a potential contractor for contracts planned jointly with Finland for the production of advanced weapons.
Russia does not disclose the causes of the sudden death of Radomir Kurtić, representative of a Serbian arms company
Despite officially communicating their expectations to the Russian side, the Serbian authorities have not yet received any explanation regarding the sudden death of Radomir Kurtić, a long-time representative of the Serbian state-owned arms company Yugoimport SDPR, which occurred on November 17, 2025, in Moscow. At the same time, the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of documents important for the company’s security — both in paper and digital form — and hard drives from the company’s Moscow sales office have not been explained. Their absence was discovered during a special audit conducted a few days after Kurtić’s death. This situation caused noticeable tensions in Russian-Serbian relations.
The death of a key representative of the defense sector led to suspicions in Serbia that Kurtić may have been murdered by the Russian secret services. Of course, alternative hypotheses are also being considered, including a sudden deterioration in health, but due to Yugoimport SDPR’s involvement in numerous arms export contracts, the scenario of accidental death is considered unlikely by some Serbian circles. This is all the more so because the Russian side is delaying the process of handing over its findings on the circumstances of the death, and the disappearance of documents and data carriers from the trade mission remains an additional aggravating factor. One of the possible reasons for the possible liquidation of Radomir Kurtić is Serbia’s significant involvement in arms exports to Western European countries. Russian intelligence services had previously publicly accused Yugoimport SDPR, Zenitprom, and Sloboda of indirectly transferring ammunition to Ukraine via NATO allies, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and African countries. It is also known that Russia has in the past attempted to physically eliminate individuals who were key to the production and sale of arms destined for Ukraine. Examples include the foiled attempt by US and German services to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of the German company Rheinmetall, and the earlier attempt to poison Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev in Sofia using a substance from the Novichok group.
Investigative cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in combating sabotage
As part of the cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, joint investigative teams were set up with the participation of representatives of the public prosecutor’s offices of each country to investigate a series of arson attacks and acts of sabotage organized by Eastern intelligence services. In 2025, incidents included arson attacks on museums and restaurants in Tallinn, an attack on the Museum of Occupation in Latvia, and the discovery of a cache of drones and explosives in Lithuania. These activities often involved individuals recruited through Telegram, who participated in exchange for relatively small remuneration.
The establishment of joint investigation teams allows for more effective, faster, and cross-border action. At the same time, it is proof of the effectiveness of Russian and Belarusian actions within the framework of so-called active measures, which, using limited resources, lead to the burdening and exhaustion of NATO security forces. The countries targeted by the attacks are forced to conduct time-consuming investigations, involving the work of many security agencies.
The architecture of total war – conclusions from the expanded Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense
A key element of the meeting attended by Putin and Belousov was the outline of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces at the turn of the 2020s/2030s. Moscow is officially moving away from a “light” expeditionary army in favor of a mass divisional model dedicated to full-scale conventional conflict. In 2025 alone, 48 tactical units (5 divisions, 13 brigades, 30 regiments) were formed. The plan for 2026 is to create another 57 units (including 4 divisions and 39 regiments). The formation of the army framework for the recreated Moscow and Leningrad districts has been completed, confirming the priority of the western direction. A new “anti-access” architecture has been implemented—a missile defense division has been created; a regiment with the S-500 system has begun combat duty (combating targets in near space). The Navy is in the process of transforming marine brigades into divisions (2 in progress, 2 planned for 2026) for amphibious operations and coastal defense.
Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense College definitively ends the discussion about the “temporary” nature of Russia’s war economy. Maintaining the pace of forming nearly 50 large tactical units per year (2025/26) is not about replenishing losses, but about building a new, “heavy” strike force, whose operational horizon is the end of the decade. However, the key factor is qualitative change. The saturation of structures with marine divisions and S-500 systems indicates that the Kremlin is preparing for a scenario of war with an adversary that has air, space, and naval superiority (NATO). Russia is building a self-sufficient “Eurasian fortress” capable of absorbing strategic strikes and conducting long-term attrition operations.
Institutionalization of “drone warfare” – creation of the Russian Federation’s Unmanned Systems Forces
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has officially defined unmanned systems as the dominant means of attack, deciding to form a separate branch of the armed forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces – by 2026. This move ends the improvisation phase, introducing standardized staffing structures modeled on the “Rubicon” center, which is credited with destroying thousands of targets. At the same time, Moscow’s response to the enemy’s tight “drone line” is rapid technical and tactical adaptation. In 2025 alone, the Russian army was saturated with over 38,000 light vehicles (motorcycles, buggies) and 130,000 sets of “trench” WRE (radio-electronic warfare), complementing this ecosystem with mass robotization of logistics delivering thousands of tons of supplies to the front line.
The decision to institutionalize unmanned forces is a doctrinal breakthrough, creating a “functional system” in the Russian army equivalent to traditional artillery or aviation. Strategically, the Kremlin is seeking to industrialize “technological guerrilla warfare,” combining the mass use of cheap weapons with high mobility to break the static nature of the front line.
This is a systemic attempt to restore maneuverability in conditions of full battlefield transparency, which is transitioning from the status of a frontline experiment to the current operational standard of the Russian Armed Forces.
“Silent” total mobilization – the personnel architecture of the Russian Armed Forces for 2026.
Vladimir Putin and Andrei Belousov officially report the recruitment of 410,000 contract soldiers in 2025, which, according to the Kremlin’s narrative, is supposed to definitively dispel the specter of a new wave of general mobilization. At the same time, the profile of the statistical recruit is becoming significantly younger and more professional – two-thirds are under 40 years of age, and one in three has specialist education. At the same time, the state is radically tightening up its human resources management system. On the one hand, the criteria for deferrals for the IT sector have been tightened, limiting them exclusively to accredited entities, and the process of raising the age of the reserve has begun, with the ultimate goal of reaching 65 for officers. On the other hand, the authorities are expanding the social package, offering veterans free re-education from December 26, which is intended to ease social tensions. The whole thing is tied together by a new digital record-keeping mechanism, revealed by independent investigations, which allows inconvenient data on personnel losses to “disappear.”
Russia is pursuing a strategy of “creeping mobilization” calculated for a long-term war, avoiding the politically costly declaration of martial law. Maintaining a pace of over 400,000 contracts per year while extending the age of reservists creates a permanent “transmission belt” to the front, independent of public sentiment. This is an evolution towards a hybrid model, in which the maximization of financial (voluntary) recruitment is supported by an increasingly tight legal corset, making it impossible to escape the military system. This is not demobilization, but a brutal optimization of human resources for a long-term war of attrition.
Technological autarky – the Russian defense industry at war
The last week of December in the Russian defense economy was marked by the systemic tightening of the “technological fortress.” A key element of this strategy is the activity of the Rostec concern, whose RT-IB (Cybersecurity) company revealed that it handled over 1.5 million security alerts in just 10 months of 2025, blocking nearly 50,000 real incidents. In response to growing pressure, the Russian arms industry has implemented AI-based tools to protect its systems, reducing response times by a quarter. At the same time, during the National Industrial Forum in Moscow, a roadmap for “silicon sovereignty” was outlined, assuming a sevenfold increase in domestic microelectronics production by 2035. This is a sine qua non condition for maintaining mass production of air and missile defense systems and robotics, which are at the core of the “GPR-36” arms program. In this context, the launch of serial production of the Il-114-300 aircraft is significant. Although officially these are civilian aircraft, they serve as a testing ground for supply chains under sanctions, and their design forms the basis for future patrol and reconnaissance platforms to replace the Western fleet.
Russia is entering 2026 with a clear plan to build a closed technological cycle. The actions of Rostec and the Ministry of Industry indicate that Moscow has abandoned its illusions of a “return to normality” and is switching the entire high-tech sector to war mode. The integration of AI into the cyber defense systems of arms factories and the desperate struggle for its own microelectronics are proof that the Kremlin is preparing for a long-term technological war in which access to processors will be as important as ammunition supplies.
This confirms that AI in the Kremlin’s doctrine no longer serves only to control swarms of drones, but is becoming a shield for the industrial base. The Il-114-300 is just the tip of the iceberg — a symbol of the attempt to build an aviation industry independent of Boeing and Airbus, capable of handling the logistics of war across the vast distances of Eurasia.
Militarization of internal security – the FSB’s new paradigm
The last few days have seen a series of high-profile FSB operations that define a new doctrine of internal security. The services publicized the arrest of ten citizens in five key regions, accused of arson and sabotage of critical infrastructure under the dictates of, as indicated, “Ukrainian curators.” A characteristic feature is the narrative of so-called “multi-level recruitment”: victims first lose money as a result of telephone scams and are then blackmailed into “working off their debt” through sabotage, which the FSB directly classifies as terrorism punishable by 20 years in prison. At the same time, a family (father and daughter) was arrested in Sochi on charges of attempting to go to the front on the enemy’s side and collecting data on Russian soldiers.
The FSB is systematically transforming civilian space into another theater of war. Pushing the thesis of “blackmailed saboteurs” serves two purposes: first, it legitimizes draconian anti-terrorism laws against ordinary citizens; second, it builds a siege mentality in which any contact with foreign countries (even by telephone) is a potential act of treason. This is a signal that the apparatus of repression is moving from selective suppression of the opposition to mass counterintelligence prevention, treating society as a resource that must either be mobilized or pacified by fear of being accused of terrorism.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- The Eastern Flank Institute, in collaboration with the Defence24 portal, has published a report entitled “Drone Warfare – Status at the end of 2025. A compendium by the Eastern Flank Institute.” Does Poland really have a great opportunity related to the development of the drone industry and the creation of a coherent concept for a drone warfare school? Will our community pass the test in the face of the threat?
- Piotr Woyke, director of the IWF, gave an interview to the Rzeczpospolita newspaper (December 16), in which he pointed out that the ongoing negotiations involving the US and European leaders are a good opportunity for the Russians to negotiate a pause, rather than a new security architecture in Europe.
- Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj, IWF expert, gave an interview on TVN24’s “TAK JEST” program (December 19), where he commented on the difficulties associated with the transfer of frozen Russian financial assets, and took part in a discussion (December 20) on Polish Radio Białystok about hybrid pressure on Poland.
- Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Maciej Korowaj, IMF expert, gave an interview to Polsat (Dec. 19), commenting on the issue of peace negotiations and the prospect of Russia waging war next year.
- On the occasion of Christmas, we wish you peace, hope, and respite from your daily duties. May this special family time bring you a sense of security, the strength to take on challenges, and prosperity in the coming New Year. Thank you for being with us!
