We invite you to read this round-up of the past week in Central and Eastern Europe:
Agreement between Bulgaria, Romania and Spain on air patrol missions
The air forces of Bulgaria, Romania and Spain have signed a trilateral technical agreement enabling cross-border NATO Air Policing operations (airspace patrols), the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence has announced. The agreement expands on the 2021 bilateral agreement between Bulgaria and Romania, bringing Spain on board. As part of NATO’s integrated air and missile defence system, Spanish fighter aircraft stationed in Romania will be able – if necessary – to carry out airspace protection missions over both Romania and Bulgaria.
The trilateral Bulgaria–Romania–Spain agreement represents a further step towards a flexible, shared air defence system on the south-eastern flank, reducing the dependence of each country in the region on its own limited air assets. The mechanism is based on the expansion of an existing bilateral agreement and demonstrates a maturing model of regional operational integration: further countries (Spain, as an ally from outside the region) are joining the previously established bilateral framework, rather than creating parallel structures.
Drone intrusion into Bulgarian airspace
On 8 August 2026, at 8.10 am, a drone entered Bulgarian airspace and exploded approximately 100 metres inside the country’s territory, near the town of General Toshevo on the border with Romania, in close proximity to the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline. Prime Minister Rumen Radev announced following an emergency meeting of the Security Council that the drone had crashed in a field. The area has been cordoned off and no casualties or damage to infrastructure have been reported. According to a preliminary analysis of the wreckage provided by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, the drone is ‘most likely’ a Maya-type dummy, widely used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence stated that, at this stage, there are no grounds to regard the incident as a deliberate act. The origin of the drone remains unconfirmed, and the aircraft was not detected by either Romanian or Bulgarian systems. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov announced that, since 31 July – in light of the situation in Romania – airspace surveillance in the region has been stepped up, with additional air defence systems, Cougar helicopters and Su-25 aircraft being deployed there, alongside the installation of additional radar stations.
As announced by Radev, the matter is to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council, at which reports on the incidents will be presented not only by Bulgaria, but also by Poland and Romania. The incident on 8 August, regardless of the drone’s final identification, exposes – according to local commentators – a genuine gap in Bulgaria’s system for detecting low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles, confirmed by the failure to detect it by both national systems and the allied centre in Torrejón. The scale and frequency of airspace violations on the eastern flank have reached a level requiring intervention at both national and allied levels. The discrepancy evident in the Bulgarian political debate between calls for investment in domestic production of low-cost anti-drone systems and the government’s more cautious, ambiguous communication may become the subject of further political disputes concerning security policy.
The Czech Republic announces a reduction in military activity outside its borders
The Czech Government has proposed reducing the maximum number of troops the country may deploy abroad (including on NATO’s eastern flank) over the next two years, from 2,000 to 1,600. The change is contained in a draft bill on overseas military missions submitted to parliament; the government did not provide specific justification in the document, but the Ministry of Defence has stated that the lower limit is due to budgetary constraints and the fact that the current ceiling has never been fully utilised – in May this year, 427 Czech soldiers were stationed in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The new legal framework would also allow for the possible deployment of Czech forces in Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland, depending on NATO’s needs. The draft also provides for a radical reduction in the number of Ukrainian soldiers trained in the Czech Republic – from 800 to 100 (last year, 564 people were trained) – whilst increasing the number of Czech instructors training Ukrainian forces outside the EU (from 40 to 60) and the number of soldiers protecting Czech diplomatic missions in Ukraine (from 20 to 30). The Czech contribution to the KFOR mission in Kosovo is also set to be reduced (from 50 to 25 by 2028) as is that to the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 200 to 15), whilst the number of military instructors in Kenya and Mauritania is set to increase (to 50 in each country). The government estimates the cost of overseas military operations at up to 2.542 billion CZK next year and 2.437 billion CZK in 2028. The Senate Defence Committee is due to discuss the draft next week.
The proposal to lower the limit, justified by the underutilisation of the current ceiling and budgetary constraints, represents a further element of cutbacks in Czech defence policy, driven by financial considerations and the political expectations of the governing coalition’s electorate. Particularly significant is the drastic reduction in the number of Ukrainian soldiers being trained (from 800 to 100) at a time when other countries on the eastern flank and in Scandinavia are stepping up their military-industrial cooperation with Kyiv. However, the reduction in Czech support for Ukraine is one of the Czech government’s key priorities in the area of foreign and security policy.
The development of Sweden’s psychological defence in times of war and peace
Sweden is consistently strengthening its psychological defence as an integral part of its total defence concept. Last week, Sweden’s first psychological defence strategy was widely discussed. The document focuses on society’s resilience to foreign interference, disinformation and influence operations. Its aim is to increase society’s resilience to foreign information interference, disinformation, propaganda and other forms of manipulation that may affect decision-making and social cohesion. Coordination of these activities is the responsibility of the Psychological Defence Agency (Swedish: Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar – MPF), established in 2022, whose tasks include detecting and countering hostile information operations and strengthening the resilience of state institutions, local authorities, businesses and society. The Swedish approach assumes that psychological defence must function both in peacetime and during a crisis or war. It encompasses not only responding to disinformation, but also building awareness of threats, public trust, institutional resilience and the ability to rapidly identify and neutralise attempts at external influence. This forms part of a broader rebuilding of Sweden’s total defence (totalförsvar), which encompasses both military and civil defence in parallel.
The development of Sweden’s psychological defence points to a shift in the perception of hybrid threats – disinformation and influence operations are no longer treated primarily as a communication problem, but as an element of a potential strategic conflict. Of particular significance is the fact that responsibility for information resilience has been distributed across the whole of society: the public administration, the media, the business sector, civil society organisations and citizens. Combined with the expansion of civil defence, this creates a model in which the state’s capacity to wage war also encompasses the maintenance of social cohesion and resilience to information pressure. This is particularly important for Sweden as a new NATO member, whose geographical location and significance for the defence of the Baltic Sea region increase its vulnerability to Russian hybrid operations.
Reform of the conscription system in Denmark
On 3 August 2026, Denmark began implementing its reformed military service system. Around 1,600 conscripts commenced 11 months’ service, replacing the previous four-month model. The reform applies to both men and women, and the new system provides for five months of basic training and six months of operational service, which is intended to enable conscripts to be deployed directly within the armed forces. Specialised training pathways are also being developed, including in the fields of unmanned aerial systems and cyber defence. Denmark intends to gradually increase the number of conscripts undergoing training, thereby strengthening the personnel pool available for mobilisation. The first contingent of over 100 conscripts is due to be deployed to Greenland at the end of August, where, for around a month, they will carry out some of the tasks previously performed by professional soldiers.
The reform marks a qualitative shift in the Danish defence model – moving away from short-term conscript training towards building a genuine pool of personnel capable of carrying out operational tasks and increasing the state’s mobilisation potential. Extending the length of service, including women in the system and developing specialisations allow conscription to be better utilised to address staffing shortages within the armed forces. At the same time, the deployment of conscripts to Greenland demonstrates that the reform is not only aimed at enhancing defence capabilities in Europe, but is also linked to the growing importance of the Arctic and the North Atlantic. Copenhagen’s actions should therefore be seen as part of a broader adaptation of the Danish armed forces to the dual threat posed by Russia in Europe and the growing strategic rivalry in the Arctic.
Baltic Trust 26 exercise in Latvia – integrated anti-drone defence
On 3 August 2026, the international NATO exercise Baltic Trust 26 (BATT26) began at the Sēlija training area in Latvia and will run until 14 August. The exercise focuses on the practical use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (C-UAS) measures. NATO is testing the interoperability of systems from different countries, command procedures and tactics for responding to drone threats. BATT26 is testing the entire C-UAS chain – from target detection and identification, through the transmission of information to the command system, to the neutralisation of the target. The exercise forms part of the LCI-X initiative, which aims to accelerate the deployment of new anti-drone technologies and develop NATO’s layered defence against the mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
BATT26 demonstrates a shift in NATO’s approach to the drone threat – from acquiring individual C-UAS systems to building an integrated, layered defence against the mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The exercise allows for the testing of systems’ interoperability, data exchange and command procedures, as well as the application of lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine to NATO’s operational solutions. It is of particular significance for Latvia given its location on the eastern flank and the growing threat of drones being used against military targets and critical infrastructure.
Russia – personnel changes at the Ministry of Defence and the establishment of unmanned systems forces
On 5 August, during a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, Vladimir Putin announced a package of personnel decisions. Colonel-General Andrei Ivanayev, the former commander of the Eastern Group of Forces, was appointed commander of the Central Military District and the Central Group of Forces. Colonel-General Valery Solodchuk, who had previously commanded the Central Group, took up the newly created post of Deputy Minister of Defence responsible for centralising all rear services under a single authority, and Putin assured him that managing logistical support is now just as important a combat role as commanding on the front line, according to the transcript of the meeting. The acting commander of the Eastern Group has been appointed as its chief of staff, Pyotr Bolgarev. Putin also announced the creation of a new branch of the armed forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces – which will ultimately be headed by Denis Lamin; the decree was published on the Kremlin’s website on 6 August.
The transfer of the commander of the Central Group to the post of Deputy Minister for Rear Services (logistics) is not a demotion; it is a sign that the Kremlin has deemed logistics to be a higher priority than command during the offensive to capture the Donbas. Solodchuk has first-hand knowledge of the real supply bottlenecks on the front line, and his promotion to the ministry means that this experience is now to be applied across the entire army ahead of the Centre-2026 exercise cycle. Ivanayev, transferred from the Eastern Military District to the Central Military District, brings expertise from a sector that has been tested for months in terms of its readiness to deploy forces deep into the continent. The third decision, however, is the most significant. The establishment of a separate branch of the armed forces dedicated to unmanned systems – structurally distinct from the existing branches – signifies that Moscow has ceased to treat drones as an adjunct to artillery or aviation and is beginning to build a fully-fledged vertical structure of command, training and doctrine for them. This signals that, in the coming quarters, the Russian drone presence along NATO’s borders will grow not through the improvisation of line units, but through systematic planning for a new branch of the armed forces.
Russia – Security Council on the protection of critical infrastructure, presentation by Bortnikov
On 7 August, Vladimir Putin held an operational meeting with the permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation devoted to additional anti-terrorist measures to protect critical infrastructure facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks from Ukraine, as reported by the Kremlin. The presentation was delivered by FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov. The meeting was attended by State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, SVR Director Sergei Naryshkin and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, as stated by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in a communiqué following the meeting.
The composition of the participants speaks volumes more than the subject of the meeting itself. This is not a ministerial meeting; it is a gathering in a format reserved for decisions of strategic importance, and the fact that the head of the FSB is briefing the meeting, rather than the Minister of Energy or Industry, shows that the Kremlin classifies the threat to refineries and energy hubs as a counter-intelligence issue, not an infrastructural one. Naryshkin’s presence alongside Bortnikov suggests that the agenda also includes an assessment of foreign support for sabotage operations, rather than solely domestic physical security measures. The inclusion of Novak, who is responsible for the energy sector, in the meeting confirms that, in the second half of 2026, the Russian fuel and energy complex is operating in a state of constant crisis readiness, rather than reacting ad hoc to individual incidents. The scale of the threat to Russia’s energy infrastructure has reached a level at which the Kremlin’s decision-making system treats it on a par with a conventional military threat; this also implies an increase in the readiness of the Russian security services to carry out retaliatory actions against the critical infrastructure of countries supporting Ukraine.
Russia – a series of FSB counter-intelligence operations and the closure of illegal cryptocurrency exchange offices in Moscow-City
During the week of 4–10 August, the FSB announced at least five separate operations, according to the service’s statements. On 4 August, two Russian citizens were detained in Crimea whilst preparing acts of sabotage and terrorism on behalf of the Ukrainian security services; they were found in possession of three combat drones and an improvised explosive device. On 5 August, a person preparing an attack on a Ministry of Defence facility was detained in the Kaluga Oblast. On 6 August, an attack planned by three minors recruited by a Ukrainian organisation was foiled in Primorsky Krai, according to RIA Novosti. On 7 August, in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, nine illegal cryptocurrency exchange points were shut down in the Moscow-City business complex, through which proceeds from telephone scams were being laundered; over 20 people were detained, with a daily turnover of between 1 and 2 million US dollars, as reported by Kommersant. On 10 August, in the Kherson Oblast, an attack on Russian military personnel in Skadovsk using an explosive device disguised as a power bank was foiled.
Five operations in a single week, geographically spread from Crimea through Kaluga to Primorsky Krai, demonstrate that the FSB is deliberately maintaining the impression of a constant, multi-directional sabotage threat as a justification for sustaining a heightened counter-intelligence regime in the interior of the country. The Moscow-Sity case is qualitatively different from the others, as it does not concern physical sabotage but rather the financial infrastructure supporting telephone scams targeting ordinary citizens, including pensioners; its link to Ukrainian handlers allows the FSB to combine, within a single narrative, the protection of state security with the protection of citizens’ wallets. The exploitation of minors in the Coastal Region as targets for subversive recruitment signals that Russian counter-intelligence has noted a shift in the focus of recruitment towards the youngest, most vulnerable demographic group, which is forcing Russia to step up its preventative efforts in schools and online. For the Polish security services, the pattern of techniques is of paramount importance, as a power bank used as an explosive device and Telegram as a recruitment channel are methods which, if the direction of operation were reversed, could just as easily be used by the Russian services against targets within NATO.
Belarus/Latvia – border crisis with Latvia, closure and reopening of the Grigorovschina–Paternieki crossing
On 31 July, the Latvian Ministry of the Interior, under the leadership of Minister Janis Dombrava, closed Paternieki, the only active border crossing with Belarus, citing a technical fault. On 3 August, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement by spokesperson Ruslan Varonkov, described this as an unfriendly move and threatened a response, including asymmetric measures, pointing out explicitly that the decision to hastily close the crossing de facto had been taken personally by Dombrava, the leader of a political party, ahead of the Latvian parliamentary elections scheduled for 3 October. On 4 August, following a cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, the crossing was reopened at 9.00 pm. On 9 August, Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov added that Riga was seeking to extract money from the European Union, comparing the situation to earlier actions by Poland and Lithuania.
Minsk consistently applies the same interpretative framework to each successive Baltic state, reducing every border decision by a neighbour to an internal electoral calculation, never to a genuine concern for security. This is a convenient narrative, as it allows Minsk to simultaneously dismiss the legitimacy of Riga’s decisions and construct a domestic narrative portraying Belarus as the party aggrieved by cynical Baltic politics. The threat of an asymmetrical response – vague and never clarified in official statements – serves as a tool for maintaining uncertainty on the Latvian side without incurring the cost of concrete retaliatory action. The fact that the border crossing was reopened after just a few days suggests that Riga itself assessed the economic cost of the closure as too high for its own hauliers, which Minsk immediately interpreted as confirmation of its argument that the move was merely for show. This pattern has practical significance, as any future decision by Poland or Lithuania to tighten border controls with Belarus will be met with an identical counter-narrative alleging electoral motives, regardless of the actual security justification.
Belarus – training exercise by the 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in intercepting aerial targets
On 6 August, the missile forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces conducted training in the interception of aerial targets involving one of the sub-units of the 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, as reported by the Belarusian Ministry of Defence. The targets were moving at various altitudes and speeds, and real aircraft were used in the exercise to make the conditions more challenging. The crews confirmed the timely detection of the test targets and their simulated destruction (electronic firing).
The use of actual aircraft, rather than merely simulated computer targets, as test targets in interception training is a method that enhances the realism of the exercise and indicates that the Belarusian air defence forces are seeking to certify their combat readiness under conditions as close as possible to a real-life airspace violation. This seemingly routine exercise takes on significance in the context of the growing number of incidents involving unmanned aerial vehicles over Belarusian territory and neighbouring countries, which have been recorded for months along the border with Ukraine and Poland. The fact that the statement comes directly from the Ministry of Defence, rather than from a lower level of command, suggests that the Belarusian military leadership wishes to highlight the readiness of its air defence as a deterrent, alongside announcements regarding ground troop deployments on the western border, which Security Council Secretary Wolfowicz spoke of earlier this week.
News from the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI):
- We encourage you to read Ignacy Brylewski’s latest analysis entitled “New funding for building fuel resilience on NATO’s eastern flank” (in Polish). The author analyses the plans to expand fuel infrastructure, worth 27 billion euros, agreed upon at the NATO summit in Ankara, highlighting the importance of securing fuel supplies for the effective defence of the eastern flank. The publication also demonstrates how the development of pipelines, storage facilities and distribution hubs can reduce dependence on road, rail and sea transport, and outlines the key challenges associated with implementing the project and its potential significance for Poland.
