We encourage you to read the review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
The European Commission has approved Romania and Bulgaria’s applications to the SAFE program
Romania and Bulgaria’s applications to the SAFE program, worth EUR 16.7 billion and EUR 3.3 billion, respectively, have been approved by the European Commission. The first tranches of cash obtained under low-interest loans are expected to be disbursed in March 2026. On the Romanian side, 75% of the funds will be used to purchase new weapons, and 25% to support “dual-use” infrastructure investments, including motorways.
Both countries sought relatively quick processing of their SAFE loan applications due to significant budget constraints in relation to the modernization needs of their armed forces and infrastructure. Therefore, the Commission’s quick approval is seen as a success that may accelerate the purchasing decisions made by Bucharest and Sofia.
Ukrainian parliament approves nomination for new defense minister
The Verkhovna Rada has approved the nomination of Mykhailo Fedorov, former minister of digital transformation, as Ukraine’s new defense minister. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Ministry of Digital Transformation headed by Fedorov has been deeply involved in the defense operation, which was reflected in particularly high activity in the field of unmanned systems (e.g., the creation of the “Brave 1” cluster) and the widespread implementation of battlefield management systems. The former defense minister and former prime minister, Denys Shmyhal, has taken on the role of deputy prime minister and energy minister.
The 34-year-old Fedorov is the youngest defense minister in Ukraine’s history and is taking over the ministry at a particularly important moment, with increasing budgetary and personnel constraints within the state’s defense system and increased international pressure to end the conflict. Fedorov is considered one of Ukraine’s most effective officials and has announced the continued widespread implementation of unmanned systems and battlefield automation. At the same time, he faces a number of challenges related to maintaining continuity of operations on the front line, maintaining personnel reserves, and continuing to obtain the necessary foreign support. In this regard, the new minister has announced an urgent “in-depth audit” of the actions of his predecessors in the ministry.
The Czech president discussed the transfer of tactical aircraft in Kyiv
Czech President Petr Pavel visited Kyiv on January 17. During his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, they discussed, among other things, the potential transfer of L-159 training aircraft to Ukraine. These would be additionally equipped with relatively inexpensive missiles and cannons, ensuring their effectiveness in combating unmanned aerial vehicles. Aircraft of this type were used in the past by the Iraqi Air Force during operations against the Islamic State. During the meeting, Pavel also offered the possibility of supplying early warning radars.
The visit of the Czech head of state, a former officer known for his strong support for Kyiv in the ongoing conflict, contrasts with the line taken by the new Czech cabinet, which wants to reduce Prague’s political involvement in helping Ukraine. At the same time, given the benefits gained by the Czech arms industry through supplies and services to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Pavel-Zelensky talks can be seen as an attempt by the Czech Republic to strike a balance in terms of further support for Kyiv.
[Update, 21.01.2026: The Czech government has denied the possibility of transferring the aircraft to Ukraine, stating that their service life allows them to continue serving in the Czech Air Force.]
GRU intelligence activities in Latvia
The Latvian prosecutor’s office has decided to bring charges against a 39-year-old man arrested in October last year on suspicion of collaborating with Russian military intelligence (GRU). The accused, a manager in the construction industry, used his professional position to gather information on Latvian military facilities and their modernization, security systems, NATO contingent personnel, and the types of weapons used. Additional information also indicates that he conducted intelligence reconnaissance on civilian aviation infrastructure; in this case, the activities concerned Spilve Airport, located a few kilometers from Riga.
The case of the man cooperating with Russian military intelligence was uncovered by the Latvian Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD, Militārais izlūkdienests un drošība). This is a formation specializing in intelligence activities for the Latvian Armed Forces, also performing counterintelligence functions. In such a complex espionage situation, involving both military and civilian facilities, there is close cooperation between the MIDD and the Latvian Internal Security Service (VDD, Valsts drošības dienests). It is worth noting that in early 2025, the VDD also detected another case of reconnaissance of critical infrastructure using technical devices such as camera traps and cameras, without any clear link to any identified special service. In this case, the persons detained were citizens of Estonia and Ukraine. The very fact of conducting reconnaissance of critical infrastructure, as well as military infrastructure, has already become a noticeable trend in European countries. Serious incidents of this kind have occurred primarily in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Germany.
New military training ground in Lithuania near the border with Poland and Belarus
A new military training ground will be built in Lithuania, in the town of Kopciowo (Kapčiamiestis), near the border with Poland and Belarus. The Lithuanian Armed Forces consider this location to be the best from a military point of view. According to the military, the site is located in the area of the so-called “Suwalki Gap,” near the Polish-Belarusian border.
The training ground has been designed as a training facility for a brigade-sized unit, i.e., approximately 4,000 soldiers. The area is to be divided into two zones. The first, located in the western part, closer to the Polish border, is intended for shooting and combat training. The second zone covers an area for maneuvering and tactical operations. Lithuania intends to invest around €100 million in this infrastructure. Relatively nearby is the still-expanding and intensively used Belarusian training ground in Hoża (Гожа).
Sweden is investing in the development of air defense to better protect its territory
Sweden plans to allocate over SEK 15 million (approximately EUR 1.3 million) to the construction of new air defense solutions. An important criterion of the strategy is to protect not only military facilities, but also the civilian population and critical infrastructure (CI), such as bridges. The system is to include many mobile units, deployed throughout the country depending on the nature of the threats.
The changes in Sweden’s current strategy result from continuous observation of the war in Ukraine and the changing conditions of combat against missile attacks, unmanned aerial systems, and other air threats. These decisions reflect analyses of the Swedish army’s capabilities and the identification of existing gaps in the defense of the civilian population and critical infrastructure. The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict clearly shows that ensuring access to electricity and water is becoming a very important factor in survival and maintaining public support in the event of a protracted war.
Modernization of Russian strategic nuclear forces
Russia is preparing to test a new generation of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2026, which are to replace the aging Topol-M missiles deployed in silos in Tatishchev and on mobile launchers in Teykovo. The new systems, probably linked to the “Kedr” program, are to be available in silo and mobile versions and carry “second-generation” hypersonic guided warheads, different from the existing “Avangard,” which indicates the development of a new class of strategic weapons. This is in line with the 2027-2036 State Armament Program, which prioritizes strategic nuclear forces, missile defense, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems, responding to the degradation of conventional capabilities and preparing for a potential conflict with NATO in Europe.
The new ICBM with second-generation hypersonic warheads shifts the center of gravity of Russian deterrence even further toward “escalation dominance” — the ability to deliver a difficult-to-intercept, rapid-response strike against targets in Europe and the US. For NATO, this means accelerating the modernization of early warning systems, missile defense, and command infrastructure hardening, as Russia’s nuclear triad becomes relatively stronger in the face of a degraded conventional component, lowering the threshold for Moscow to consider selective, “signaling” use of nuclear weapons in a European crisis.
Russian artificial intelligence and the autonomization of combat systems
The 2027–2036 State Armament Program prioritizes the integration of AI into strategic nuclear forces, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, command systems, and selected weapons platforms. The creation of an “AI headquarters,” announced by Putin in November 2025, is intended to accelerate development, although Russia remains technologically behind the West, including in the production of modern chips. Russia compensates for these shortcomings through gray imports of equipment and the integration of AI into specific systems – from drones with automatic target tracking, through the Su 57 with a “virtual co-pilot” and modernized Tor M2U systems, to potentially autonomous nuclear delivery vehicles such as Poseidon.
Russia’s AI strategy is clearly asymmetrical: technically backward, but focused on the rapid implementation of risky military applications, including in the nuclear domain. The integration of AI into strategic strike systems and autonomous delivery vehicles—while dependent on the smuggling of Western components and suffering from a shortage of personnel—increases the risk of errors, unintended escalation, and a partial loss of control over the decision-making cycle for the use of force. For NATO, this means that Russian experiments with AI must be treated as a destabilizing factor, especially in the areas of early warning and nuclear command.
Personnel changes at the operational level in the Russian army
The week brought a series of dismissals of Russian operational commanders, formally presented as personnel rotation, but in fact linked to failed offensives and high losses. Major General Sukhrab Akhmedov, known as the “commander of the meat grinder,” lost his position again—this time as deputy commander of the Russian Navy’s Coastal and Ground Forces—after unsuccessful attacks near Dobropillia, where three marine brigades suffered heavy losses. The dismissals of Col. Ruslan Nazarenko (19th Motorized Division), Robert Zykov (429th Division) in the Orikhiv and Huliaipole area, and Major General Oleksandr Nilov of the 90th Armored Division “for failure to complete the task” complete the picture of the crisis at the command level.
The series of dismissals shows that the Kremlin is trying to cover up a systemic doctrinal problem—dependence on “human wave” tactics and frontal assaults—by pointing to successive scapegoats among the commanders. Replacing some officers with others within the same operational framework does not remove the cause of the losses, but deepens the culture of fear and conformity among the officer corps, discouraging tactical initiative and critical evaluation of orders, which in the long run degrades the quality of Russian command at the operational-tactical level.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- Ambassador Bartosz Cichocki, member of the IWF Program Council, gave an interview to editor Dariusz Rosiak in the podcast “Raport o stanie świata” (Report on the State of the World). The conversation concerned recent personnel changes in the Ukrainian government and security structures. We encourage you to listen to the entire conversation on the “Raport o stanie świata” podcast website.
- IWF Senior Fellow Col. (ret.) Łukasz Paczesny participated in the “Kierunek Polska” Forum, during which he discussed building the Polish state’s resilience to hybrid threats. We encourage you to watch the full discussion on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBjfm4tSM-A. The main points of the discussion can be found on the IWF website: https://wschodniaflanka.pl/iwf-podczas-forum-kierunek-polska/
