We encourage you to read the review of the past week in Central and Eastern European countries:
Will Romania acquire H225M Caracal helicopters?
Romania plans to acquire an unspecified number of H225M Caracal multi-role helicopters and H175 medium transport helicopters from the French division of Airbus. The purchase plans were to be included in an application for favorable credit from the EU’s SAFE program—Bucharest submitted one of the largest applications among all member states. The total value of the contract would amount to approximately EUR 1 billion. The final outcome of the contract is to be linked to the issue of the location of production at the IAR plant in Brașov, Romania. An alternative purchase option remains the American Black Hawk helicopters manufactured by Lockheed Martin, but for now they do not have such a favorable financing structure.
Romania is trying to pursue a balanced procurement policy in order to maintain good relations with both the United States and Western European countries. The tradition of cooperation between the Romanian and French aviation sectors dates back to the 1970s, and Paris is actively seeking to leverage the long-standing ties between the two countries to promote its active role in the region. Given the growing importance of the defense sector in Romanian public debate, it seems likely that at least part of the production of Airbus helicopters will be located in Romania.
Bulgarian political crisis hits technical modernization of armed forces
Outgoing Bulgarian Defense Minister Atanas Zapryanov warned that the prolonged parliamentary deadlock resulting from the lack of a stable majority is beginning to affect the schedule for the technical modernization of the armed forces. An example of this is the lack of legislative action that would allow for the payment of the next tranche (approximately €42 million) for TRML 3D radars contracted from the French company Thales.
The prolonged political crisis in Bulgaria is also affecting modernization programs due to the growing dependence of defense policy on external financial support, including loans obtained at the EU level. The deepening instability of defense funding may be an obstacle both in relations with Brussels and in Sofia’s fulfillment of its NATO commitments.
Czech and Slovak prime ministers jointly discuss potential deployment of troops to Ukraine
During a joint press conference on January 8, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico jointly declared their opposition to the potential deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of a stabilization mission to support the implementation of a ceasefire. In the opinion of both leaders, the presence of European soldiers in Ukraine would not create conditions for long-term peace. The Czech prime minister pointed out that most European countries, with the exception of the UK and France, have not yet declared their readiness to take such a step.
The prime ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia reflect the prevailing mood in their countries, and especially among their own electorates, which strongly reject deeper involvement in Ukraine’s defensive war with Russia. At the same time, both the Czech and Slovak governments will continue to maneuver on the issue of military support for Ukraine due to the significant profits generated by the arms industry, particularly in the supply of ammunition and the repair of weapons.
Lithuania purchases CV90 infantry fighting vehicles
Lithuania has approved a contract for the delivery of 100 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. The project will be carried out as part of a joint order, in which Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Estonia are also participating. This form of cooperation aims to optimize the production process and deepen defense cooperation between these countries.
The signing of the agreement means that the first deliveries will reach the Lithuanian army as early as 2028. Importantly, the Lithuanians have negotiated the possibility of producing selected technical components directly in their own country.
The CV90, manufactured by the British-Swedish company BAE Systems Hägglunds, is a tracked vehicle characterized by high mobility and firepower. Currently, these machines are in service in Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and the Netherlands, among others, and other countries (e.g., Slovakia) are planning to purchase them.
It can be noted that the CV90 is slowly becoming the European standard for modern infantry fighting vehicles. The newly ordered units will be equipped with the advanced Israeli Iron Fist active protection system from the Israeli company Elbit Systems.
The Swedish counterintelligence service Säpo arrested a man suspected of espionage against the Swedish Armed Forces
In early January, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) arrested a 33-year-old man from the Mellansverige region in Stockholm. The case is related to suspicion of espionage on Swedish territory over the past few years. The arrested man had connections with the Swedish Armed Forces, which could be of significant importance from the point of view of foreign intelligence services.
At this stage of the investigation, there is only unofficial confirmation that the detained man collaborated with Russian intelligence services. At the same time, it is known that the Swedish suspect was a specialist in one of the IT companies that carried out contracts for the Swedish military between 2018 and 2022. In subsequent years, he was to operate his own cyber consulting company, offering offensive cyber services.
Sweden remains a particularly attractive country for the activities of Russian intelligence services. In recent years, there have been several spectacular failures of the Swedish security system. In November 2022, a Russian couple, who had been living in Sweden since the early 1990s, were arrested. They ran a business related to modern technologies that could also be used in the military sector. Their arrest was exceptional in nature, involving Black Hawk helicopters, military forces, and police.
Also in November 2022, two brothers of Iranian origin, Peyman (born 1980) and Payam (born 1987) Kia, were accused of many years of cooperation with the Russian military intelligence service GU/GRU. The older brother was an employee of the Swedish military intelligence service MUST, from where he allegedly stole classified documents for many years. It should be noted that MUST also plays a key role in military counterintelligence within the armed forces. The exposure of an agent within the structures of this service is a serious signal — on the one hand, it testifies to the high effectiveness of the Russian services, and on the other, it exposes significant weaknesses in the Swedish security system. The second brother was responsible for organization, logistics, and maintaining contacts with GRU officers.
Additionally, in May 2025, a Swedish diplomat was arrested in Stockholm on suspicion of collaborating with Russian intelligence. Due to the nature of the case, most of its details remain confidential.
Reform of the FR Personnel Reserve System – legalization of permanent mobilization outside the threshold of war – regulations for 2026
In October 2025, a law was passed changing the status of reservists in the Russian Federation (RF). Reservists – persons voluntarily enlisted in the mobilization reserve under a contract with the RF Ministry of Defense – can now be assigned to “special duties” – peacetime exercises, as well as tasks related to the protection of critical infrastructure: power plants, fuel depots, pipelines, railway junctions, refineries, and telecommunications. The President of the RF issued regulations directing reservists to such “calls” from December 29, 2025.
Reservists are called up for a maximum of 6 months per year and are limited to the specified region of residence of the reservist, who is rewarded for such attendance with additional remuneration, job retention, and salary in the civilian sector. The BARS (Combat Reserve of the Country) system currently includes approximately 30,000 people with professional military training. The structure has an extensive training infrastructure and staff. Reservists are recruited in the regions through local military offices and commissions. The “special call-up” mechanism allows the Russian Federation to flexibly direct human resources to military tasks outside its borders or in “neighboring” countries without formally announcing mobilization.
The reform represents a shift from a crisis-based mobilization model to a permanent model anchored in administrative structures. The change transforms the BARS reserve from an instrument for use in emergencies to an integral part of the security system. The operational potential of such a solution is an efficient military structure that can be quickly scaled and deployed for tasks outside the country, while maintaining the appearance of “military exercises” below the threshold of war. Russia formalizes its ability to maintain military engagement in multiple operational and strategic directions without formal mobilization, which reduces public resistance in Russia and makes it difficult to assess the Kremlin’s real intentions.
Civilian production in Russia’s arms complex exceeded 30% at the end of 2025
On January 11, 2026, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, submitted a report to President Putin confirming the achievement of a key indicator of diversification of the arms complex (OPK). The share of civilian products in OPK production exceeded 30% for the first time, which is in line with the path set out by Putin in 2016 (target for 2025: 30%, for 2030: 50%). The increase in civilian production has been steady: over the last three years, the annual growth rate has been 10%. This mainly concerns rail transport, construction machinery, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics, and telecommunications equipment. A total of 3.8 million people work in the OPK, 800,000 of whom have been employed in the last three years. Manturov emphasized that the growth in civilian capabilities took place in parallel with the full execution of orders for the military. In 2025, 1,000 new or modernized weapon systems were transferred to the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov pointed out that the export portfolio of Russian weapons has grown to $70 billion.
Reaching 30% is a turning point in Russia’s long-term strategy. The diversification of the OPK is not a traditional type of arms conversion (as in the USSR), but a Russian strategy to build technological autonomy and avoid sanctions. Arms companies are used for so-called “dual-use production.” In this model, military technologies are transferred to civilian products and vice versa, which facilitates the procurement of components. Russia has applied a model of organic integration of the arms industry into all major civilian projects (railways, network expansion, medicine), which allows for broader financial support for the OPK outside the Ministry of Defense budget. After the potential end of the war, this structure will remain, and the OPK will function as a hybrid technical conglomerate—dual-use. The main uncertain element of this concept is whether Russia will be able to maintain international access to the materials, components, and technologies necessary for the production of both segments—military and civilian.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (IWF):
- Michał Dworczyk, Chairman of the IWF Program Council, gave an interview to RMF FM (in Polish), in which he discussed, among other things, the rebuilding of personnel reserves for the Polish Armed Forces and referred to the Institute’s report published in June entitled “Universal State Service. Program for building personnel reserves for the security of the Republic of Poland” (in Polish).
- We encourage you to read the analysis of the Russian strike on Lviv – OPFOR ANALYSIS – ballistic attack with “Oresznik” (in Polish), authored by IWF expert Lt. Col. (ret.) Maciej Korowaj.
