We invite you to read this round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Another drone intrusion into Romanian airspace
In the early hours of the night of 15–16 August 2026, a Spanish F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, on a NATO Air Policing mission from the 57th Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, shot down a drone which, at 4.44 am, had entered Romanian airspace from the direction of Moldova, approximately 24 km north of Galați. The aircraft established radar contact with the target and, after receiving authorisation to engage it, shot down the drone at 5.01 am – 17 minutes after it was detected – over uninhabited terrain between the villages of Băleni and Cudalbi in the Galați County. The air alert for the county was lifted at 5.20 am. Acting Minister of National Defence Radu Miruța congratulated the Spanish pilots and the Romanian command centre staff, emphasising that Romania defends its airspace alongside its allies. This was the fourth drone shot down over Romania in 2026. The incident occurred just three days after two Spanish F-18s were scrambled in response to another aerial object detected near the border with Ukraine, which spent around 12 minutes in Romanian airspace before returning to Ukrainian territory.
There is a growing frequency and scale of incidents involving not only Romania but also Moldova – a non-NATO country (albeit governed by a pro-Western administration) whose airspace is becoming a de facto transit corridor for strike drones heading for Ukraine or deliberately testing the Alliance’s response. The fact that the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled its ambassador from Moscow in direct response to a drone explosion on its own territory suggests that hybrid pressure on the area surrounding Ukraine is beginning to have tangible diplomatic consequences even beyond the borders of NATO member states.
Fire at a Bulgarian ammunition factory
On 10 August 2026, shortly before 11:00, at the private EMCO ammunition factory in Belica (Trjawna municipality, central Bulgaria), a fire broke out in a fuel delivery lorry, which spread to one of the ammunition depots, triggering a series of explosions and secondary detonations lasting several hours. According to local and regional authorities, there were no fatalities or injuries. Around 300 people were evacuated from the site by bus, and neighbouring villages were evacuated as a precautionary measure on the orders of the Minister of the Interior, Ivan Demerdzhiev. The fire in the woods surrounding the site was extinguished by the morning of the following day. Ammunition remains scattered across the factory site and within a radius of approximately 500 metres around it, requiring further neutralisation by the emergency services. The factory owner described the explosion as an accident. An on-site investigation began on 11 August, whilst the causes of the lorry fire remain unexplained for the time being.
EMCO, owned by businessman Emilian Gebrev, is one of Bulgaria’s largest private arms manufacturers, producing 122 mm, 152 and 155 mm artillery shells, rockets for Grad launchers, as well as tank and grenade launcher rounds in both Soviet and NATO standards. Although preliminary findings by the local authorities suggest the incident was accidental (a fire in a delivery lorry), the mere coincidence in timing of two security incidents affecting key Bulgarian defence and energy infrastructure within two days – the explosion of a drone near the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline and a fire at a private munitions plant – is fuelling questions in Bulgaria and the wider region about the resilience of the arms production and distribution chain on the eastern flank.
Slovakia interested in acquiring Czech training aircraft
The Slovak Ministry of Defence, led by Robert Kaliňák, is continuing its efforts to purchase around 12 Czech L-39 Skyfox light combat trainer aircraft manufactured by Aero Vodochody. These are primarily intended for training fighter pilots and practising combat tactics, but could potentially also be used for anti-drone defence. The Minister pointed out that, despite the signing of a contract in 2018 to purchase American F-16s, only eight of the planned 22 Slovak pilots have been trained on them so far, which highlights the need to strengthen the country’s own training capabilities. At present, Slovakia has only two L-39 Albatros aircraft, the predecessors of the Skyfox. The manufacturer, Aero Vodochody, states that the aircraft is suitable for training pilots of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, including the F-16, F-35 and Gripen. A single L-39 Skyfox is priced at around €13 million, although the final cost may rise significantly when training, maintenance and other support services are taken into account. According to reports from August 2026, the Ministry of Defence intends to award this contract – alongside a parallel contract for Czech Pless passive radar systems – without an open tender.
Negotiations regarding the trainer aircraft have been ongoing since April 2025, when Kaliňák, together with the then Czech Defence Minister Jana Černochová, visited the Aero Vodochody facility. Slovakia’s potential purchase of the L-39 Skyfox, considered in conjunction with the contract for the Pless systems without an open tender, fits into the pattern of bilateral industrial and defence integration between the Czech Republic and Slovakia observed by the IWF – for example, the earlier joint venture between CSG and FNSS, based in Slovakia. Critics point out that the concept of using the L-39 to combat drones raises economic concerns: operating the aircraft with a pilot, ground crew and 20 mm cannons remains significantly more expensive than the cheap drones it is designed to counter (costing around 10,000 euros each), and the decision to bypass an open tender for both Czech contracts (Skyfox and Pless) has sparked further political controversy.
Drone intrusion into Latvian airspace
On 14 August 2026, an unidentified unmanned aerial vehicle intruded into Latvian airspace in north-eastern Latvia. The object was detected in the Balvi area, approximately 35 km from the border with Russia. The Latvian National Armed Forces activated response procedures and requested support from NATO’s Baltic Air Policing forces. Italian Eurofighter Typhoons stationed at Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania and Turkish F-16s deployed at Ämari Air Base in Estonia were scrambled to intercept the object. Ultimately, one of the Italian Eurofighters shot down the drone over an uninhabited area. Representatives of the Latvian authorities pointed to the possibility that the drone’s entry into Latvian airspace might have been linked to Russian electronic warfare activities. In particular, a scenario is being considered in which the jamming of navigation signals by Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems may have caused the Ukrainian UAV to deviate from its planned route.
The incident demonstrates the practical functioning of the allied response system to threats in the airspace of the Baltic states. Italian Eurofighters operating from Lithuania and Turkish F-16s from Estonia were deployed to support Latvia, confirming the ability to rapidly deploy NATO forces beyond the borders of the region’s states. This is of particular significance in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, in which the intensive use of drones increases the risk of accidental violations of NATO airspace.
Danish battalion within the NATO structure in Latvia
The Danish Armed Forces have announced that the Danish combat battalion deployed in Latvia has been placed under the command of a multinational NATO brigade. The unit has been integrated into the structure of the brigade commanded by Canada. The contingent forms part of Denmark’s broader commitment on NATO’s eastern flank. Copenhagen had previously decided to deploy nearly 850 troops to Latvia in the second half of 2026, as part of the NATO Force Model. The Danish unit operates within a multinational formation that also includes forces from other NATO countries. Placing the battalion under brigade command means that the Danish battalion can be utilised within the Alliance’s joint planning and command structure, rather than operating solely as a national contingent. The deployment of Danish troops in Latvia forms part of a broader system of NATO’s forward presence on its eastern flank, designed to enhance the Alliance’s capability to conduct defensive operations in the Baltic states.
Placing the battalion under NATO command has operational significance. The Danish unit becomes part of an existing multinational formation, which enhances the scope for its joint use with allied forces. In the event of a crisis, this reduces the need to establish a joint command structure. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, the geographical deployment of Danish troops is of particular significance. The battalion’s presence in Latvia increases the number of NATO countries directly involved in the defence of the Baltic states. A potential conflict in this theatre would therefore be multinational in nature from the outset. From Denmark’s perspective, this is also a means of enhancing the interoperability and operational experience of its own forces. Operating within a multinational brigade allows the forces to practise command procedures, logistics, reconnaissance and cooperation with units from other NATO countries.
Reform of Sweden’s intelligence system
Sweden is undertaking a reform of its intelligence system, the most significant element of which is the establishment of a new civilian foreign intelligence service (Swedish: Sveriges utrikes underrättelsetjänst – Und). The Riksdag passed legislation on the reform on 13 August 2026, and the new service is due to commence operations on 1 January 2027. However, the reform is not limited to the establishment of Und – the legislative changes also cover the other key institutions of the Swedish intelligence and counter-intelligence system, primarily the military intelligence and security service MUST, the FRA (Swedish: Försvarets radioanstalt), responsible, amongst other things, for electronic intelligence, and Säpo (Swedish: Säkerhetspolisen), the security and counter-intelligence service.
One of the key changes under the reform is the transfer to Und of certain tasks relating to foreign intelligence activities, which were previously carried out by MUST. According to the adopted guidelines, the new institution is to focus on strengthening the capacity to gather intelligence outside the military sphere (see Eastern Flank Review 15 April 2026–21 April 2026) and this does not entail the abolition of military intelligence and counter-intelligence. MUST, which is responsible for these areas, will retain responsibility for military intelligence and security. Interestingly, the reform establishes a new legal framework for the exchange of information between the Und, MUST, FRA and Säpo, including the possibility of accessing specific data held by individual institutions. The new regulations also strengthen Und’s capacity for cooperation with foreign intelligence and security services, including the ability to share specific data with partners and – in strictly defined cases – to grant them direct access to selected information. The reform also expands the scope for utilising open-source intelligence and commercial data (OSINT) and clarifies the legal framework for conducting foreign intelligence activities. Another significant change is the shift in legislation away from the previous term ‘defence intelligence’ (Swedish: försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet) towards the term ‘foreign intelligence’ (Swedish: utrikesunderrättelseverksamhet), which reflects an organisational and functional change across the entire system. The reform is therefore broader in scope than merely the establishment of a new service – it leads to a restructuring of the relationships between Und, MUST, FRA and Säpo, and the creation of a more integrated mechanism for gathering, processing and exchanging information. This change is of particular significance following Sweden’s accession to NATO, as it enhances the country’s capacity to independently gather intelligence on Russia, the military situation in the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic, and to exchange data with allied partners.
The Swedish reform should also be examined by Polish experts specialising in the reform of intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Following extensive analysis, the Swedes decided to establish a new civilian foreign intelligence agency. At the same time, the reform aims to relieve the Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service (MUST) of some of the tasks it has hitherto carried out, and to refocus this institution on tasks related to supporting the rapidly developing Swedish Armed Forces, whilst maintaining Säpo as a separate civilian counter-intelligence service.
Russia – Moscow City Court sentences man to 23 years’ imprisonment for spying for the Polish secret services
On 14 August, the Moscow City Court sentenced Russian citizen Georgy Pirogov to 23 years’ imprisonment for spying for the Polish secret services, finding that he had gathered data on advanced weaponry used in combat operations, including missile systems, as well as personal details of individuals with access to state secrets, according to TASS. The verdict came into force on the same day, and the FSB published a recording of the convicted man’s interrogation.
The severity of the sentence – 23 years’ imprisonment – is one of the harshest penalties handed down in this series of espionage cases and indicates that the Russian judiciary treats the transfer of data on weapon designs as a threat comparable to direct subversion, rather than a mere breach of secrecy. The direct identification of the Polish secret services as the instigators, rather than a vague reference to Western intelligence, is part of a deliberate propaganda strategy in which Russia personalises the intelligence threat around specific countries neighbouring the Eastern Flank, constructing an internal narrative of Poland as an active participant in an information and against Russia, rather than merely a passive logistical base for Ukraine. The publication of the interrogation recording serves the same purpose as a series of earlier FSB operations, namely to maintain within Russian society the impression of a constant intelligence siege, in which Poland is cast alongside Ukraine as a source of threat.
Russia and Syria – a joint memorandum strengthening the military bases at Hmeimim and Tartus
The Russian Foreign Ministry assessed the memorandum of understanding signed with Syria on 9 August as a strengthening of the treaty-based legal framework for its military presence under the new political conditions following the change of government in Damascus, as reported by Kommersant. The document provides for the conversion of facilities at the Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus into joint training and preparation centres, whilst civilian facilities will come under Syrian administration.
The formal legal consolidation of the military presence in Syria, almost a year after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, shows that Moscow has successfully negotiated with the new Syrian authorities to retain its only permanent military foothold in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, despite earlier fears of a complete loss of access to these bases. The distinction between joint training facilities and civilian facilities is a legal manoeuvre allowing the new Syrian authorities to save face in the eyes of their own public, whilst Russia effectively retains its operational capability in the region. Retaining Tartus and Humaymim enables Russia to continue channelling military support to Africa and to maintain a naval presence close to NATO’s southern flank, which complicates the Alliance’s assessment of the dispersion of Russian power-projection capabilities beyond the European theatre.
Belarus – Traffic queues at the borders with Poland and Lithuania grow to over 3,400 vehicles
Belarus’ State Border Committee reported growing traffic queues throughout the week. On August 10, the queue to enter Poland had grown since Friday from approximately 1,400 to 2,200 vehicles, with Polish authorities processing only 27 percent of trucks and 32 percent of passenger cars relative to normal levels over a two-day period. On August 13, European authorities processed only 21 percent of vehicles within a 24-hour period compared to the standard rate. On August 17, the number of vehicles waiting exceeded 3,400, of which more than 2,000 passenger cars were waiting at Terespol, Bobrowniki, and Kuźnica Białostocka, and the Polish side had admitted only 29 percent of vehicles since Friday.
The increase in the queue from 2,200 to over 3,400 vehicles in a single week shows that the problem of border capacity is no longer a stable phenomenon but is accelerating, and the percentage of vehicles cleared—which remains in the range of 21 to 29 percent of the norm—indicates a persistent mismatch between clearance capacity and actual freight traffic, regardless of the day of the week. The systematic, daily publication of this data by BELTA, ONT, and Sputnik Belarus is part of an ongoing information campaign in which Minsk consistently attributes the blame for the paralysis of the transport corridor solely to Polish and Lithuanian capacity limits, never to its own exit clearance procedures. Crucially, the fall surge in freight traffic before the end of the year will place additional strain on an already overburdened system; under the current “Eastern Shield” regime, this will mean further worsening of the backlogs, and each successive week of such data reinforces Minsk’s narrative directed both at its own carriers and at the EU public.
Belarus – The Western Operational Command is testing artificial intelligence in Grodno and Brest to reduce target engagement time
From August 11 to 13, a tactical-special exercise was conducted in the Grodno and Brest regions involving forces and assets for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, firepower, and air defense of the Western Operational Command (WOC), during which domestic radar reconnaissance stations and automated data transmission systems for firepower were tested under field conditions. The Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the ZDO forces, Aleksandr Lavrenov, emphasized the role of automation and artificial intelligence in minimizing the time required to engage a target, and the scenario included active countermeasures against enemy drones.
The location of the exercise—directly in the regions bordering Poland and Lithuania—and the command’s open admission that the goal is to use artificial intelligence to shorten the reconnaissance -to-strike chain, demonstrates that the Belarusian army is deliberately replicating Russian experience in integrating automatic guidance systems—developed during the war with Ukraine—and applying it directly to the western front, rather than limiting it to internal central training grounds. The combination of radar reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and counter-drone measures in a single scenario is a response to the growing number of incidents involving unmanned aerial vehicles over Belarusian territory that have been recorded for months; however, the scale of the solutions being tested—including domestic radar stations—indicates an ambition to build its own, rather than merely importing from Russia, system for detecting and countering drones along the western border. Any reduction in the time it takes to engage a target on the Belarusian side directly shortens the defensive reaction time in the event of a potential border incident, making this exercise more significant than most of the routine ZDO maneuvers of previous months.
The Chinese-Belarusian Swift Eagle 2026 airborne exercises are kicking off in Hubei in parallel with Streamitielny Orzeł
On August 12, at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force training center in Hubei Province, an opening ceremony was held for the fourth edition of the Sino-Belarusian airborne military exercises Swift Eagle 2026, which resumed after a hiatus of several years. The exercises focused on joint counterterrorism operations in urban areas, including reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, the seizure and retention of a target, as well as its neutralization and defense, according to the Chinese Ministry of Defense. Wang Yanan, editor-in-chief of Aerospace Knowledge, assessed that Belarus will likely use Il-76 aircraft for low-altitude airdrops, while China may deploy Y-9 or Y-20 transport aircraft. The exercise is taking place in the same theater and during the same time frame as the Streamitielnyj Orioł 2026 tactical maneuvers, which have been ongoing for a week and for which a Belarusian special operations contingent arrived in China on August 12.
The fact that two separate Belarusian-Chinese exercises—one an airborne operation and the other involving special operations forces—are taking place simultaneously in the same Hubei province represents a qualitatively new element in Minsk’s military cooperation with Beijing, as it demonstrates a shift from isolated, one-off maneuvers to the ability to conduct parallel, multi-threaded training cycles in a single theater. The resumption of the Swift Eagle series after a hiatus of several years—and, moreover, with an open expert discussion on specific types of transport aircraft—suggests that both sides view this cooperation as a return to the regularity that existed before the hiatus, rather than as a new, one-time experiment. The training profile—urban counterterrorism operations—aligns with Belarusian experiences in protecting critical infrastructure against drones, as described in previous weeks, indicating a consistent direction in the development of both armies’ capabilities. Significantly, Belarusian special operations forces and airborne troops are committing substantial resources to China in a single week, which extends their operational potential toward Asia at the expense of their availability on the western front, at least for the duration of both training cycles.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- The Director of the Eastern Flank Institute, Dr Piotr Woyke, commented to the Lithuanian outlet LRT.lt on the violation of Polish airspace by a Russian missile, emphasising the need for a firm response from NATO and the strengthening of the eastern flank. The statement is available via this link.
