We encourage you to read our review of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Delivery of the first Turkish corvette to the Romanian Navy and presidential consultations
On June 20, at the Naval Shipyard in Istanbul, Romania officially commissioned the corvette “Contraamiral August Roman.” This is the first new combat vessel to be added to the Romanian Navy’s fleet, as well as the first vessel in history exported by the Turkish defense industry to a NATO member state. The ceremony, attended by Presidents Nicușor Dan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was combined with the induction of the sister ship “Koçhisar” into the Turkish fleet. The ship was acquired by the Romanian Ministry of Defense in late 2025 for approximately 223 million EUR as part of a package that included crew training as well as logistical and technical support. Following the ceremony, the President of Romania emphasized that the visit also served as a broader political and strategic consultation: He described Turkey as a “key partner” for Romania and the entire EU, highlighting Ankara’s role in the Black Sea security architecture, and announced further cooperation to promote freedom of navigation and combat maritime drones as part of the MCM Black Sea initiative. The parties agreed to deepen security cooperation ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara, with a particular focus on Ukraine, the Black Sea, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
The deal confirms Turkey’s growing role as a key actor in the Black Sea security architecture and Romania’s consistent openness to cooperation with that country. At the same time, from Romania’s perspective, there is a clear mismatch between Turkey’s expanding regional ambitions and its insufficient resources to carry out those activities. The new vessel is being delivered to Romania in a relatively light configuration, closer to that of patrol boats, and is intended to remain open to future upgrades. The choice of a Turkish supplier was based not only on political considerations but also on the opportunity to acquire the new vessel at a more favorable price.
Zelenskyy proposes a “Drone Agreement” to Sofia
Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held talks on the sidelines of the two-day European Council meeting in Brussels (June 18). According to the Bulgarian side, the discussion focused on Bulgaria’s strategic role in regional energy security, as well as on opportunities for industrial cooperation, with particular emphasis on technology transfer and potential joint drone production. Zelenskyy announced that he had proposed to Bulgaria that they begin work on a separate agreement in the form of a “drone deal,” and both sides tasked expert teams with finalizing the arrangements and preparing a package of bilateral documents. The “Drone Deal” framework – according to Zelenskyy’s earlier statements, including those made in Ramstein, and already involving 27 countries – is based on Ukraine sharing unmanned technology and deepening defense partnerships with NATO allies and friendly non-NATO countries.
Kyiv is seeking to improve relations with Sofia. The Radev government, which took office on May 8, confirmed that Bulgaria will no longer supply military equipment to Ukraine, and the prime minister himself opposes some of the proposed new sanctions against Russia. Bulgaria is suspending state-sponsored arms transfers but is simultaneously considering commercial and industrial cooperation on drones, in which support for Ukrainian capabilities is sometimes redefined from “military aid” to an “industrial and energy project.” Radev’s stance to date is tied to the expectations of the electorate, but launching drone production on Bulgarian territory would effectively strengthen the regional industrial base and its export potential.
Changes to the remuneration and contracting System for Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, announced the introduction of a new, unified contracting system within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Under this system, the maximum contract duration in assault units will be 14 months and will be intended for civilians joining these types of units.
Active-duty soldiers who sign a contract to serve in assault units will receive a 10-month contract, while retired soldiers will receive a 6-month contract. In combat units (unmanned systems operators, artillery, electronic warfare, and other combat specializations), the maximum contract term will be 24 months, the same as in rear units. Gen. O. Syrski assured that in any case, upon completion of the contract, a soldier will be entitled to a 6-month period during which he will be exempt from mobilization. Additionally, for each month spent in combat or assault units, this period will be extended by 3 months. Both periods are cumulative.
Earlier, Ukrainian authorities announced a new pay scale for the army. Under this scale, the base salary of a private serving in rear units will increase from 20,000 to 30,000 UAH (i.e., from approximately 1,650 PLN to 2,480 PLN). At the same time, very high combat service allowances have been introduced, which could allow a private to earn a salary more than 10 times higher. The allowances include:
- 10,000 UAH (approx. 830 PLN) per day of service in a combat position;
- 20,000 UAH (approx. 1,650 PLN) per day of service during which particularly dangerous tasks were performed (e.g., reconnaissance, medical evacuation, etc.);
- 40,000 UAH (approx. 3,300 PLN) for each day of service during which a successful assault operation took place;
- 15,000 UAH (approx. 1,240 PLN) for the destruction of a specific target (military equipment, fortified position, structure);
- 100,000 UAH (approx. 8,300 PLN) for taking a prisoner—this amount may be paid individually or divided among the team of soldiers who participated in such an operation.
The above amounts do not accumulate on a daily basis; each day, the highest bonus earned that day is credited to the soldier’s account. According to calculations by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the average salary of a soldier stationed in combat positions will amount to approximately 300,000 UAH (approx. 25,000 PLN) after the changes, and the highest monthly amount, including participation in the bonus system, may reach as much as approximately 460,000 UAH (approx. 38,000 PLN). Compensation for the family of a soldier killed in the war with Russia remains unchanged. This amount is 15 million UAH (1.25 million PLN).
One of the most important, though often overlooked, aspects of a country’s preparedness for war is the need for the state to have the financial capacity to wage war. In Ukraine, these funds come mainly from EU macro-financial assistance. In this context, the experiences of both Kyiv and Moscow clearly indicate that without very high financial incentives, attracting volunteers to fight will be difficult and, in the long term, practically impossible.
The high effectiveness of Ukrainian interceptor drones in combating Shahed-136/Gerań-2 UAVs
Representatives of the private defense company SkyFall, the manufacturer of, among other things, the P1-SUN interceptor drones, reported that over the past 6 months, approximately 3,500 Russian drones from the Shahed/Geran family have been shot down using this type of UAV, and since their deployment on the battlefield, over 10,000 UAVs of various types have been downed. P1-SUN can reach speeds of 310 km/h, carry up to 800 g of explosive payload, and operate at altitudes of up to 9,000 m within a range of 33 km from its launch site. The latest operational versions of the drone are equipped with Computer Vision cameras supported by artificial intelligence. This allows the operator to detect an enemy target more quickly and effectively and attempt to destroy it. At the same time, representatives of SkyFall noted that intensive battlefield testing is underway for the P1-SUN, which is controlled almost entirely by AI. In this scenario, the operator decides only when to launch the mission, while the drone’s takeoff, target location, and elimination are all carried out based on an algorithm. A single soldier will be able to control the missions of approximately 10 interceptor drones simultaneously. The effectiveness of this technology was confirmed by Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. Although he did not specify the name of the company or the type of device, he stated that a member of the Brave1 Dataroom cluster (which allows defense companies to design their own AI-based solutions using structured data collected on the actual battlefield) had developed an interceptor drone that is 95% controlled by AI. According to the minister, the equipment was reportedly used effectively in the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile, the management of Wild Hornets reported that in May of this year alone, the STING interceptor drones manufactured by their company destroyed 3,000 UAVs from the Shahed/Gerań family (compared to 8,150 UAVs of this type used against Ukraine in May by the Russian Armed Forces).
Anti-drone technologies are one of the cornerstones of the development of Ukraine’s private defense sector. It is highly likely that these solutions have already been exported from Ukraine and may also have been used in the Middle East to counter drones launched by Iran against the Gulf monarchies.
This type of military equipment is also likely of interest to the Polish Armed Forces and the Polish Ministry of National Defense and may have been the subject of discussions between Warsaw and Kyiv during negotiations regarding the transfer of MiG-29 aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Assessments by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense regarding modifications to Russian Kalibr missiles
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported that the latest round of research analyzing the debris from 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles – designed to strike land targets – used in the Russian Armed Forces’ attacks on Ukraine has been completed. According to the results, the Russians have for the first time begun using cluster warheads in these missiles instead of the fragmentation warheads previously employed. This is intended to improve the effectiveness of attacks, particularly against dispersed targets, especially aircraft at airfields. The warhead’s design is very similar to that used in Kh-101 missiles. Another revealed feature is a return to the use of Western electronic components in place of Russian substitutes, which had been installed since 2023. This applies, among other things, to components of the guidance system and the onboard computer. This indicates a lower quality of these components, which likely affected the effectiveness of the weapon systems. Furthermore, Ukrainian researchers have pointed out that the 3M14 Kalibr missiles use the CH-99 navigation system, which was developed in Ukraine around the year 2000. It is reportedly manufactured within the Russian Federation but is based almost entirely on Ukrainian technology. Researchers also noted a growing standardization of missiles and increasing similarities among them. This applies in particular to the tail section, the satellite navigation system, and the onboard computer, which are said to be nearly identical to those used in the Iskander and Bastion systems. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported that it had successfully identified all manufacturers of the electronics used in the 3M14 Kalibr, as well as the key managers and designers involved in their production. This information is intended to be used to further tighten the sanctions regime imposed on the Russian Federation.
The Ukrainian side currently possesses what is likely the world’s most comprehensive knowledge of Russia’s major weapons systems. Data collected, among other sources, from equipment debris on the battlefield or from weapons systems used in long-range attacks allows for a fairly precise assessment of the state of the Russian defense industry, the effectiveness of Western sanctions, and, in certain cases, even an estimation of the production capabilities and stockpiles of the Russian military-industrial complex and the Russian Armed Forces. Information on the technologies employed in specific weapons systems is of inestimable value to Western defense contractors, including manufacturers of radars, jamming and electronic warfare systems, and air defense systems.
For this reason, the knowledge gathered by the Ukrainians could serve as an excellent bargaining chip in dealings between defense companies in both countries and between the intelligence services of Ukraine and NATO member states.
Voluntary military training in Romania
The Romanian government has passed a law introducing an expanded voluntary military training program as part of a broader effort to modernize defense and rebuild the reserve forces. The new program replaces the previous one-week training model with a four-month course and offers participants the opportunity to transition to full-time military service. The program is open to men and women aged 18–35 who have not previously served in the military. It has been designed to be financially attractive: volunteers are to receive 400–600 euros per month, along with free housing, meals, medical care, and equipment. The goal is to rejuvenate the aging reserve corps and fill personnel shortages, particularly among officers and specialists. Romania abolished compulsory military service in 2007 and has no plans to reinstate it, so recruitment remains both a strategic necessity and a challenge. The bill still requires parliamentary approval and is part of a broader package of defense reforms.
This initiative acknowledges that simply increasing spending and purchasing modern equipment will not be enough if there are not enough people capable of operating it. Romania is not returning to full conscription like the Baltic states or Finland, nor is it sticking to a purely professional model; instead, it is choosing a “third way” – a voluntary, well-paid program to build up the reserve force. Attractive pay rates (400–600 euros is a substantial amount in Romania, especially in poorer provinces) suggest that the government is counting on economic incentives rather than a patriotic surge. Two risks are worth monitoring: whether parliament will pass the bill quickly, and whether the actual influx of volunteers will meet expectations, as interest in military service has been limited so far. From a regional perspective, Romania is part of a trend in which frontline states view a large, trained reserve as a deterrent just as important as military equipment.
Assessment of hybrid operations around airports in Denmark in 2025
The Danish Defense Command (Forsvarskommandoen) has prepared an assessment of military operations in response to drones entering Danish airspace between September 22 and October 6, 2025. The document, published on June 19, 2026, states – based on soldiers’ reports and technical data – that incidents involving drones did indeed occur in several cases. However, the report does not determine where the drones came from or who was controlling them, and the military itself admits that it lacked the necessary capabilities to counter such incidents.
The crisis that took place in Denmark in late September and early October shocked the public. It is possible that the public’s perception of the incident was also influenced by events in Poland in September 2025, when more than a dozen unidentified drones were reported, some of which were shot down by allied fighter jets. The Danish report, however, highlights the difficulties associated with systematically identifying such incidents and points to the inability to unequivocally identify the perpetrators. Doubts have also arisen as to whether some of the reports of drone sightings were the result of misinterpretation of observed phenomena, a figment of the imagination, or the effect of growing public panic.
Criminal case in Lithuania against an FSB officer
The Lithuanian prosecutor’s office has filed an indictment with the court against an officer of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), accused of organizing intelligence activities on Lithuanian territory. He will be tried in absentia. According to investigators, between 2014 and 2020, he organized and coordinated the activities of an intelligence network focused on gathering information about strategic facilities, state institutions, the border security system, social events, and individuals participating in various public initiatives. If convicted, he faces up to 15 years in prison.
The case is linked to two Lithuanian citizens who were previously convicted of collaborating with Russian intelligence and were allegedly recruited by the defendant. One of them was Aleksėjus Greičius, who was sentenced to four years in prison. His task was to organize cultural and social events in Lithuania that were financed in whole or in part by an FSB officer, and then to gather information about the participants, photograph and film the events, and pass the collected materials on to the Russian officer. Greičius was a public figure and served as the managing director of the Baltic Youth Association “Juvenis.” The second person convicted was Mindaugas Tunikaitis, who received a sentence of 1.5 years in prison. He was responsible for gathering information on state institutions and other sites of interest to Russian intelligence. He photographed infrastructure, collected data on officials and participants in public events, obtained publications, and disseminated the specified materials. He lived near the border with the Kaliningrad Oblast and regularly traveled to Russia, where he met with an FSB officer.
Russia – FSB: intensification of counterintelligence activities – a series of detentions for treason
On June 15, the FSB announced the detention and arrest of a resident of the Orenburg Oblast (born in 2008) who had been collecting data on the region’s critical infrastructure facilities on behalf of the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for the purpose of planning drone strikes. The detainee was charged under Article 275 (treason). It was confirmed that contact with the Ukrainian agent was initiated by the suspect. That same week, the FSB in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast detained a citizen of the Russian Federation (RF) who was assisting Ukrainian intelligence services by financing an organization affiliated with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
The series of FSB detentions involves increasingly younger citizens – the suspect from the Orenburg Oblast was born in 2008 – which indicates that Ukrainian military intelligence is successfully penetrating Russian provinces through digital channels and recruiting individuals without access to classified information, solely for infrastructure reconnaissance. For Russian counterintelligence (FSB, Third Directorate/Service), this poses a systemic challenge: open-source intelligence and the mass use of citizens as “OSINT data collectors” are difficult to block using traditional counterintelligence methods.
Russia – fifth adjustment to the Armed Forces authorized strength – 2.39 million soldiers
June 12, 2026. Putin signed a new decree increasing the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,399,130 positions, including 1,510,000 professional soldiers. This is the fifth such adjustment since the start of the full-scale invasion – the previous decree, dated March 4, 2026, set the authorized strength at 2,391,770 personnel. Compared to pre-war levels (1,902,758 in 2017), the military’s authorized strength has increased by more than 496,000 positions. The decree obligates the government to provide additional budgetary funds to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
The systematic increase in authorized strength every few months signals not only the replenishment of losses but also a structural expansion of the forces even beyond the context of the Ukrainian front. For analysts, the key factor is not the headcount itself, but the pace at which it is being filled – if Russia maintains recruitment targets above the level of losses, the Kremlin will gain the resources to build reserve strike forces capable of operating in directions other than Ukraine.
Belarus – revision of the Armed Forces Development Plan for 2026–2030 – Lukashenko outlines priorities
On June 18, Lukashenko heard a report on revisions to the Plan for the Construction and Development of the Armed Forces of Belarus for 2026–2030 and approved the proposed changes. The meeting was attended by: State Secretary of the Security Council Wolfowicz, Defense Minister Chrenin, GRU Chief Kuprijaniuk, Commander of Special Operations Forces Iljiukiewicz, and Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Lukjanowicz. Lukashenko identified three priorities: improving the effectiveness of air defense, countering UAVs, and training officers.
The fact that the plan is being revised mid-year and involves the full civilian-military security apparatus suggests a response to new threats, including the incident involving a Ukrainian bus near Bryansk. The emphasis on air defense and counter-drone operations as priorities confirms that Minsk recognizes a real capability gap — Belarusian air defense systems (S-300 PS) are outdated and cannot cope with massive attacks by FPV drones or modern air assault systems, which, according to Belarusian and Russian analysts, constitutes a systemic weakness of the entire western flank of the Union State.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- We encourage you to read the analysis by EFI expert Rafał Kamiński titled “Snipers in Ukraine: An Evolution in Significance and a Revolution in Operations” (in Polish). The author demonstrates how the war in Ukraine and the rapid development of unmanned technologies have led to a profound transformation in the role of snipers—from traditional fire support to specialized reconnaissance missions and the precision neutralization of high-value targets. This analysis makes a significant contribution to the discussion on the development of training, organization, and equipment for NATO’s armed forces in the context of the modern battlefield.
- Could Russia become the target of the active measures it has itself been using against other countries for years? In the analysis “Doxing as an Example of an Active Measure Against the Russian Federation” (in Polish), Dr. Sebastian Bojemski, an EFI expert, demonstrates how the disclosure of internal Russian documents is becoming a tool of information pressure, exposing the Kremlin’s weaknesses and the growing role of cyber operations in contemporary international competition.
- An article by Marek Kozubal titled “Two Laws at Odds: Who Will Go to the Front in the Event of War, and Who Will Join Civil Defense?” (in Polish), dedicated to the challenges associated with organizing and utilizing the state’s human resources for defense and civil protection. The author refers to a report by the Eastern Flank Institute and the Sobieski Institute titled “Universal State Service: A Program for Building Human Reserves for the Security of the Republic of Poland” (in Polish), which proposes the creation of a shared database enabling the effective utilization of citizens’ skills for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces, Civil Defense, and other institutions responsible for security.
